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Abstract
Honeypot for Wireless Sensor Networks
Jürgen Markert
PEOPLE have understood that computer systems need safeguarding and requireknowledge of security principles for their protection. While this has led to solutions
for system components such as malware-protection, firewalls and intrusion detection
systems, the ubiquitous usage of tiny microcomputers appeared at the same time. A
new interconnectivity is on the rise in our lives. Things become “smart” and increasingly
build new networks of devices.
In this context the wireless sensor networks here interact with users and also, vice
versa as well; unprivileged users able to interact with the wireless sensor network may
harm the privileged user as a result. The problem that needs to be solved consists of
possible harm that may be caused by an unprivileged user interacting with the wireless
sensor network of a privileged user and may come via an attack vector targeting a vul-
nerability that may take as long as it is needed and the detection of such mal-behaviour
can only be done if a sensing component is implemented as a kind of tool detecting the
status of the attacked wireless sensor network component and monitors this problem
happening as an event that needs to be researched further on. Innovation in attack
detection comprehension is the key aspect of this work, because it was found to be
a set of hitherto not combined aspects, mechanisms, drafts and sketches, lacking a
central combined outcome. Therefore the contribution of this thesis consists in a span
of topics starting with a summary of attacks, possible countermeasures and a sketch
of the outcome to the design and implementation of a viable product, concluding in an
outlook at possible further work.
The chosen path for the work in this research was experimental prototype construction
following an established research method that first highlights the analysis of attack
vectors to the system component and then evaluates the possibilities in order to im-
prove said method. This led to a concept well known in common large-scale computer
science systems, called a honeypot. Its common definitions and setups were analy-
sed and the concept translation to the wireless sensor network domain was evaluated.
Then the prototype was designed and implemented. This was done by following the ap-
proach set by the science of cybersecurity, which states that the results of experiments
and prototypes lead to improving knowledge intentionally for re-use.
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M OST people have heard of the Industrial Revolution. Where initially the powerof humans and animals was supplemented by mechanics, and the steam en-
gine provided necessary power and performance in the second phase of the industrial
revolution, which is accompanied by the use of electricity, there was a specialisation
and miniaturisation of production. Smaller plants had become possible, therefore pul-
leys, belts and bearings for the transfer of power in the production halls were no longer
necessary. The advent of electronic circuits, coupled with the miniaturisation with tran-
sistors and later integrated circuits and then microchips allowed automation and control
of the machines, which is generally referred to as the third industrial revolution.
The 4th stage of the industrial revolution happens right now, where progressive networ-
king of production is taking place. Private citizens furthermore implement networking
of everyday objects in their smart homes.
Furthermore, in this fourth industrial revolution, control and operation by remote access
to industrial plants may be accessible on the Internet. Besides that, the so-called
smart home has become a reality in a growing number of implementations. A central
aspect of this fourth industrial revolution is the networking of systems, which is possible
in wired form, but is also increasingly implemented with wireless technology. Direct
physical access to a network is no longer necessary when using radio technology, only





So, the next industrial revolution will be the “Internet of Things” (IoT) (Dexheimer et al.
2014) with “Machine to Machine” communication (M2M) (Glanz & Jung 2010), “smart
homes”, “smart buildings” or even “smart cities” (Sorensen 2009). The concept is de-
ceptively simple: Everything can be connected to anything else. Anything can provide
services and be monitored and controlled. This evolution is already laid out and well
on its way. IPv6 and other technical prerequisites are already available to cope with
the challenge of having more and more systems to be accessed, internationally and
worldwide.
Yet, these networks do not necessarily have to be wire-bound. A lot of networking
technologies have their focus on wireless communication channels. For example, many
companies have worked together in the development of Bluetooth as a wireless stan-
dard (IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2005).
ZigBee was likewise introduced and developed to be an ideal de facto standard for wi-
reless sensor and control networks. It has been established over the course of the last
ten years to address the expected need for measurement and control solutions using
wireless communications in the low and medium range of thirty metres and beyond.
ZigBee is an additional feature set to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and defines additi-
onal layers on top of it (IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2006)
for wireless sensor networks (WSN). ZigBee offers manufacturers all over the world
a reliable standard for the upcoming need for team play functionality. About a dozen
manufacturing companies worked together on the ZigBee drafts in order to establish
a common operational platform for future technologies using low power communicati-
ons in star and mesh networks (ZigBee Alliance 2008). The current number of ZigBee
standard contributing companies is given as 118 according to the 2017 ZigBee report
(ZigBee Resource Guide 2017).
In 2006 the first ZigBee certified products were brought to market (ZigBee Alliance
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2006). Such products have been present in home automation, in home entertainment
and in buildings for monitoring purposes. These wireless nodes are all intended to
communicate among each other directly or relayed over peered communication (Zig-
Bee Alliance 2008).
Such products are for example:
• Control4 is a company selling ZigBee products for home entertainment and home
control. The press release from Control4 in August 2009 stated that they have
already sold 1 million ZigBee products worldwide (Control4 2009).
• The Eaton Corporation sells a product called Home Heartbeat. Customers con-
trol and monitor their home electronic equipment on the road by mobile smartp-
hone (Eaton Corporation 2007). With ValveSense they provide a solution for
power metering via ZigBee (Eaton Corporation 2012).
• Salus Controls manufactures radiator thermostats that are controlled remotely.
Their products are certified by ZigBee (Salus Controls 2009).
• Siemens APOGEE Building Automation is a range of products for application in
office buildings. Their products can also be monitored and controlled remotely
via ZigBee (Siemens Industry Inc. 2007).
• Philips offers medical device manufacturers a solution for their patient monitoring
systems. They developed the ZigBee Health Care standard. Manufacturers can
use the design to develop products using the ZigBee network (Philips Applied
Technologies 2010).
• Newcastle in Australia is the first Australian city getting a Smart Grid using ZigBee
products. Electric Power consuming machines will be controlled via ZigBee to
achieve steady power plant utilization (Smart Grid Australia 2011).
New ways of interaction become available through WSN, offering great advantages and
a lot of potential to save energy and make life much more comfortable, but also requires
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that underlying structures be robust, reliable, safe, and secure. The key aspects of
network technologies are commonly the same; application developers are expected
to protect communications in order to attain the information security core principles:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Elahi & Gschwender 2009). These principles
were already mentioned by (Clark & Wilson 1987) for computer security in defence.
1.2 Motivation
New communication technologies offer new opportunities for developers. Yet, they also
pose new risks through potential attacks by an intruder. The purpose of this work is to
present the current state of work in the area concerning the security of wireless sensor
networks, furthermore, the improvements, resulting in and from the PhD research, will
be illustrated.
This thesis examines safeguarding wireless sensor networks, showing possible solu-
tions. It also covers a comprehensive overview of the threats, vulnerabilities, attacks
and countermeasures. Furthermore, it surveys the applicability of techniques found in
other wirebound and wireless domains to the domain of wireless sensor networks. Fi-
nally, it gives an introduction to the legal aspects of security solution research. The
objectives are to find the need, to present the current state of the art in wireless sensor
network security implementations and to present as a novel approach a honeypot for
wireless sensor networks as a very systematic and scientific method. The contribution
is twofold, as on the one side the thesis gives a broad overview on the wireless sensor
network security aspects, as shown by the research community, and on the other side
it presents possible novel improvements by introducing a honeypot for wireless sensor
networks. The course of research showed that components in the wireless sensor net-
works should exist to monitor for attacks, while one attempt is known as an intrusion
detection system, a honeypot system was found to be a feasible and suitable solution
for wireless sensor networks.
Wireless sensor networks are a new communication technology and offer opportunities
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not only for developers, but also emerge as a possible risk containing flaws for an
attacker to focus on. The major findings from research on recent literature on the
subject pertain to the improvement of the security features of these networks, based
upon formal specification, simulation and tests.
Another tendency seen, pursues the development of methods to detect intrusions or in-
trusion attempts conducted by an attacker against the wireless sensor network. Thus,
a further aspect of this work is the analysis of specific attacks and interceptions on wire-
less sensor networks with the intention of designing corresponding countermeasures.
There is a trend in this field to develop methods for tracking intrusions and unauthorised
access by an attacker, and for detecting attempted attacks against the stability of wi-
reless sensor networks with intrusion detection systems. Very little research has been
done so far in the development of so-called honeypots which offer analysis opportuni-
ties on specific attacks and interceptions of wireless sensor networks. These systems
represent the current state of the art in the field of research on detecting attacks on
wireless sensor networks.
The introduction of new technologies into daily life takes place progressively, however,
this should not be done without a safety-critical review. The assumption that every
technology is potentially vulnerable to flaws automatically applies to WSNs as well.
They must be considered to be failure-prone. The task and the challenge in risk ma-
nagement in this case is to determine to what extent damage can happen in case of
failure, and to project what could unintentionally happen if this technology gets used
by a third party. This means exploring the possible failure modes and propagation of
appropriate mitigation. It is important to ask what will happen and what results it might
have, if this technique fails or for any reason does not behave as you would expect
from it.
Such considerations are traditionally carried out in a risk analysis; for a smart home it
would be considered, what would happen if a shutter or window, a garage or a door
would be remotely configured different than normal. The users want reliability, they
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must be able to rely on these sensors and actuators. To think of a situation in which a
machine can severely get in conflict with the health of users is not too difficult. So it is a
very important topic, which affects people in their private life, likely everyone who wants
to use new gadgets from current technology in their own home; and also companies
that use the technology already in their production.
At the concluding lines of the motivation an outlook to the state of the art attacks that
are possible is shown here as such:
An attack to the light control protocol in wireless sensor networks has been shown to
be used, and an example attack was executed via a flying drone containing a trans-
mitter with a self executing attack example (Morgner et al. 2017). The authors used
responsible disclosure to contact the companies and fixed firmware was released in
due course. However, this is only solved when the components attacked are updated.
A further example as motivation is a self-propagating worm, replicating itself from one
smart device to another (Ronen et al. 2018). The attack was not carried out comple-
tely by the researchers and was done only in a laboratory environment, where it was
ensured that no outside components would be affected and spread this malware. But
as a conclusion, such attack vectors do demonstrably exist, and also the danger of
not-yet-installed, though available, patches is quite real.
The authors state in this example (Cesare 2014), that the smart home opens new at-
tack vectors for burglars with technology hacking tools. They can subvert a burglar
alarm system into not detecting anything and therefore not recording any information
of the attack. According to the research above this is like operating in a stealth mode.
The doors are openable and access is granted but not a single log that the door was
opened is written. So for a summary, the burglar gets in, no alarm, no recording, no log-
ging, just people to find out of the stolen goods by missing something when returning
home. Where forensic experts at common homes could find evidence on the surveil-
lance system and the lock cylinder, the situation at a smart home could get severe in
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this case for the victim, they simply cannot give proof that a burglar has been there,
which will come to be an interesting topic for victims and insurance companies alike.
1.3 Problem Definition
A technology is not a problem by itself, it is rendered to be a problem by improper use
and faulty implementation. This is the same within WSN technology, the implementa-
tion and its use may differ from the intentions. Improper use of a WSN can result in
various problems, although the WSN was set up to assist and help people. This also
means that a modification of the technology by third parties is a problem, as this can
affect the proper function. WSN are not designed to detect improper use, or learn to
do it. Rather it is assumed, that once put into long term use a technology works as
intended.
But in fact, experience shows, over and over again, with each new technology, that
there are people who see it as a sporting challenge, as it were, to take over technology
for their own purposes and profit. Furthermore, there are also criminals who want to
use the function of the new technology for their own benefit and interests, if only to be
enriched financially, for example, by theft.
The authors Islam et al. (2012) presented a paper for the discussion of wireless sensor
networks in smart homes. They also focused on security aspects and reviewed possi-
ble attacks to the WSN in smart homes. They state, that “Although the existing security
paradigms as outlined by the standards (for example, 802.15.4 and ZigBee) seem to
be sufficient to counter against major attacks, they leave the design and implementa-
tion details to the users.” and further they state, that “traditional complex cryptographic
algorithms (e.g., public key cryptography) that seem effective to handle most security
issues may not be suitable for sensors because of their lesser power and processing
capabilities.”
Although WSNs and ZigBee received little attention as to their security in the past
years; they were always highly present as a revolution in everyone’s lives. Meanwhile
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such applications and devices are available in many areas of life and therefore it has
become part of many communications devices as shown in section 1.1. This means
for now, among other things, that sometimes this standard is distributed throughout a
whole city, as for instance all electricity meters are exchanged with smart meters and
can be controlled via ZigBee.
1.4 Research Aims & Objectives
The intention and aim of the research is the generation of knowledge of security in the
domain of wireless sensor networks, which is planned to be achieved by showing a
relationship between wireless sensor networks and well-known WiFi networks in the
sense of existing and theoretical attacks and countermeasures.
In the beginning of this work these pointsare there in the researchers statements.
• Review and summary of the usual strategies for detecting attacks on wireless
sensor networks and presenting existing solutions, as well as highlighting promi-
sing strategies. This will be done in a way to construct a connection and compa-
rison to the WiFi networks security. The outcome is an overview in the form of a
table showing the relevant data.
• Perform literature review to understand trade-offs in wireless sensor networks
security. Therefore, similarities and differences between wireless network types
are to be collected for classification.
• For honeypots’ common definitions and setups, perform an analysis and concept
translation to the wireless sensor network domain evaluation, then design and
implement a prototype. This includes the process to produce a roadmap, starting
with the research methodology, the translation between domains, the develop-
ment of strong connections between the idea of knowledge generation and the
synthesis of a result.
• Prototype development to detect the proposed attacks as a model of complete-
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ness by using determined scenarios. For this objective, the attacks are performed
against a test-bed setup and the security mechanisms are evaluated by their per-
formance in collecting and discerning between normal network traffic and security
relevant events.
These are the main objectives that are going to be answered in this work. Outcomes
on these points are going to be discussed in the following chapters and concluded in
chapter 7. The outcome of the research is a contribution to the security knowledge
for the domain of wireless sensor networks, namely in theoretical and also applied
science; the solution is meant to be a proof that the way taken is the correct one, and
the result is also showing a correlation between the research domains.
1.5 Thesis Outline
Within chapter two the topic is about security and reliability in new technologies, focus-
sing upon the use of wireless sensor networks in these new technologies and popular
use of such devices, and then showing in the view of the computer scientist the need
to protect such devices from misuse. Further into this chapter, the mechanisms cur-
rently used on WSN nodes to ensure security objectives are explained, and important
facts shown about the shortcoming of the approaches taken. At the end of that chapter
results from an investigation into users’ statements about the security of their wire-
less sensor network installation are discussed; this is done to understand the average
users’ assumptions of the security measures and their use of WSN devices with focus
on their need of WSN monitoring mechanism.
Chapter three then is undertaking a review of security in general and especially with
regard to its necessity in WSNs. After this discussion of security basics, single aspects
and also the big picture, a look to the importance of threats that exist and that directly
can happen to WSNs. The chapter then continues with attack detections in WSN;
which leads to the objective of having continuous monitoring. The use of honeypots is




Also in chapter three, an exploration of the the usefulness of honeypots and monitoring
analysis on a WSN node is undertaken. These research sections are on the identifi-
cation of legitimate installation usage, with the goal to secure the user through looking
at how users normally interact with their WSN, use the feature set of their system and
control their environment. Therefore a particular network packet characteristic for ca-
tegorisation needs to be present to determine malicious users based upon the network
packets received and monitored.
In chapter four, a discussion is performed to achieve a deeper understanding whether
the monitoring of potential malicious users and the type of networking packets they
send in a WSN is sufficient to generate a reliable metric, purpose of the metric is to
measure the performance and coefficient of attack identification.
With the previously achieved results, chapter five illustrates the monitoring methods
and procedures. The combination of more than one technique allows for an enhanced
detection of the presence of a malicious user; shortcomings of a single technique are
compensated by a combination of several ones. This combination enables a pervasive
kind of monitoring of malicious users during certain network interactions such as a net-
work joining request, but not others. In the occurrence of diverse attacks happening,
technique combination also provides a wide set of knowledge on the attacker’s beha-
viour and skills. This combination of a set of techniques is described in a prototype
design as flexible as possible to cover most of the hardware and network setups fre-
quently used. The chapter ends with a conclusion about the framework necessary to
perform as described.
Chapter five also develops a deeper insight into the design of the monitoring system.
Previously discussed results from chapters 2 and later are included. The subsequent
goal is to create a monitoring system that is capable to combine the results from single
nodes. Therefore the WSN honeypot system combines the gathered data using a state
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of the art procedures within a data analysis system to achieve its results. The develop-
ment of honeypot analysis and a monitoring system is the core of the demonstration.
In this chapter the creation of the prototype is explained in all its four parts.
The following chapter six contains the evaluation of the WSN honeypot system pro-
totype, especially with regard to the detection of attacks. Exploring the system’s per-
formance and whether it is possible to figure out a comparison and an improvement to
other solutions exists as the logical consequence of the usage.
And at the end, chapter seven consists of the conclusion. It is discussed whether
the research goal has been reached, what has been achieved, which open research
questions arise, what new research questions were found and consequently, possible
future projects are detailed.




THE related work is split into sections. Of course there is a literature review ne-cessary, but outcome of other researchers is not only in papers, it is also in
presentations at conferences and prototypical implementation of tools and frameworks
for numerous purposes. Therefore the related work is regarded in addition to a com-
mon literature review to show the state of applied research as well. This chapter will
begin with a literature review to lay the foundation on which this work is based; first of
all the terminology of the wireless sensor networks is clarified before it is time to des-
cribe the attacks on wireless sensor networks in the published works of the research
community. Similarly, a look at categorisation of attacks is being taken; these catego-
ries will play a central role in the further course of this work. Since this work is not just
about theory but also about practical application, the remainder of this chapter is about
specific tools, solutions, frameworks and the like that have to be dealt with in this work.
2.1 Literature Review
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) uses radio frequency (RF) communication at a
relatively short range of lower than 100m. The parts of a WSN are often referred to as
nodes, those devices are commonly battery or harvested energy powered with ultra-
low power standby of mostly less than 100 µA on average. An overview on common
powering practices for WSNs can be found in the work by Roundy et al. (2004). They
use small packets of less than hundred bytes at a low data rate, often of less than
hundred bits per second. When WSN are implemented, the trade-off’s between the
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cost of the nodes, the security, radio range, compatibility and flexibility have to be taken
into account. In this work the focus is on WSN using IEEE standard 802.15.4, which
is a simple packet data protocol for lightweight wireless networks, the network channel
access is via Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) and
optional time slotting (Farahani 2008).
2.1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks - Terms and Definitions
IEEE 802.15.4 defines physical radio and a MAC1 layer, providing a simple packet
data protocol for lightweight wireless networks. ZigBee adds layers for logical network,
security and application software. ZigBee determines the API, and the ZigBee Alli-
ance certifies ZigBee-compatible devices guaranteeing their interoperability (Elahi &
Gschwender 2009).
WSN can make use of 16 channels in the 2.4GHz ISM (for industrial, scientific and me-
dical purpose) band, 10 channels in the 915MHz ISM band, 1 channel in the European
868MHz band at data rates of 250 kbps, 20 kbps and 40kpbs.
According to IEEE 802.15.4 there are two different device types, called FFD (full function




• PAN coordinator (the principal controller of a personal area network)
An RFD can only serve as:
• Device




Some benefits of ZigBee are the reliability, network self healing options, support of
a large number of nodes (more than sixty-five thousand). Although security features
were added to ZigBee a long battery life is targeted. The global alliance is the basis for
global usage, deployment without trouble and supports low cost maintenance and low
cost hardware.
These are the ZigBee device types:
2.1.2 Coordinator
The coordinator is a FFD, each network has exactly one (Faludi 2010). It manages the
whole network, as such it selects the channel to use for the communication and esta-
blishes the network communication. It assigns addresses to the end-devices and to the
routing devices. It grants devices access to the network and acknowledges them the
request of leaving a network. Finally, it is most often the sink of a packet transmission,
meaning, that it receives the messages and makes the data usable via a gateway.
Address allocation – Tree: Coordinator has information about all routers and end devi-
ces, assigns addresses to routers, routers assign addresses to end devices.
Mesh: Coordinator has information about all routers, assigns addresses to routers, but
routers assign random addresses to their children.
2.1.3 Router
The router is a FFD, too (Eady 2007). A Router does in principle the same as a coor-
dinator, except: establishing the network. It is used in networks of mesh and tree
structures. Its optional use case is the extension of the networks’ width. Environmental
measurements and control functions can be done as well at a router device.
2.1.4 End-device
An end device can be an RFD (Gislason 2008). This concludes, that it is allowed to
sleep for energy saving purposes. An RFD uses limited 802.15.4 MAC layer set, needs
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less power. As the name suggests it is not involved in routing messages. It can be
connected to router or coordinator. End device addressing: When a node wants to join
a network, the coordinator assigns an ID. The ID has 16bit length. Each device has
additionally an IEEE 64bit address, this address is unique. Though devices in different
ZigBee Networks might have the same 16bit address. The shorter 16bit address is
used for energy saving purposes.
2.1.5 Gateway
The gateway is defined as follows (Farahani 2008). It connects ZigBee network to
other networks using a different standard, e.g. LAN. The gateway is part of protocol
transcoding. Information from wireless networks are in this case translated from Zig-
Bee packets to the IP packet format by the gateway, and on their answer received the
other way around.
2.1.6 ZigBee Trust Centre
The trust centre is a single node in the ZigBee network defined by the coordinator
(Farahani 2008). It manages the link key and the network key for usage in the ZigBee
network. The link key’s purpose is a secure communication between two nodes of the
network, the network key’s purpose it the secure communication in the whole network.
When devices want to make use of a link key, it can be pre-installed on the device by
the manufacturer, another way is using the key-transport method with the trust centre,
a third way is a key-establishment process that makes use of a master-key.
2.1.7 ZigBee Protocol Architecture
The ZigBee packet architecture is build of PHY packet, MAC frame, NWK frame and
APS frame nested in each other as following.
At the physical layer the modulation/demodulation of signals 802.15.4 is taking place.
Besides the radio communication synchronisation components on the channel and fre-
quency at the PHY layer the PHY packet consists next to the synchronisation header
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(SHR) of the PHY header (PHR) and the actual PHY payload. At the PHY payload of
the PHY frame the following is nested.
The MAC layer (Medium Access Control) is the second part of the IEEE802.15.4 de-
fined data structure, consisting of a MAC header (MHR) a MAC payload and a MAC
footer (MFR) with a checksum called Frame Check Sequence (FCS). In the MAC pay-
load the followind resides:
The Network layer (NWK) is built of a header (NHR) and the NWK payload. The pay-
load nests the application support sublayer (APS).
The Application Support Sublayer (APS) sits between network and application, defines
set of details to control the function of network, passes information from network to
application.
The ZigBee device object (ZDO) is handling device management, its tasks are: it
initialises APS, network layer, security service provider, it determines type of device,
device and service discovery, as well as network and binding management.
ZigBee and ZigBee PRO since October 2007:
• Final release of ZigBee (few improvements and fixes)
• Additionally ZigBee PRO was published, it has
– Only mesh networking,
– Self-forming,
– Self-healing,
– End devices make first decision which route to take in mesh networks,
– Interference are detected, transmission problems are reported,
– Group-addressing (multicast),
– Asymmetric link possible (A→D via B and C, D→A via E).
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Possible topologies differ in WSN and ZigBee networks. Where the WSN definition as
in IEEE 802.15.4:2003 spoke of star, peer-to-peer and cluster tree topologies, ZigBee
only allowed to support star, tree, and the mesh topology (ZigBee Alliance 2012).
Network sizes differ, the transceivers are equipped with various antenna, transmission
power and antenna amplification, depending on the ground, walls, obstacles. Gene-
rally, for the best connections good line of sight is needed due to the high frequency
used in radio communication, where a Fresnel-zone free of obstacles is vital for con-
nectivity (Krauße & Konrad 2014).
2.2 Attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks
When the topic comes to smart home security, critical voices show up and warn to
use wireless technologies. Even more, in an ACM journal (Denning et al. 2013) this
approach is pursued, and also in this case spoken of new challenges. This raises the
issue of whether the smart home will remain just a pipe dream when threats are not
reconsidered, and if this requires to support new technologies. Is the smart home at
risk?
The ACM report mentioned (Denning et al. 2013) even states that all these new devices
entering consumer homes give reason to think about these new technologies: how to
define the smart home by its security requirements and evaluate its installations to
discuss improvements. The report introduces a framework by which the current threat
can be ascertained, together with the impact on residents.
The concerns around privacy and security are increasingly present, the more network
connectivity smart devices have and the more data they possibly collect and publish,
by intention or even unintentionally, a study on consumers behaviour shows (Emami-
Naeini et al. 2019).
More on smart home security research is presented in a comprehensive security ana-
lysis of (Fernandes et al. 2016). They present components of smart homes to be used
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as possibly surveillance systems used by burglars to find out whether the owners are at
home. Other use is presented for a device called Wink Relay of which the microphone
can be turned active whenever this is wanted. They further on continue to analyse a set
of several hundred smartphone apps that make use of the Samsung SmartThings fra-
mework which is used to read and control smart home components easily. During the
course of this research they found more than the half of them requesting more access
rights to the smart home devices than needed, which leverage the attack possibilities
to steal codes and disable security features or control features such as generating an
alarm event or others.
The insecurity of smart home devices not only poses a threat to the owners, it addi-
tionally enables malicious users to elevate attack strengths, as described in a paper
by Benson & Chandrasekaran (2017). They show an overview and a categorisation
of security flaws and weaknesses and their possible outcome in different categories,
providing a guideline and discussion on the challenges of security.
Researchers have shown, that so called “google-hacking” nowadays happens for the
smart home gateways as they are equipped with standard user-name and password
combinations and are reachable via the Internet, therefore they presented issues with
smart home gateway implementation (Eilers 2014).
A group of researchers presented a honeypot that presents itself and emulates a WSN
at the wire-bound LAN part connected to the Internet (Dowling et al. 2017).
The next pages will give an overview on the threats resulting from attack possibilities
to WSNs. This overview consists of possible attack scenarios produced by the fact
that wireless transmissions take place on a shared medium, making the listening and
eavesdropping to a channel simple, also leading to the possibility of not only reading
information of the sensors and actuator, but also possibly reading the data from a key
exchange if this is done in plaintext. Moreover, destabilising attacks on the transmis-
sion medium will be regarded, starting by simply sending something on the frequency,
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Figure 2.1: Passive eavesdropping
but also what is possible by sending real data packets, that are not originating in the
established wireless sensor network. Even more, crafted data packets are discussed,
that are designed to interfere with the established network communication with different
intent, one of them is to cause a re-send of packets to let a result appear again, other
packet transmissions are presented that cause changing the structure of the network
and establishing active malicious components in the network. The by far most elabo-
rated attacks are these that eventually change the software on the wireless sensor
network nodes, doing code or firmware modifications.
2.2.1 Eavesdropping
Whenever a wireless communication is established, there is a way to eavesdrop and
listen to the transmitted content (Cunha 2007). Cole et al. (2005) distinguish between
passive and active eavesdropping. The first is according to their definition the ’Unaut-
horized, covert monitoring of transmission’ (see Figure 2.1). Active eavesdropping is
described more like poking into the transmissions until valuable information can be gat-
hered by ’Probing, scanning, or tampering with a transmission channel to access the
transmitted information’.
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Figure 2.2: Over-the-air programming
2.2.2 Obtaining Keys
The initial assignment and distribution of encryption keys in a wireless sensor network
is very peculiar. The keys in ZigBee networks, for instance, can be assigned before
placing the nodes. The key can be read in plaintext when the nodes are captured
and wires can be attached for instance to the Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) lines,
this was shown to be effective by Goodspeed (2009). The keys can also be modified
over the air (so called “Over-the-air programming” OTAP, see Figure 2.2) (Das 2009).
Actual research states that it is possible to eavesdrop the key distribution in plain text,
depending on the chosen implementation. Valuable information about the reliability of
OTAP can be taken from Aschenbruck et al. (2011). They state, that they refused from
using OTAP due to its failure prone implementation and the needed resources.
Some possible research for obtaining network encryption keys has already been done.
These attack scenarios focus on the challenge of extracting the encryption keys from
the hardware by using off-the-shelf hardware or homebrewn hard- and software (De-
Petrillo 2009).
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Figure 2.3: Jamming
2.2.3 Jamming
For every wireless communication, there is a way to interfere with the communication
by concurrently sending data on the same medium (DePetrillo 2009). This transmission
does not have to have information in it at all (see Figure 2.3). A variation is called the
Garbage-Attack and it sends packets that may contain valid data (Raj & Thilagavathy
2012).
2.2.4 Redirecting Communication
It is possible to redirect streams of data in a local area network (LAN) in order to
eavesdrop as an attacker, these techniques can also be used to launch a man-in-the-
middle attack2 with the intent of changing the transmitted data. One of the possibilities
is the redirecting a data stream in a wireless sensor network over a node operated by a
malicious intruder. A variation is selective forwarding (see Figure 2.4), or the sinkhole
attack. In selective forwarding the attacker claims to be the best route and then drops
most of the packets that ought to be redirected via the attackers node. The sinkhole
2MitM: a form of active eavesdropping, where the attacker routes the information between the commu-
nicating network nodes
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Figure 2.4: Selective forwarding
(see Figure 2.5) is the attack where the throughput gets even worse until none of the
packets is routed any more.
2.2.5 Network Key Distribution
A man-in-the-middle attack is a supplemental method to that of eavesdropping on the
channel for obtaining a network key. The intended purpose of this approach is the
acquisition or modification of a key. Further attacks will become possible with the
possession of such a key. This offers new ways of effectively exploiting the network.
Furthermore the modification of a valid network key of one node would probably lead
to the loss of this node for the operator, rendering it unusable (Wright 2009).
2.2.6 Packet Injection
Generating packets with the purpose to send them to a WSN has different goals. Such
packets could be either meaningful, or just nonsense. Stages in between can be used
to test WSN behaviour.
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Figure 2.5: Sinkhole attack
2.2.6.1 Garbage-Attack
A variation of the packet injection attack is the so called “Garbage-Attack”, where
instead of replaying a valid trafffic from a network as in the replay attack a network
is flooded with garbage data, which could be randomly originating from a packet gene-
rator. A flood of packets leads to a denial of service of devices if they cannot handle the
amount of data they receive. This concept was further on considered to be worth doing
research on by Goodspeed et al. (2012) where the KillerBee framework was refined to
do practical packet injection using their dot15d4 layer extension for scapy.
2.2.6.2 Replay Attacks
It was partly researched how wireless sensor networks react to replay attacks (Wright
2009) and (Wright & Cache 2015). This is an attack on a data transmission with the
goal to circumvent security mechanisms or in the case of wireless networks it can also
be performed with the goal to extensively drain battery power. In such a scenario, an
outside party re-sends captured packets which have been previously transmitted in a
network.
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Figure 2.6: Replay attack
2.2.6.3 Code Injection
The most interesting generated type of packet is the one carrying exploit-code and
and additional payload. Such attacks were shown to be successful by (Goodspeed
2007b) and (Goodspeed 2007a). Such exploitability leads to the theory and prototypes
of WSN worms as shown by (Gu & Noorani 2008) and (Yang et al. 2008).
There are studies on resistance to viruses and worms (Skrzewski 2012), which show
clearly that attacks by a worm will stop almost never. Even 10 years after a new worm
attack, it is still the case that if you have an unpatched personal computer with an
outdated operating system like Microsoft Windows 98, Windows 2000 or Windows XP
connected to the Internet without a firewall for a very short time, then this computer
will be infected. In principle, all the infected computers eventually would be updated,
or go off the grid, at least that is the theory. In reality, these devices are presented and
vulnerable for a very long time on the Internet, then infected with a worm with the first
waves and have not been updated since (Skrzewski 2012).
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2.2.7 Attack Categorisation
Attacks can be divided into categories. Such categories were previously presented in
various papers and their categorisation can be done in different manners. A common
approach is to separate them by security goals as CIA, namely Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability in targeting attacks. One can also sort by the defence mechanisms or
even the network layer they target. It is necessary to go more into detail as follows.
2.2.7.1 Categories Confidentiality Integrity and Availability
As seen in this chapter there are possible attacks on WSNs. It is also possible to put
them in categories. Common attacks on wireless sensor networks (WSN) as described
in current publications and literature are part of a range of working and well-known
attacks on these networks: Eavesdropping, replay attack, sinkhole attack, selective
forwarding, network flooding, firmware modification and code injection (see section
2.2.3 to 2.2.6.3). They can be sorted by the kind of information security principles they
compromise, this will be shown in detail in the section regarding cloning 3.3.1.3.
Unencrypted wireless networks can be attacked with the intent of compromising their
confidentiality by sniffing 2.2.1 and man-in-the-middle attacks 2.2.4.
The integrity in wireless sensor networks is targeted for example by: man-in-the-middle
attacks and replay attacks, but the network nodes could also be compromised by a
firmware modification/replacement (see section 2.2.6.3).
Availability is a problem in unencrypted wireless networks through replay attacks as
presented in 2.2.6.2, jamming 2.2.3 and flooding, denial of service attacks 2.2.6.1 and
selective forwarding 2.2.4. Modifications to the network nodes and their firmware can
also interfere with their availability.
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Figure 2.7: Power drain through replay attack
2.2.7.2 Component Based Categorisation
These attacks can be subdivided into three categories of components which they tar-
get:
1. resource drain attacks
2. network attacks
3. hardware-specific attacks
The first category shall be termed “resource drain attacks”. These attacks target the
power of network devices as shown in Figure 2.7 (replay attack). In a battery-driven
system, the main goal of an attacker is to exploit the system’s power consumption
against the system itself. An attacker might render wireless sensor network unusable
by making parts of it run out of battery power through the modification of networking
schematics, with the propagation of new routes, and by incessantly sending and reque-
sting data. Batteries are a limited resource, once used up they need to be replaced.
Nevertheless, commensurable the network capacity is likewise limited. An increasing
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Figure 2.8: Network redirection for man-in-the-middle scenario
network load also cripples the already limited throughput of the network as seen in
section 3.1.
The second category is called “network attacks”, describing the attacker’s goal of mo-
difying the network’s routing structure. By this, the attacker aims to gain valuable in-
formation through redirection. He becomes therefore a “man-in-the-middle” listening to
any traffic as seen in 2.2.1. An example is shown in Figure 2.8.
The third category is called “hardware-specific attacks”, standing for the goal to bring
networking nodes under complete control of the attacker (e.g. firmware modification
as shown in Figure 2.2 or code injection, see Figure 2.9). This could be achieved with
physical attacks like attaching wires in order to extract encryption keys from a network
node. Attacks on hardware can also be an attack on firmware, resulting in firmware
modification. This is possible through security flaws in software components of the
nodes.
All of the three attack types mentioned above exist, numerous attacks already were
shown on the exhaustive usage of “resources” (see section 2.2.7.2), others on the
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Figure 2.9: Code injection attack
attacks to the “networking” (see section 2.2.7.2) and to the nodes “hardware” (see
section 2.9). This development should make abundantly clear, that the security threats
for WSN are real and serious, which is conclusive proof that solutions to detect attacks
are of crucial necessity.
An operators goal in normal network operation is to run everything as secure as nee-
ded and keep the bad guys outside. In a honeypot the network operator wants the
opposite. In practise a honeypot is usually a specially prepared and deliberately inse-
cure configured system with one or more security vulnerabilities. These monitoring,
attack and defence mechanisms were proven and shown to work in classical network
architecture, meaning wire-bound local area networks, WAN or MAN with a hierarchical
network structure in tree or clustered form and shape.
The main difference between the traditional approach to honeypots and the proposed
solution for a WSN honeypot has to be discussed. This will be explained in the following
section 4.3 in a very detailed description and design of the features for the honeypot in
wireless sensor networks. As mentioned above, the goal of a honeypot is traditionally
to lure attackers in to get into contact with the system. In wire-based networks first
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there is a host discovery done by an attacker, a scan through a network segment to
find reachable hosts, then by service discovery the ones with services, these are inte-
resting hosts. When a host with services is found, an attacker typically tries to find out
whether there are logins with weak user-name and password combinations, or services
that are not up-to-date with existing security patches and therefore have an exposed
vulnerability which can be exploited to gain access to this host. In this “traditional”
approach a honeypot is a service that is designed to be vulnerable, for instance with
guessing the user/password combination as i.e. root/root or admin/admin.
If the attacker noticed this after having tried the plentiful attacks from his stockpile,
then everything is fine. The honeypot has done its work, by having neatly recorded
everything and the corresponding samples of possible new exploits are kept safe.
It could even be that an IDS / IPS provides a heuristic to detect an attack on its own,
but in the case of wireless sensor network devices with very low capacity this has to be
re-evaluated. It follows, that, as written in chapter 2.2.7.2, it is simply not possible to
run a lot of additional code to perform calculations or to store very many rules and as-
sign patterns to them. In an example of a WSN implementation, for instance the “Atmel
BitCloud” on “Atmel ZigBit” nodes, of 128KB of memory, less than 10KB (Atmel Corpo-
ration 2012) are available. In the area of WSN, devices are not resource hungry, WSN
are designed to use a very low amount of resources. This results in the conclusion that
an increase of the device resource specifications is gratuitous or impossible.
2.3 Related Tools for Wireless Sensor Networks Security Research
In the WSN security research area are numerous tools developed for monitoring and
programming, others also focus on attacks and WSN penetration. To conclude this
chapter an overview is presented on categories of tools, also to show the attacking
tools, giving an overview and point out the most important ones used. This tool clas-
sification is meant as an overview and introduction classifying the tools on the type of
WSN layers they work with:
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In the first point hardware, a set of hardware tools that were built by researchers is
presented.
The tools section is the largest one, although only the most important and available
ones are presented. Only these tools are shown that are relevant and available.
2.3.1 Hardware Category
The latest research in literature showed again that there are only a few players in
ZigBee security research from the academic point of view. Following are a set of some
of the DIY Hardware development for security research, existed and results can be
found.
2.3.1.1 GoodFET
In the hardware-development for WSN there is Travis Goodspeed with the GoodFET
framework. Travis Goodspeed is a security researcher doing research in the field of
WSN, but also in other hardware centric hacking tools. He presented GoodFET as
an open-source JTAG adapter which is a variation of the original TI MSP430 FET UIF
(Texas Instruments Mixed Signal Processor 430 Flash Emulation Tool with USB In-
terface) as well as the EZ430U boards, as described in the documentation on the
Website (Goodspeed 2009). There, he discussed the Flash Emulation Tool built of
an MSP430F1612. It is widely available and is in its current version v4.2 capable of
supporting even more devices than the initial design for just TI processors. The de-
velopment of this tool initially led to the development of tools for this MSP type of
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microcontroller, a first set of attacks and security testing results. More on these results
is presented in the software section, a few pages later. It can be said, that the de-
velopment of this tool was necessary for the whole wireless sensor network security
research community, as it was delivering results that were till then estimated, but not
proven.
2.3.1.2 Api-Mote
Ryan Speers created the Api-Mote, which is a newer and better version of the TelosB
Mote3. TelosB is a wireless sensor network node that was designed and manufactured
by Crossbow, the design is currently belonging by Memsic. The original TelosB consists
of a MSP430 microcontroller and a CC2420 transceiver component. The Api-Mote is
designed to be a research device, that is more capable of reading and sending crafted
messages. It is by design a research tool, not to be meant to be put into production.
The development was done with core criteria in mind such as freedom in choosing in-
terfaces, external antenna, changeable power sources and more, as these were details
that were not found on the earlier TelosB. The importance of the development of this
hardware is obvious, as lots of research results were generated through the use of this
device.
2.3.1.3 Freakduino
There is an Arduino project, that developers new hardware on the basis of Arduino, a
free and open source platform so that every researcher interested in this topic can work
with it. It consists of the hardware and this is enhanced with additional boards that can
be used to enhance the platform (Freakduino 2011). As the name already suggests,
the Freakduino is based on the Open Source Arduino platform, done by a group of re-
searchers hosting the Freaklabs website. Besides the hardware development, they are
also involved in software development as Open Source. As they host a webshop, the
results of their work can be purchased. Although being an open platform, the hardware
3http://goodfet.sourceforge.net/hardware/apimote/
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is rarely seen security research, therefore it was apparently not hotly favoured.
2.3.2 Software Tools
Regarding other Researchers and references, this section contains an overview on
available tools for WSN security research. It is divided in the following structure:
• Monitoring and network traffic sniffing and network load display
• Programming tools
• Attack toolsets
Tools exist for WSN, in using, programming, analysing and for research. Regarding
these tools, between good, of the one part, and bad, on the other part, it is not easy to
differentiate. They are needed for security research and development, but could also
be used as tools to attack a WSN; there is even a “proof-of-concept” worm that exploits
network node communications and propagates itself over the network (Goodspeed
2007b), also in smart meters (Davis 2009).
It should be noted that there are several new attacks and ideas by developers regar-
ding security flaws in the WSN field. The KillerBee API (Wright 2009) is a simple but
powerful tool, and it is easy to build add-ons on top of it. The KillerBee API and the
tools for it provide a basis for further development. Results may be given back to the
community.
And new results in the area of WSN hacking were presented. Improvements to the
KillerBee API with extensions to enable “war driving” scenarios on wireless sensor
networks were developed (Goodspeed et al. 2012). They extended existing tools until
all 16 ZigBee channels could be monitored in parallel. The authors then combined
this with a GPS signal logger for “war driving” around the campus of Dartmouth. They
also wrote semi-automatic tools to attack the networks with a number of different attack
types.
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15dot4 is a tool to listen to ZigBee and 802.15.4 communication (O’Flynn 2012), it
provides an input device for the well known network monitoring tool Wireshark (Combs
2012) to monitor and capture the network traffic in realtime. Both tools feature usage
with state of the art development kits, for example the AVR Raven (AVR 2008) and they
might be ported to other platforms as well.
Free projects like the Freakduino (Freakduino 2011) make it easy to build WSN com-
ponents based on the cheap Arduino development kits. These kits have powerful tools
available to work with, bringing WSN technology to everybody interested in working
with it and doing research on the technology.
The authors Parbat et al. (2010) presented an overview on data visualisation tools for
WSNs. These tools are also used for monitoring the WSN and fit to the first category.
The authors Dwivedi & Vyas (2011) additionally also presented a very comprehensive
survey on tools for WSN experimental research in 2011. They present 63 simula-
tors/simulation frameworks, 14 emulators, 19 data visualisation tools, 46 testbeds, 26
debugging tools/services/concepts, 10 code-updating/reprogramming tools and 8 net-
work monitors (Dwivedi & Vyas 2011).
2.3.2.1 Monitoring Tools
The tools for monitoring the WSNs have different purposes. Some of them are used
purely to gather data, others have displaying functionality, and there are tools building
a bridge between already existing network analysers and the WSN domain. So, they
all appear to have some of these functionality:
• Monitoring the network and its structure,
• monitoring the data gathered,
• a combination of these both categories
• displaying raw data material.
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• showing graphs of the data material
• showing graphs of signal strength
• showing WSN channel frequency occupation and usage in packets or data per
second.
A sniffer is a piece of software to obtain the information sent wireless in data packets.
This information is then further on processed and can be analysed. The basic functi-
onality can be seen in the packet dump and storage of data to logging. The sniffers
are equipped with other features occasionally, including filtering, display, and further
analysis tools.
The Freakduino sniffer makes use of the tool Wireshark for packet analysis.4
Wireshark Zigbee Utility is a tool developed by Jakob Thomasen, currently in Alpha
version 0.45 The Wireshark ZigBee Utility is enabling easy capture of Zigbee network
frames. Then, the monitoring within Wireshark is made possible. It implements a
named pipe between Wireshark and the hardware, in the current development stage it
is a USB dongle running on a Freescale MC1322x. The author states, that support for
other devices can be added easily (Thomsen 2010).
Kisbee is more than a sniffer, it is a complete toolset consisting of:
• A hardware platform
• sniffing firmware for this platform
• bluetooth or serial interface to android device
• android app for analysis of sniffed data, monitoring, storing, putting GPS coordi-
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The hardware is available for purchase from Mike Kershaw, the author of the Wireless
tool Kismet6. The application is downloadable in the app store.
15dot47 is a tool by Collin O’Flynn, working as a 802.15.4 sniffer and capturing frame-
work. This is a group of useful tools for working with 802.15.4 networks. It currently
includes a sniffer which interfaces with Wireshark in Windows/Linux. It allows to cap-
ture 802.15.4, ZigBee, and 6LoWPAN. Additionally graph is showing the signal strength
on the different ZigBee channels.
In 2013 the Atmel AVR Company released a documentation for developers with the
intent to have a reliable sniffing tool for their hardware. The documentation is available
for download at their website: “Atmel AT02597: ZigBee PRO Packet Analysis with Snif-
fer”. It suggests hardware and software components; as hardware the AVR Raven USB
stick or the RZ600-231 as well as deRFusb23E06 can be used to sniff at 2.4GHz, the
deRFusb13E06 can be used to sniff for the 900MHz ZigBee. As software component
three products were evaluated: Wireshark, Perytons and BitCatcher.
Luxoft BitCatcher is a tool for wireless analysis in ZigBee networks8. It can make use
of AVR Raven stick and others for data packet input.
Wireshark was mentioned beforehand9. It is a packet monitor and analysis software.
It receives the data from packet capturing sources, be they wireless or wire-bound. It
is an open-source software that displays all the packets it receives and shows their
network layers. For debugging networks it is one of the standard tools.
Perytons is more than a packet displaying tool, it contains features to display and debug
complete networks. It is designed to be specialised in the wireless networks10.
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one channel for ZigBee communication it might be useful to sniff on more than a single
one. One possibility is to use channel hopping and when a channel is busy to sniff
on it. This is only useful if only a single communication is taking place at one time. If
more than one ZigBee communication takes place and they are on different channels,
the channel hopping is not sufficient. Instead sniffing on more than one channel is
the better approach, it is also called multi-channel Sniffing. The following tools are
available for sniffing on all of the channels simultaneously:
1. Peryton Company since 2008
2. Travis Goodspeed in 2010
3. EECS Berkeley, Thomas Watteyne and Boyang Zhang 2012
4. Dartmouth University, Ryan Speers, Sergej Bratus et al. 2012
The research project was started with the aim to build a 16 channel sniffer for 802.15.4
networks that could also be used for other protocols than ZigBee namely IEEE802.15.4e,
WirelessHart and ISA100a. These were mentioned before (see section 3.1)11.
The researchers from Dartmouth also have established a setup to sniff on all 16 chan-
nels at once, without doing a channel hopping. It is part of the Api-do toolset and more
details on it is found in the attack tools section 2.3.2.3.
2.3.2.2 Programming Tools
This involves programming languages and integrated development environmental. They
are available for free with no cost but there are also some of the open source tools avai-
lable.
AVaRICE is a tool by Scott Finneran for debugging, it offers the possibility to use the
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AVRDUDE is a tool by Brian Dean to download and upload to the Atmel AVR micro-
controllers using the ISP way of programming these chips.
WinAVR is a software bundle consisting of the GCC compiler for the Atmel AVR micro-
controllers and other tools together for development13.
2.3.2.3 Penetration Tools
In this category all the hacking and network penetration tools can be found.
One of the first steps in penetration testing is information gathering and fingerprinting.
As seen in research work, fingerprinting as well as quasi “stealth” communication can
be achieved. Jenkins, Shapiro, Bratus, Speers & Goodspeed (2014) conducted rese-
arch on 802.15.4 receivers and tested the comparability of their networking. Although
he first assumed an outcome of minor differences he presented the results very proud
to be able to not only find out, that fingerprinting is possible, also he discovered the
possibility to do data transmissions that could only be read by a set of WSN chip-sets,
for other WSN chip-sets the transmission was not read.
Killerbee is one of the first freely available toolsets to conduct research with. Other
tools can be divided into the following categories. For example, there are tools simply
being single scripts, that automatically does a single task. But there are also tool-set
consisting of a set of tools.
It was further on refined and more tools were built on top or around Killerbee, namely
the Api-do tools (2.3.2.3)
Another attack tool set was developed calles Sensys (Giannetsos et al. 2010) and
Spy-sense (Giannetsos & Dimitriou 2013).
Joshua Wright was writing an attack tool for ZigBee and presented his work in 200914.
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on (Cache et al. 2010).
One of the other research projects with available code for attacks or defences in WSN
/ 802.15.4 /ZigBee is Api-do. Ryan Speers and Travis Goodspeed, Sergey Bratus,
Ricky Melgares, Sean W. Smith and other researchers were working on this attack
framework15 of tools.
OpenEar is a tool that captures data on one or many up to 16 channels in parallel,
waiting for current coordinates provided by a GPS device to combine them in the logfile.
Another part of the toolset is the zbWarDrive that assists in the ZigBee wardriving
purpose of the attack tool by selecting the best channels to do packet capturing.
The SenSys tool consists of a sniffing component and also has a component for vi-
sualisation of the network topology, traffic, status of the network nodes and gives an
overview whether an attack was successful; it has attack tools that can compromise the
network. Sensys was the first tool that was developed by the authors of (Giannetsos
et al. 2010).
Spy-Sense is a tool that is also called spyware16. It is a tool as a prove of concept
showing that it is possible to have code running stealthy in the background, that was
originally placed there by code injection (Giannetsos & Dimitriou 2013).
2.3.3 Conclusion of the Related Research Tools
The development of a honeypot for wireless sensor networks required data to work on.
It was hence necessary to evaluate all available tools before deciding on a toolset to
use during the development of a defensive tool.
The argument in favour of using these tools is obvious: KillerBee is used to attack a
network. The gathered data is then used to gain knowledge on the detection.
The KillerBee API soon turned out to be the first choice to achieve knowledge about
15https://code.google.com/p/zigbee-security/
16malicious code that collects data from the target system and provides it to the attacker
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attacks on a WSN in practice and in theory. It is the perfect toolset for information gat-
hering in the form of packet captures of attacks on a WSN. The setup for the capturing
is presented in chapter 5.
2.4 Conclusion of the Literature Review
The previous sections featured the WSN basics, the standards as well as possible
attacks on WSN.
All the previously shown information, considered as a whole, shows that a lot of rese-
arch has already been done in the field of attacking wireless sensor networks. Encryp-
ting the communication and hardening a system to resist an attack will not stop the
attack itself from taking place. It is difficult, if not impossible to prevent a novel attack
methods against a network, by just hardening.
The tools section presented in this chapter consisted of the structure shown initially
in section 2.3. A focus was set on the non commercially available hardware and soft-
ware to show the research undertaken by research groups and not by vendors. The
hardware presented is as follows:
Hardware Tools Type Sourcemodel Available
GoodFET Programmer and debugger Opensource yes
Api-mote WSN platform Opensource request
Freakduino WSN platform Opensource yes
Table 2.1: Hardware for wireless sensor networks
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The software tools presented are summarised as:
SW-tool type Release Version Maintained License
Freakduino sniffer 2016 - - BSD
WiresharkZigBee sniffer 2011 0.10a no free
Kisbee sniffer 2019 R1 yes GPL
15dot4 sniffer 2010 0.5 yes BSD
Luxoft Bitcatcher sniffer 2013 1.0.1 no Proprietary
Perytons sniffer 2017 - no Proprietary
AVaRICE programming 2012 2.13 - GNU
AVRDUDE programming 2016 6.3 yes GNU
WinAVR programming 2014 - yes open source
Killerbee pentesting 2019 - yes open source
Api-do pentesting 2011 - - BSD
Sensys pentesting 2010 - no -
Spy-sense pentesting 2013 - no -
Table 2.2: Software for wireless sensor networks
A ’-’ in the description means, that no information is given, the release date refers to
the latest available version online. All of the different types of tools are present: tools
to program wireless sensor node devices, tools to analyse the network by sniffing the
traffic for analysis, and also tools to find out weaknesses of the wireless sensor net-
work setup. While the commercial tools by Perytons and Luxoft became unmaintained
by the end of the thesis in 2018, the open-source and community-driven projects are
alive and maintained.
The chapter started with a literature review to create the foundation on which this work
is based; first of all the terminology of the wireless sensor networks was clarified before
it was time to describe the attacks on wireless sensor networks in the published works
of the research community. The immensely important look at the categorisation of the
attacks on wireless sensor networks has been made, because these categories will
continue to play a central role in the course of this thesis as announced. Since this
work is not just about theory but also about practical application, the remainder of this
chapter was about specific tools, solutions, frameworks and the like that have been
dealt with in this work.
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Summing up what has been seen in the last chapters, a lot of research and develop-
ment has been done on honeypots in wired networks, and security research in WSN
is ongoing as researchers see further need in exploring practical and usable intrusion
detection for WSN. The further reading is exactly about that, the practical security ap-
proaches, the detection and defence approaches.
The related work in the next chapter is a literature review on the security mechanisms
and defence possibilities as well as their resource usage and conceptual limitations.
This chapter continues the fundamental review of literature and comparable works. A
topical separation was nevertheless sensible, because the following should also col-
late the known and partly standardised safety measures in wireless sensor networks,
the reliability and the defence measures, up to a knowledge of missing components.
Furthermore, a discussion of the honeypot topic is presented, as well as maintenance
measures and resource applications, which the presented defence strategy in general
demands. With a look at the legal framework, the chapter will be rounded off and a
conclusion will be presented.
53
Chapter 3
Related Security Mechanisms and their Li-
mitation
REFFERING to the introduction 1.1 WSNs needs protection of the network commu-nication. The WSN do not have security features, but the ZigBee specification
on top defines these for confidentiality, integrity and partially also availability. As a cryp-
tographic standard implementation the ZigBee Alliance mandates the use of encryption
with AES with 128-bit keys and counter mode (CTR) for messages. The message inte-
grity code (MIC) shall be generated by AES with 128-bit key and cipher block chaining
(CBC) (Elahi & Gschwender 2009).
Beside the security in WSN, other wireless networks were viewed by Neil Peterson
and Jeff Potter (2011), who wrote a summary about the security in WirelessHART and
Wi-Fi networks. They say, that in the usage of wireless technologies, it is crucial to
have security features enabled and implemented. Their three key areas for security in-
clude access control, network protection and device integrity. Therefore, they give the
conclusion, that clients should have authentication to the wireless network, the trans-
missions to be encrypted and the devices protected. When there is a gateway, a proper
configured firewall is necessary.
As could already be observed in the design and implementation of the common wire-
less networks IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n, there is a need for providing security and reliability,
preventing data loss. The following paper contains design principles for implementing
a secure WSN. It also gives best practice for operating the network. Target readers
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are especially in industry as if focusses on WSN in productive environments such as
manufacturers or in process automation. The recommendation is basically to activate
all security mechanisms that are given by the WSN and to refrain from unencrypted
communication or key exchange procedures. The authentication and preservation of
data integrity is a requirement in wireless data communication (Masica 2007).
Several threats arise whenever such a network is established. Developers are asked to
protect communication in order to attain the classic information security requirements:
confidentiality, integrity and availability (Elahi & Gschwender 2009).
3.1 Standards for Wireless Sensor Networks
ZigBee is a well-known example of a wireless sensor network feature set among ot-
hers like Z-Link, SmartLink or Z-Wave. ZigBee PRO 2007 defines mechanisms for
authentication, encryption and trust centre functions on selected main components of
the wireless networks (ZigBee Alliance 2008).
Network communication, be it wired or wireless, always bears security flaws, which
must be dealt with. The network traffic can be listened to, also interruption of the
networking is possible, be it fully or partially by different types of interference. When
transmissions are forwarded and not just point to point, routing takes place. Routes
can be changed and therefore communication be redirected, also information can be
intercepted and changed during the routing and forwarding (Cole et al. 2005). In wire-
less communication this gets even easier, because the information is sent also into the
surrounding environment providing access to all parties within signal range.
The analysis of the security and reliability of ZigBee networks has shown that these
aspects have not yet been resolved satisfactorily, depending on the chosen implemen-
tation. But not all of the above requirements are present in the various configurations.
The background to this is as easy as might be: the intended purposes of wireless
sensor networks vary widely. One of them is low power consumption, running in-
dependently for the longest possible time, another one is for these devices to be as
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interoperable, compatible and easy to use as possible (Faludi 2010).
The IEC standard 100.11a (ISA 2011) describes another wireless standard based on
802.15.4, comparable to ZigBee, WIA-PA (Wireless Networks for Industrial Automation
- Process Automation is an IEC international standard) or WirelessHART (A wireless
version of the Highway Addressable Remote Transducer protocol).
The authors Song et al. (2008) have a look at the WirelessHART standard. They des-
cribe it as the premier industrial wireless sensor network standard. They provide solu-
tions for several challenges to a WirelessHART network and present their first protocol
stack. Their main challenges were security as well as time and mesh-network mana-
gement. For security they propose to always use hardware accelerated encryption and
decryption routines. For the timing they decided to use an extra timer module because
the microcontroller itself provided no satisfactory results and implemented a scheduler
with priority for time critical execution and the possibility to assign to other tasks less
priority. The challenge for network management was the implementation, the standard
sets the goal, the concrete algorithms had to be found and implemented.
3.2 Defences to Attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks
The previous section listed known possible attacks on wireless sensor networks and
classified them into three categories. This section gives an overview of the considera-
tion of appropriate countermeasures to the presented attack scenarios.
3.2.1 Standardised Improvement with Encryption
IEEE 802.15.4 contains nothing about security at all, but additional standardised lay-
ers like ZigBee enhance the standard with essential features (ZigBee Alliance 2008).
Several concerns about security were targeted by the final release of ZigBee PRO in
2007 (ZigBee Alliance 2008). Improvements were made regarding encryption and au-
thentication and were added to the standard to address threats (Yüksel et al. 2008).
The authors’ opinion on the key issue of WSN is about the cryptographic key update.
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Devices obtained by an attacker still have the key material. Changing the keys every
time a node gets unresponsive and the key could have been compromised is a re-
source drain. Therefore if has to be chosen to have either secure or long-living WSNs.
However, key management is suggested to be hierarchical or distributed.
The ZigBee standard defines three key types: master key, network key and link key.
The master key is optional and may be used for link key generation set by the device
manufacturer, it might also get installed by a trust centre. The network key is a key
shared among all devices in a network, therefore it has to be installed by a device
manufacturer, it might also get installed by a trust centre. The link keys’ use is two-fold,
for application usage the key is individually generated and installed to the devices that
establish a network, for communication with the trust centre this key is a trust centre
link key (Elahi & Gschwender 2009). The standard requires: “A default global trust
center link key must be supported by the device if no other link key is specified by the
application at the time of joining. This default link key shall have a value of 5A 69 67
42 65 65 41 6C 6C 69 61 6E 63 65 30 39 (ZigBeeAlliance09)” (ZigBee Alliance 2012).
The current ZigBee PRO 2007 standard requires that AES 128 bit encryption (NIST
2001) is provided with any new hardware in order to comply with the ZigBee specifica-
tion. The strength of the implementations of vendors may differ, especially regarding
the protection of shared secrets. AES-128 is discussed in the security community,
which considers it to be strong cryptography1, but the security implementation in har-
dware may still contain flaws (Böck et al. 2016). The authors were able to identify an
implementation flaw, based on using a weak initialisation vector and furthermore found
a set of load balancers from a manufacturer, which was relying on another vendor for
these routines. Simply spoken, all the devices used the same nonce2. Therefore the
key material was weak and could be broken. For these devices a patch was released.3
1https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
57pt1r4.pdf
2Arbitrary number to be used just once
3Security Advisory Explicit Initialization Vector for AES-GCM Cipher https://support.radware.
com/app/answers/answer_view/a_id/18456
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In a survey by Chen et al. (2009) about a hundred references to security related re-
search is presented. The survey starts at threats and vulnerabilities. It continues by
grouping defences in order to discuss promising solutions and weak ones. For the lat-
ter, open research questions are posed. One of the authors’ statements is considered
helpful in the formulation of the research questions; they propose more research in
the area of detection mechanisms, together with research in the area of corresponding
countermeasures with the detection of an attack (Chen et al. 2009). For improvement
of cryptography they suggest to perform research on the use of public key cryptography,
although it is considered resource costly. They propose doing research on optimisation
of efficiency. But also in symmetric cryptography they see work to be done on key ma-
nagement procedures. Especially for mobile nodes they suggest to focus on further
research. Attack detection is seen as a further research topic and also attack preven-
tion. As a suggestion of a further research topic they see a focus on finding out nodes
that have a high probability of being attacked and have intrusion detection mechanisms
safeguard those more than others to reduce the overall workload of the intrusion de-
tection system in the wireless sensor network. Also secure routing algorithms research
is suggested, with a focus on protecting the routing information in such a way that the
routing information is not distributed more than necessary as well as broadcast en-
cryption. Also about secure routing, the suggestion tends to research on mobile WSN.
Another proposed further research topic is seen in the physical security of the main
controller of the WSN.
3.2.2 Intrusion Detection System
The authors Wei & Kim (2012) propose an IDS (intrusion detection system) scheme
in a WIA-PA network, which is sensing changes in information transmission. WIA-
PA networks use a superframe, which is a kind of scheduling system that determines
transmission slots. This timings follow a pattern that can be used to generate a pre-
diction model on when the transmissions will be done. The prediction model can then
decide whether the transmissions seen are normal network traffic, and the model can
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then also identify attack traffic, which is not following the model. The authors found this
to be effective whilst also being resource friendly.
The most important fact apart from the improvement of security features is the de-
tection of attacks to the wireless sensor network. Intrusion detection systems (IDS)
are well known in wired networks. IDS analyse network traffic by scanning patterns for
anomalies. Due to the two-fold use of the term IDS, this necessitates a concise defini-
tion: An intrusion detection system (IDS) is, within the scope of information technology,
an application with the purpose of monitoring network traffic for malicious activity. The
application of policies leads to the reporting of detected violations to the operator of
the system. The paper gives an outlook on intrusion detection systems in WSN, which
the authors state, can be used to help identify attacks on the network. They suggest
that the coordinator of the network should analyse the network traffic and detect the
intrusion. This could be a very spontaneous raise in the network usage, or a marked
increase of network load over time, or even a flooding with packets to many different
network coordinators. They suggest that the analysis should take place on less mobile
nodes, that have higher computational possibilities and power supply. Additionally, a
kind of heartbeat message is proposed, to make the nodes periodically transmit their
liveliness. The authors close the paper with the comment that even if the attack is
continuing, the network is at least aware of the attack happening. (Misic et al. 2005).
Surveillance of an area with the aid of wireless sensors, for example for troop mo-
vement observation or for perimeter breach detection is also sometimes called an
intrusion detection system (Klues et al. 2005), (Wang et al. 2008). In this given ex-
ample, the first paper uses the term to describe a network intrusion, the second paper
discusses the detection of an intruder in a battlefield by the sensing components of
a WSN. They define an intrusion detection system as a component to detect attac-
kers that behave different in a battlefield by analysing their movement anomaly. Two
different models are possible, the homogeneous and the heterogeneous detection in
WSN. Therefore, the quality of detection is depending on the distribution density of
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the sensing nodes as well as their sensor accuracy. The authors state, that there is a
difference between a just well-aimed sensor and collaborative sensors to detect an in-
truder. In their work they use network simulation to determine the detection probability,
and end with a discussion on the connection strength. They conclude with the result,
that both network models are possible to make a thorough detection.
Intrusion attempts are reported in classical network security solutions by IDS. They use
only passive inspection to monitor all network activities for violation of regular use, and
have no other function in the network. The exceptions from regular use are put into de-
tection rules, also called signatures. Whenever such a signature is found in the traffic,
then an alert to the administrator can be generated. The IDS rely on predefined policies
describing normal network activity and normal behaviour (Meier 2007). The signature
use is known to be less error-prone, meaning that a low number of false reports are
generated; these are called false positives. A disadvantage is seen in the overlooking
of an intrusion, because a pattern does not match enough. This circumstance is called
a false negative. In contrast to the use of well defined patterns to search for to come to
the alerting, there exists another method, called heuristic or anomaly based detection.
The use of heuristics is possible to detect unknown attacks, in general an IDS is known
to log false positives. However, the use of heuristics may find more new and unknown
intrusions, so has a less false-negative rate, but is known to have a high false-positive
number, in comparison to the signature based attempt.
An IDS is generally a single system in the network, this is also called NIDS (network-
based IDS), but it might also be distributed on several hosts of the network like it is
done in an HIDS (host-based IDS). An IDS as an active part of the network that might
also stop intrusion or filter or modify malicious traffic and is in this case most often
called an intrusion prevention system (IPS) (Cole et al. 2005).
In an IPS, the controlling aspect of Figure 3.1 is much more elaborate than in an IDS.
The IPS is seen as an addition to an IDS, meaning that the detection of an intrusion is
resulting in activating additional safeguarding methods, of which filtering can be a part
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Figure 3.1: Intrusion detection system (IDS) working scheme
of, by simply putting a new rule up such that every similar traffic is not to traverse the
network any more. All of these setups provide logging and reporting.
In an IDS, every data packet has to be regarded and analysed. Its purpose is to spot
the packets of an attack within a large amount of regular and normal network traffic
(Meier 2007).
The following gives an overview on the detections, that are possible by pattern analysis,
some of the attacks are already detectable by pattern analysis:
Kaplantzis et al. (2007) did a network simulation and had success in detecting selective
forwarding attacks in wireless sensor networks by support vector machines (SVM).4
They also concluded that these attacks are the most difficult to accurately detect, thus
verifying assumptions made in previous research. In the paper the authors use a sin-
4A support vector machine is a mathematical model to classify and distinguish between patterns, it
belongs to machine based learning.
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gle detecting node to be able to detect selective forwarding and black hole attacks.
The IDS is built with the constraint to have a low impact on the long lasting live of the
network nodes, therefore not draining too much energy when running. The single de-
tection means, that all the detection is running solely on the coordinator of the network.
The emphasis on two attack patterns is because they consider these to be the most
important issues to solve. The results are promising, especially the black hole attack
could be always detected, not a single alarm was missed. However, the sink-hole attack
was found to be very subtle and the accuracy was deteriorating, the less interaction the
attacking node had. However, when the attacker was not wise enough to be sneaky,
then the attacks were found with high detection ratio. Therefore the authors conclude,
that the sink-hole attack is indeed hard to detect, as it was described already before by
(Karlof & Wagner 2003)The absolute numbers and measurements are found in tables
at the paper and are not copied here.
Sedjelmaci & Feham (2011) presented a novel IDS for the use in clustered wireless
sensor networks. Using SVM like Kaplantzis et al. (2007) the essential point is to teach
the detector nodes about normal network behaviour, such that they achieve a detection
ratio of over 98% regarding unusual network traffic. The paper proposes an intrusion
detection system in a dual-split attempt, meaning that the anomaly based detection as
well as a signature based detection are executed. This combination was researched,
having combined the befits of both attempts, the signature based detection and the
anomaly based detection. The results were shown to provide a good detection with low
false-positive alerts. Also they conclude the paper, that the calculation costs at a WSN
are not that resource draining and refer to a paper by Stetsko et al. (2010). There,
they calculated the ratio of a single bit transmission over the air to an equivalent of one
thousand microprocessor cycles. The energy saving component of this approach is the
component most worth mentioning.
A lot of research on this topic has been done before, starting from the detection of
intrusion on the lowest, at the physical layer (Bhuse & Gupta 2006). Bhuse and Gupta
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propose a detection based on anomalies in signal strength. The research was con-
ducted using already available data sources and aiming at an easy solution. It was
showing results to the different layers of a wireless sensor network, namely at the
PHY, MAC RTG and APP layer (physical, message-authentication-code, routing and
application layer) of a WSN; on PHY layer they made use of the RSSI value (received
signal strength indicator), on the MAC they used scheduling mechanism for detection.
On the RTG layer a technique called forwarding tables were measured. On the APP
layer safeguarding mechanisms were introduced by the researchers. The researchers
are concluding the paper with the statement, that for the PHY layer the detection with
RSSI has a high false-positive ratio. The MAC detection has a little overhead in the
workload of the nodes, because they have to keep track of the TDMA (time division
multiple access) for their neighbours, however, the detection ratio is good and the over-
head was discussed to be fair. For the other proposed technique at the MAC layer the
S-MAC is seen, it means, that the use of fixed time slots is negotiated, intruders are
not aware of the details and their transmissions at other timeslots than the ones nego-
tiated are easily spotted. At the RTG layer they present the details of their proposed
algorithm called IASN (information authentication for sensor networks). The approach
is to authenticate the information sent, but not the sender. The neighbouring nodes
keep track of the information routed, and can therefore find out whether it is changed.
At the APP layer a set of possibilities are presented, but the results are not promising
as they suffer from problems in overlooking as well as a large number of false positives.
Additionally, using resource saving sleep mode of nodes is not possible, as they have
to be listening the whole time. The authors conclude at the end of the paper, that their
approach to use a set of several lightweight detection mechanisms is promising, as the
results show, except at PHY layer, a low false-positive ratio and due to the low resource
usage they are low on energy consumption.
Iwendi & Allen (2011) wrote a comprehensive paper on attacks on wireless sensor
networks and demonstrated a way to simulate attacks with the intention of developing
appropriate countermeasures. It contains a summary of attack schemes at the WSN
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network layers and connects them to appropriate defence mechanisms in a table. In
their conclusion they propose the development of a security protocol for a defensible
WSN. The authors see especially challenges due to the limited communication range,
calculation cycles of the microcontrollers, signal noise on the frequency and hardware
attacks. The issues that are arising with regard to CIA (confidentiality, integrity and
availability) are limiting the widespread of WSN in the authors’ point of view.
The detection of unusual traffic has been extensively researched for wireless LANs.
The use of wavelets for fingerprinting normal behaviour compared to unusual traffic
has been discussed by Hamdi et al. (2008). The authors propose a multilayer frame-
work for intrusion detection, this novel multilayer statistical approach is introduced as
a set of detecting system components and uses a heterogeneous setup. The authors
build this setup at multiple network layers and choose different pre-processing methods
to gather the data. The pre-processing features are all based on statistics. The results
from simulation determine the performance as good in total and propose for further im-
provement research on the use of additional detector systems to improve the efficiency
when the region size to be monitored is growing.
Another proposed method employs a separate IDS which is not part of the network
at all. This IDS will only detect a smaller amount of different attacks to the network
in this scenario (Bhuse & Gupta 2006). Other research using IDS nodes as part of
the network has proven to achieve a higher detection ratio (Hai et al. 2010). The pa-
per proposes a lightweight intrusion detection framework where an IDS component is
within every node. Also the authors show algorithms to be used for the detection. In
this attempt the nodes all have intrusion detection capabilities and work together for de-
tection, however, the determining whether an attack has happened is done at a central
system. If a threshold of alerts is received at this central component, then the node is
seen as not trustworthy and is excluded from the routing tables at the WSN. To achieve
results network simulation was conducted. During simulation the algorithms resulted in
lower energy consumption than other researchers have found. The effectiveness was
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shown to be high, in low and high density network structure where collision occur more
often. The low energy need was reached by reducing the transmission of alert packets.
This means, that if an IDS alert is generated, but has not been sent because of the
channel being busy and the same node reads messages, that other components are
reporting the same alert, then the alert is not sent. They conclude with their opinion
that further research is needed on the performance details.
3.2.3 Research Gap at Attack Detection for Wireless Sensor Network
In the paper of Ghosal & Halder (2013) interesting results and conclusions are presen-
ted.They propose further research to be done in the areas of:
• cooperative intrusion detection,
• intrusion detection for advanced metering infrastructure,
• hierarchical intrusion detection for wireless industrial sensor networks,
• energy efficient learning solution for intrusion detection, and
• intrusion detection systems in mobile WSNs.
Intrusion detection for WSN could also be achieved by a honeypot for WSN, which
would be a solution for the above-stated tasks.
There is currently no known sophisticated implementation of an IDS available for a
WSN. The known wireless networks do not have much in common with WSNs, they
have to be distinguished according to (Mitchell & Chen 2014). This difference in struc-
ture and accompanying problems to other networks is also found in other articles of
research publication such as (Kim et al. 2013). Wireless sensor networks do not have
the structure and the associated problems of traditional wired networks (Zhang et al.
2003). They are sometimes in tree structures, but also can be done in other and dif-
ferent networking structures, where some of the nodes cannot see each other directly
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although being on the same network, in structures like mesh or ring they use forwar-
ding to extend the ranges. In the industry this is seen as a challenge because the
differences between wireless networks and wired networks are described as funda-
mental due to resource limitation and unattended deployed large scale communication
devices (Wei & Kim 2012). An attack on the network is however theoretically possible
according to current knowledge, resulting in long-term loss of information. It will re-
main unknown whether or what information has been compromised in the time before
the discovery of an attack (Lee et al. 2008). The authors describe an attack that makes
use of a malicious node that behaves like being more than just one node with the aim to
change routing or interfere with the exchanged information. This is called Sybil-attack.
This type of attack can be detected in WSNs using a challenge-response approach.
The authors found acceptable detection rate of the approach and suggest to use it in
WSN and ZigBee networks. The method mitigates the Sybil-attack. Also the resource
usage is highlighted by the authors as being reasonable fair.
There is a definite need for security in WSN communications, and possible impro-
vements should include IDS. The emerging outline can be briefly described as a sen-
sor working on different network layers. Its purpose is to detect anomalies in the net
and to report these attacks. This is supposed to provide a new technical instrument for
reacting to this new attack scheme. This feature-set forms the common core of a ho-
neypot to support an intrusion detection and prevention system, for example prompting
the generation of new signatures.
3.3 Introduction of the Honeypot Concept
A honeypot can be described with a single phrase: It is a trap. It is in general an active
system in a network, monitoring every connection to this part of the network. The
results are written to log files and reported accordingly (see Figure 3.2). The honeypot
looks like a normal node of the network to every communication passing by. To an
attacker, however, it shall appear as a valuable target (Gupta et al. 2012). A collection
of nodes acting as a honeypot is also called Honeynet. The authors show possibilities
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Figure 3.2: Honeypot working scheme
to secure a wireless mesh network with different honeypot approaches. They close with
the summary of the proposed work.
The advantages of a honeypot might be summarised as follows: instead of inspecting
and analysing every packet of the network like an IDS, and then deciding whether this
has been an attack or not, a honeypot simply regards every connection as a likely
attack (Cole et al. 2005). This behaviour saves a lot of resources because not every
packet needs to be processed, inspected and filtered for attacks. Even in the context of
WSN and therefore battery driven networks, the honeypot system could make do with
very limited resources.
Research in the field of wireless LAN has emphasised the need of a honeypot techni-
que. The introduction of wireless networking was accompanied by security problems.
Wireless as a shared medium is prone to interception by common network sniffing
tools that are already available. They were existing for wired environments and enhan-
cing them to use wireless devices was obvious. The sniffing of wireless network traffic
remains unknown to a targeted organisation, as there is no physical connection ne-
cessary at all. An attacker simply needs to be within the vicinity of the network. The
author states, that deception is essential in wired networks, when attackers want to be
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understood. Her paper focusses on the use of deception in a wireless environment.
The common wireless attacks are analysed to find out whether a honeypot technique
can help such as honeypots do in wired networks. This concludes the first paper in the
row of three with the conclusion, that the wireless honeypot needs to be implemented
and tested to get the results (Yek 2003). In the next paper the research setup follows a
deception in depth approach. This means, that the honeypot core that is needed to be
productive to keep the honeypot in total running even though attacks occur is seen in
the middle, and other wireless honeypot devices are grouped around it. On the outside
a set of deception wireless devices are placed, they do not have a specific functionality,
are just deception devices. The research was done with network scanning tools to find
out whether the honeypot routines deployed with wireless connectivity. The authors’
conclusion is, that the results achieved were important to know how wireless networks
security can be improved with honeypots. The wireless honeypot provided information
on the deception effectiveness in a wireless setup. The outer ring was found to be
running accurate, the honeypot devices instead were suffering from the load and were
shown to have possible improvement. In total it is considered, that the deception ef-
fectiveness needs further research. Also running the wireless honeypot in a real-live
environment is proposed, also to get results from real-world attackers (Yek 2004). This
was also confirmed at later research results, stating, that the wireless honeypot was
reported other than the wired honeypot at attack tools. This paper further investigates
the inconsistency and tries to find out the root cause to later improve to more reliable
results in comparison of wired and wireless networks. The result was showing the dif-
ficulties of accurate system fingerprinting in wireless networks in comparison to wired
networks. The author concluded, that the use of a shared medium is considered to
be the main issue and suggested to eliminate outside introduced effects by building
a Faraday cage to find out more on this aspect. As a further result the fingerprinting
was more accurate. For further work the invitation of penetration-tester is proposed to
have an expert opinion on the honeypot in total (Yek 2005). The chosen reports on
honeypots for wireless networks describe tools in a draft and prototype status; those
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results shall be the basis for a honeypot for ZigBee networks (Siles 2007). The Ho-
neyspot is a project that is belonging to the Honeynet project, in this case providing a
comprehensive discussion on the parts and features of a wireless honeypot. The Ho-
neyspot is going to be discussed and analysed thoroughly in the next chapter, as the
design suggestions are fruitful. By now, many tools have been created that make pos-
sible to detect an attack for beginners or novices. There are now a number of honeypot
implementations for wireless LAN (Siles 2007). Not all of the Wireless Honeypots work
“out-of-the-box”, meaning, that they do not come such as other tools as an installation
file, a live-CD or a firmware for an access-point. They are even more a set of tools
and configurations, that need to be brought together to have a running example. This
explains the following result: A study by the European Union Agency for Network and
Information Security (ENISA) instead came to the conclusion, that for “wireless ho-
neypots” they “were unable to find any working example” (Grudziecki et al. 2012). The
authors choose the set of honeypots to discuss by the ones they were able to download
and afterwards install them. Discontinued and obsolete wireless honeypots were not
tested.
Prathapani et al. (2009) propose a honeypot system for the wireless mesh network
standard 802.11s, then still in draft status.5 They set up the network simulator ns-2
and showed in their environment a very significant and successful result in network
throughput with a ratio of high detection to low false positives during a blackhole at-
tack6. A transfer of these results to real networks is estimated to be possible and
similar results might be achieved in wireless sensor networks based on IEEE 802.15.4
standard communication, this assumption supports further research on this topic. For
further work they state that honeypot detection is planned to be done on other types of
attacks.
Gupta et al. (2012) propose a honeypot technique for wireless networks. They discuss
5IEEE 802.11s was incorporated into IEEE 802.11 standard in 2012, the new standard is since then
referred to as IEEE 802.11-2012.
6blackhole attack: different name for a packet drop attack; instead of relaying the packets like it was
propagated, the data is discarded
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a group of honeypots, which are then called a honeynet. The authors differentiate be-
tween different types of honeypots such as honeypots for research and honeypots for
production environments. In detail they propose using a concept called honeyPHARM
described by Hassan & Al Ali (2011), their solution has specified for the 802.11s wi-
reless mesh networks. The additional use of wireless technology at the nepenthes
system together with the pharm component to build the so called honeyPHARM is pro-
posed in both these papers. The authors Hassan & Al Ali (2011) propose the use of
the available product called a honeyPHARM, a distributed honeynet for the collection of
malware in networks. Collected data will be used to discover new attack methods. This
will be an addition to the nephentesPHARM system. The authors were looking forward
to combine the PHARM with Dionaea, a honeypot system that was not yet compatible
by the time of writing the papers.
The authors Raj & Thilagavathy (2012) propose a solution to a specific type of net-
work load caused by so called jamming attacks in wireless sensor networks. Due to
the amount of commonly available radio channels in these networks, shifting to anot-
her network channel is suggested each time a jamming attack is detected. The authors
claim that a residual network activity should keep the channel busy for a limited time du-
ring the short interval in which the jamming is not taking place as to make the jamming
attacker believe that the jamming attack is successfully disturbing the WSN communi-
cation. As this could even also attract an attacker and act as a decoy for the attacker,
this behaviour could also be described as deception, or, simply put, a honeypot or
honeynet.The use of honeypot works together in this case with the channel switching
proposal to have a positive effect on the network recovery. The paper discusses finding
an optimal channel switching algorithm to enhance connectivity in the presence of jam-
ming. a monitoring node considers a channel switch and sends a notification message
to the network components, this means that the jammed channel will still be used and
the jamming is likely to continue. However, the real packet transmission is done at the
new channel. The authors see further research at nodes missing the channel switch
command as well as node schedule synchronisation.
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The authors Muraleedharan & Osadciw (2009) propose a framework using a honeypot
technique combined with swarm intelligence for a “battlefield monitoring” application
in a wireless sensor network. They state that traditional security schemes can not
be applied in the field of WSN due to resource constraints. They planned to build a
simulation to prove this proposal, and validate the results. The authors of the paper
propose an efficient way of detecting an intruder using Honeypot as well as swarm
intelligence, hereby the honeypot enables the tracking of intruders. The authors found
this to be an effective way to reduce denial of service attacks. With the knowledge
of existing attacks the further attack patterns can be estimated by the use of pattern
recognition. The sooner an attack is detected the more reliably the network is to be de-
fended. The honeypot network is using game-theory, meaning that there is a value that
is traded, and if the value is good this increases the likelihood of a node being on the
route for a message. Also the trading process makes the honeypot network look like
a usually productive WSN. For future work the authors want to use network simulation
to produce results. As a conclusion the authors state that the honeypot renders the
detection and tracking of intruders ideal with regard to cost, time and availability while
also having a good sensor threshold.
As a first introduction to honeypots, a look at the relevant literature should be underta-
ken here.
The book from Spitzner (2003b) called “Honeypots: Tracking Hackers” can be seen
as one of the primary literature sources on honeypots. He is also the founder of the
Honeypot project (Spitzner 2003a)7. Spitzner defines a couple of very fundamental
statements for the community of honeypot researchers, developers and users. His
honeypot definition is:
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The subject of a honeypot is to lure the hacker in, to let him interact with it and let
the attack happen; enduring as long as it takes while everything is recorded in the
background.
He also mentions one of the first publicly known honeypots from the mid-1980s, where
the IT administrator and author Clifford Stoll from the book “The Cuckoo’s Egg” found
out that an attacker had gotten access to his infrastructure. But instead of wiping the
compromised accounts he decided to investigate the attackers behaviour (Stoll 1989).
He further differentiates between production honeypots in the sense of increasing the
security of a network and to protect an organisation, and a second type of research
honeypots with the purpose of gathering information about vulnerabilities, threats and
attackers with their tools, motives and tactics.
One example of an SSH shell honeypot is called Kippo and was developed by Tam-
minen (2009). In this case, a prepared honeypot seems to be a valuable target to the
attacker, showing a seemingly standard full featured shell, which can be used to con-
figure the system. Changing passwords or downloading packages from other servers
is possible. But in all these cases the installation of the packages will fail, and also the
execution of downloaded scripts is not working properly and presents the usual error
messages. The way that the attacker in the honeypot interacts with it gives a lot of in-
formation for further analysis. There are numerous log files available for Kippo that can
be watched in a playback mode and can be analysed further. Kippo was developed
further on and this lead to a new project called Cowrie, that has the Kippo sources as
a base and builds further features on top of it. One enhancement is the simulation of
insecure telnet protocol available besides ssh (Oosterhof 2018).
The honeypot’s purpose is that it is there to deceive and entrap an attacker and exists
as long as possible to hold and investigate him. With this attraction to a seemingly
easy target, casual attacker may be distracted from the really important systems. It
is not wanted that the attacker remains there for a long period of time, but that he
suspects under no circumstances that he’s fallen into a trap. Although there is also a
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paper by Wagener et al. (2011) that describes the behaviour of attackers when they
recognise a system as a honeypot. Their honeypot is an SSH emulation that after a
while of interaction insults the attacker, some of them leave instantly, some insult back
and some start to do research on the honeypot and its logic, trying to understand it.
The honeypot called Heliza contains a self learning component, which is configured to
keep the attackers as long as possible inside the decoy. To achieve this the commands
that can be executed at a shell are processed such as wget is always possible, so that
in the logs will be presented from which IP data was requested to load onto the system.
Unlike an unpacking algorithm, which will not be executed to do extraction of software
from the archive just downloaded. Machine learning was found to be an effective way
to configure the honeypot by itself to an optimum. The behaviour of Heliza changes
over time and is depending on the history of the commands already executed. The aut-
hors conclude, that Heliza is an ideal source for studies on the attacker itself. Is there
something to learn from the timing of the keystrokes, or from something happening if
Heliza print an insult message in a language that matches the connecting IP range
and so on. The authors also state, that the honeypot Heliza has its limits, it is likely
possible, that experienced hackers find possible ways to still execute commands even
though Heliza should prevent this. Therefore the authors propose on further research
on a test setup where an experienced hacker is trying to circumvent Heliza. In pene-
tration testing terms this would be called a white box testing, where all information is
given to the tester before the penetration test is executed.
In the paper by Qiang & Yuqiang (2013) the use is made clear once again like previ-
ously described. The authors also state that a honeypot is a playground for an attacker
and that the results can then be used to increase the security in networks. The afore-
mentioned final step with the use of samples from the authors looks similar, because
they focus on wire-networks to generate patterns that can be deployed again to an
IDS in the network. This is presented as a cooperative system of honeypots together
with intrusion detection system. The authors call it CSHIDS. It is a chain of three work-
steps, called concealment, data-capture and security, that is beginning at the honeypot
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to collect the attack data, another system uses the information from the logs to gene-
rate patterns out of the labelled attacks and generates attack rules with the intention to
react to a new attack pattern. It was shown that new attack detection is effective in the
experiments using simulation.
In Honeynet Project (2002), the authors state thathoneypots are systems designed
to be compromised by an attacker. Using activity monitoring with a honeypot makes
reasonable sure which way an attacker took to compromise systems. By having a ho-
neypot next to the production systems the intruder will probably leave traces there. The
authors define a set of honeypots in a network as a honeynet and two critical elements:
data control and data capture. Data control is defined by the authors as being stealthy
to the attacker, who should not be able to find out that the traffic is controlled. Data cap-
ture means that the logged traffic is not allowed to be detected or destroyed. Therefore
reasonable storage and access control has to be in place.
This was refined by Spitzner (2003b) where the author states two more requirements
for a honeynet, namely collection and analysis. Collection means, that the gathered
information off honeypots forming a honeynet need to be collected and centralised
to have the highest possible value. This data collection then is used for the fourth
requirement, the data analysis, which is the opportunity to analyse gathered data to
glean information from the honeynet of honeypots.





The design of a honeypot for wireless sensor networks needs to fulfil the needs of
these four aspects.
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Another valuable resource on getting honeypot background information and a decision
list on how to handle the tasks that come with a honeypot is the work by Grimes (2005),
which contains a list of basic steps to understand what a honeypot is not and what it
might be, and also a list of points what a honeypot definitely is. As stated before in the
honeypot basics, this is a resource that is destined to be attacked. The author states,
that there exist several generations of honeypot types. The generation “I” honeypot is a
single host that acts as a honeypot, whereas the generation “II” honeypot is a combina-
tion of tools that safeguard the honeypot once it gets compromised by an attack. The
further generation “III” honeypots differ from “II” in the way of their analysis features




According to Grimes (2005) “Data control is making sure the compromised honeypot
is not used to attack other legitimate resources. Data capture is recording everything
the hacker does.”.
He continues and generates these requirements from the first ones:
1. Store collected data remotely. You want to store as much evidence as you can
remotely. If it is stored locally, the hacker can find and erase it.
2. Don’t let the hackers discover your monitoring devices. If your monitoring tools
are discovered, the hackers could disable them, delete the collected data, or just
avoid the honeypot.
3. A honeypot should strive to look like a production asset.
4. Your honeypot system should be designed to prevent a compromise to the pro-
duction network. This means, that the hacker should never have access to legiti-
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mate data, systems, or user accounts.
3.3.1 Honeypot Categories by Level of Interaction
Honeypots are divided in literature into categories depending on their level of inte-
raction.
3.3.1.1 High Interaction Honeypot
A high interaction honeypot is explained in the statement from Bechtold & Heinlein
(2004), where the authors make clear, that a high interaction honeypot can be a non-
virtual system, once set up and not well maintained but with no real functionality on
the network. It is constantly monitored and interactions with it captured. Regarding
advantages and disadvantages of this approach it can be said, that it has both: a
definitive advantage is the fact, that it can not be detected as being a trap, because
of its high interaction level and mostly also the installed vulnerable services are not
emulated, but real. If this system still gets effectively exploited without this event being
monitored and detected, this leads to a clear disadvantage, because obviously, this
compromised system is one in a possible row of such in the network, that can be used
for further attacks. This possible drawback must be circumvented! In one of the first
tryouts of Lance Spitzner to make a honeypot the attacker simply wiped the whole
harddrive of the honeypot after detecting that all of the attacks to the Internet were
blocked by a firewall (Spitzner 2003b).
3.3.1.2 Low Interaction Honeypot
A low interaction honeypot also has its advantages, for instance it is created with the
intent to not and hopefully never get hacked. All the services present are only simulated
and do not exist. But due to all these simulations and most often also the fact that the
operating system itself runs on a virtual machine and not a standalone one, this can be
a clear disadvantage, because an attacker can figure it out when exploring a honeypot
system. Research on this topic is documented by Holz & Raynal (2005) and Wenda
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& Ning (2012). So the results might therefore be somehow not as accurate as on a
physical machine. Nevertheless, this is the more secure way to build a honeypot in
the context of traditional wire-bound network hosts according to Bechtold & Heinlein
(2004) and Cole et al. (2005). The statement by Holz & Raynal (2005) is, that the
high-interaction honeypots are set up for so called script kiddies solely as a logging
platform for the administrator, they are efficient, but prone to be found out automatically
as honeypots. Further work was presented as every attacker to be found needs its own
kind of attraction. This means, that a low level script kiddie needs another bait than
a high level expert and a honeypot administrator has to consider this circumstance.
The statement by Wenda & Ning (2012) is, that for the attacking party it is crucial to
detect a honeypot. The authors collect information for a determination whether a sy-
stem is a honeypot. This information can further on be used to find out how to improve
honeypots to not so easily being fingerprinted as such. At the end of the paper the
authors collect all relevant facts on the detection methods and are elevating the result
of the experimentation to the further research on this topic.
The survey by Bringer et al. (2012) gives a good overview over 60 papers since 2005
regarding honeypots. They have put the recent development into five categories:
1. new types of honeypots to cope with emergent new security threats,
2. utilizing honeypot output data to improve the accuracy in threat detections,
3. configuring honeypots to reduce the cost of maintaining honeypots as well as to
improve the accuracy in threat detections,
4. counteracting honeypot detections by attackers, and
5. legal and ethical issues in using honeypots. Bringer et al. (2012)
They state, that their “literature reviews indicate that the advances in the first four areas
reflect the recent changes in” their “networking environments, such as those in user
demography and the ways those diverse users use new applications.” For the ethical
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ascpects they state that their “literature reviews on legal and ethical issues in using
honeypots reveals that there has not been widely accepted agreement on the legal and
ethical issues about honeypots, which must be an important agenda in future honeypot
research.” Bringer et al. (2012). Also very essential is the fact, that Bringer et al. (2012)
state that there is only one approach discussed by Prathapani et al. (2009), that gives
a possible solution to a black hole attack in wireless networks by a set of message
requests and responses that when found compromised lead to the result of a currently
ongoing attack happening during simulation runtime.
Observed attacks on a network should also be analysed later on to devise counter-
measures. This could lead to an enhancement in network security. The reactions
may be passive and not interact with the attacker at all. Active reactions on the other
hand could include countermeasures such as alerting the rest of the network to the
detection of an attack and flag a specific part of the network as not trustworthy, which
should then be ignored for routing purposes. The protecting nodes defend the working
network through directed responses upon detection of potential intruders (Das 2009).
In their paper a list of honeypots is provided by the agents to the clients at the time
of network establishment. The roles in this network will change over time following a
predefined schedule in order to attain a lower false positive intrusion detection rate and
to render these networks harder to attack. Furthermore, the clients are forbidden from
using the honeypots for networking purposes since connections to these honeypots
would be regarded as an attack.
A paper by Mostarda & Navarra (2008) suggests assigning specific roles in wireless
IDS. The roles shall then change over the lifetime of the established network. Some of
the nodes are normal routers and forward the traffic, others have sensing functionality
and are part of a distributed IDS . This approach seems to fit well in the context of
wireless sensor network honeypots. This work uses another technique to specify intru-
sion detection patterns and attack signatures, it is a specification-based IDS. It is done
by an IDS specification that is transformed by the detection in the sensors. The local
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detection then forwards the information over the network to the other sensor nodes.
In this setup the possibility to put the nodes into sleep mode is still available, issues
arising with the sleep mode are discussed by the authors as well. The evaluation took
place as experiments in sensor networks without attacks in comparison to attack and
the authors point out a good performance at an overhead of around twenty to fourty
percent of energy consumption increase.
Kaplantzis (2006) introduces and describes a conceptual honeypot system without dis-
cussing an implementation under real-life conditions. Further development remains to
be done. There is still a gap in the research of honeypots for wireless sensor networks.
The idea of a honeypot as alternative approach to IDS and its proposed features should
also be implemented in WSN. Such a detection entity should span different layers, star-
ting from the physical and MAC layer and reaching up to the high layers such as ZigBee
has (Kaplantzis 2006). The process of pattern generation for an intrusion detection sy-
stem is described by the author as follows. The signature generation is considered to
be automatically by using the advantages of packet capture of a honeypot. Her appro-
ach follows the work of (Kreibich & Crowcroft 2004). The authors describe the so called
Honeycomb. It is a honeypot that features signature generation that then can be used
in the intrusion detection system. They made use of a tool called honeyd, which is a
low interaction honeypot, honeycomb is a plugin for honeyd. The signature generation
can itself be a problem, because with an internet worm, the worm payload itself can be
part of the detection string.
In (Qassrawi & Hongli 2010) regular clients are also forbidden (like in (Das 2009)) from
using the honeypots for networking purposes, since connections to these honeypots
would be regarded as an attack. Since the roles of nodes in this network should change
over time between honeypot nodes and regular nodes, a predefined schedule will be
used to guarantee a low false positive intrusion detection rate. This method renders
the network harder to attack. By using this method detecting new attack methods is
definitely possible with honeypots. The rest of the network will be left in a functional
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state while the honeypots are under attack. As an additional benefit, new counterme-
asures can be prepared while the attack is still ongoing. All these presented uses of
honeypots are suitable to increase the reliability and availability of ZigBee networks
(Qassrawi & Hongli 2010).
3.3.1.3 Single Honeypot Node Comparison to Honeynet of Honeypot Nodes
The discussion by Hai et al. (2010) on the use of a single networking node (see 3.2.2)
did not yield satisfactory results in comparison to a single intrusion detection sensor in a
wired network. This is due to the possible configuration of WSN nodes to form different
topologies (Krontiris et al. 2009). These could be a star topology, or a meshed network.
In meshed networks, each node in the network has only a few peers to communicate
with. The authors of the paper describe a collaborative identification of an attacker.
They made use of simulation and at the end of the experiments also described the
identification of a malicious node in a real setup. In this setup they made measure-
ments to find out how much effort is needed for the identification. The future work is
described as concentrating on the identification of more than a single attacking node.
A single node can therefore only detect attackers within its direct communication range
(Shin et al. 2010). This prevents the detection of attacks in other parts of the network
which are not routed through this part of the meshed network. The proposed schemes
in the hierarchical detection were done with experiments. The importance of clustering
is emphasised. The authors state that a hierarchical approach is useful to secure in-
dustrial production and WSN. Islam et al. (2010) discuss a solution to this problem in
their paper which focuses on hierarchical intrusion detection systems. They assumed
a routed tree topology, and implemented the detection mechanisms in the main routing
nodes. The authors make clear, that the use of a four layer architecture to identify an
attack is successful in the specification based detection. The topology is divided into
the sensors, then two layers of monitoring devices and then at the the top the base sta-
tion of the WSN. Further research includes the setup and experiments in a simulator.
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The topologies a WSN or a ZigBee network can make use of were described previously
in section 2.1.7.
Several technical details are worthy of discussion. One of the proposed features of a
honeypot should be that it might be temporarily part of the net at various different times
(Huang & Lu 2012). It should not always be next to the same node in the network,
because these nodes in the net might not be the target of the attacker. One of the pro-
posed features named here involves cloning. Those resources of special appeal to the
intruder might duplicate themselves virtually during the course of an attack, expanding
the target range and thus reducing the likelihood of an attack on the real network (Hu-
ang & Lu 2012). The paper gives details on the cloning to be dynamic. As described
in the introduction of the network coverage model section, the covered area is to be
maximised to have the best effect. The cloning algorithm chooses the variation as well
as the range of particles. Also the amount of clones and their position is determined by
the algorithm. The paper closes with checking the algorithm validity and analyses the
experimental results to be an effective way to determine ideal sensor node placement.
Further research is proposed on energy consumption centric optimisation of network
coverage.
3.3.2 Robustness
This section is about robustness of networks. The network robustness is a summary of
different approaches. It is shown that when in a meshed network a significant removal
of nodes happens, then the network is split. As a result of the split a set of clusters
arise. In wireless sensor networks the network should stay stable, therefore it is of in-
terest what other researchers do and find out on this topic on how to keep a network in
a stable status. Whenever such a WSN is to be established, it is customary to deploy
a larger amount of nodes than minimally required as a best practice method to ens-
ure higher reliability of communication and interaction through redundancy (Cai et al.
2011). Such redundancies might be needed for several reasons: some of the nodes
might run out of battery power sooner than others, or the signal strength of neighbou-
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ring nodes may deteriorate, or other wireless communications are taking place on the
channel and frequency used, or interfering with the mesh network, or natural radio acti-
vity has increased within a period of time (higher ambient noise), or just plain stability
of the network. The authors state, that they can always find a critical number for sensor
density. This means, that when this threshold value is undershot, then the network con-
nectivity is falling into pieces, but and just a bit above this value the network reliability is
high enough. Throughout the paper they have proven this to be true for a set of simu-
lations for different sensor network deployment schemes, whether they were circularly
distributed or hexagonally distributed. The result is that they can determine the point of
density of sensors when there is a sharp decrease of connectivity when nodes fail to
work.
The authors Min et al. (2010) designed and implemented the security communication
services of WIA-PA, a wireless sensor network standard. This standard is compara-
ble to ZigBee, but features improved robustness when compared with ZigBee due to
channel-switching. According to the authors the security in a WIA-PA network has
two levels. The security manager is located at the first level and the security manger
agents are at the next level which is providing these policies to the end devices. Diffe-
rent encryption strategies are present in WIA-PA by design, this also includes the key
management procedures for these strategies. This also includes end to end encryption
as well as point to point encryption, located at the application layer and at the data link
layer.
The authors Radmand et al. (2010) did a comparison of WSN standards that are are
available for industrial application. They focused especially on improvements with re-
gard to the weaknesses that ZigBee has in the domain of the oil and gas industry. The
authors present an overview of existing vulnerabilities in ZigBee. They found that even
though lots of vulnerabilities were found and closed with the new ZigBee standard re-
leased, some of the vulnerabilities were still present in the standard. This means, that
even with the implementation of the new standard, and the encryption methods that
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were enhanced with it, attackers have the possibility to execute attacks even without
having compromised the key material beforehand.
Another paper focusses on robustness and fault-tolerance in wireless sensor networks
(Ghosh et al. 2011). An interesting fact is that the authors use the problem with regard
to biological information flow to map it to a wireless sensor network, the robustness of
a genome is the background to construct similarities. They propose the use of the at-
tractor theory in the gene regulatory network to create fault- tolerance in WSN routing,
a comparison between genetic networks to wireless sensor networks is proposed. The
authors conclude, that the models are proven and the future work will concentrate on
using this knowledge in a simulation.
The article by Zand et al. (2012) describes communication standards for sensor net-
works and has a look on the “Wireless interface to Sensors and Actuators” WISA,
based on physical layer of IEEE 802.15.1, and 802.15.4 based ZigBee, WirelessHART,
WIA-PA and ISA 100.11a (developed by the “ISA” International Society of Automation)
for the use of wireless technologies in industrial monitoring and control networks. They
state that the wireless communication have “the potential to provide fine-grained, flex-
ible, robust, low-cost and low-maintenance monitoring and control.” They state, that
“they still have severe limitations, especially when real-time, reliable distributed con-
trol operations are concerned.” Future research topic suggestions are seen but not
concluded in details.
Alcaraz & Lopez (2010) have reviewed the standards ZigBee PRO, WirelessHART,
and ISA100.11a. They considered their coexistence, reliability, and security in their
communications. They have also identified a set of threats and potential attacks in their
routing protocols. In conclusion they provided recommendations and countermeasures
for each one of the presented potential attacks to the three wireless standards. In their
paper the authors have split the threats on the standards into three groups regarding
the attack surface of confidentiality, integrity and availability concerning attacks. This
is called the security model for the classification of attacks. They state, that from their
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research most attacks on WSN are performed by insiders that are authorised to do
interaction with the networks. From their research the three standards observed can
be attacked the same way on confidentiality. ZigBee PRO and WirelessHART have the
same attack surface for integrity concerning attacks. WirelessHART and ISA100.11a
seem to be a bit more vulnerable to denial of services attacks, which is due to the fact
that their routing can be manipulated by a malicious node, which then generates false
routing tables which makes them prone to worm- and sinkhole attacks, which attacks
are not present in ZigBee PRO by design if the ACL possibility is used and configured
properly, rendering only trustworthy nodes to be able to become part of the network.
Furthermore, they suggest hardening the key renegotiation process, as this is possible
to be done without encryption. For a set of attacks they suggest the use of a separate
intrusion detection, due to the fact that this cannot be solved otherwise by improving







And for WirelessHART and ISA100a as written before, the worm- and sinkhole attack
can also be detected by an IDS.
3.3.3 Hardening
The goal of protecting a network from a successful attack is supported by hardening.
This term is defined as the improvement of a technology for the reduction of attack
vectors (Barnett 2006). This can for instance also be achieved with the application of
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encryption methods. The intention is an improvement of reliability and availability (Cole
et al. 2005) of network nodes. The author presents a guidance on how to configure
Apache properly, as this is seen as a challenge, The author explains the way to harden
web servers as well as a view on web proxy, a software program that executes as both
server and client to do requests for clients. The book gives an insight into web server
security misconceptions commonly seen. Hardening the web-server means for the aut-
hor, that ports available are reduced to the minimum. Additionally the operating system
needs to be hardened in the way that vendor patches available have to be put in place
in a timely manner, unnecessary daemons should be disabled, access management
has to be implemented and access control has to be put in place. Configuration har-
dening is a very important topic, but the author also gives insight into web application
scanners that are available for free.
There are already guidelines for manufacturers regarding the many possibilities in the
configuration and in the design of ZigBee networks. These have been written in part
by governmental research departments. One example is the security guide by (Masica
2007) for the U.S. CERT. A document (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Information-
stechnik 2009) by the German BSI (German governmental institute for standards and
best practises in network security) discusses possible problems in ZigBee installations
and provides advice with minimal requirements for the development of new products
using ZigBee networks. Some of the examples are:
• refraining from over the air programming and plain-text key exchange.
• using MAC address filtering
• planning the channel usage to minimise interference,
• planning of redundancy for robust network,
• protecting the ZigBee Coordinator/Gateway.
A honeypot system should be a hardened system. Singh & Verma (2011) list a number
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Figure 3.3: Honeypot host being attacked via Internet
of possibilities for hardening a WSN in the paper “Security For Wireless Sensor Net-
work”. They also show a list of unresolved problems, and state that these problems
are difficult to solve. The authors have pointed to issues related to security, in which
attacks occur simultaneously on the WSN. The attacks can happen at different protocol
layers of the network architecture.
3.3.4 Summary of Defence Strategies
Therefore, to clarify this once again unequivocally, a honeypot can not be portrayed
as active line of defence, which it is not. But by the use of honeypots, it is possible to
perform a detection of attacks, which is a first basic part of a line of defence, which was
previously not possible. A honeypot in a traditional setup can be either set up standa-
lone, or set up with a corresponding production network. As a standalone solution it is
solely present at a network connection. For illustration purposes the following honeypot
diagram is shown, showing a possible setup of a honeypot. The first diagram 3.3 shows
an attacker over the Internet reaching the honeypot host on a single host computer, a
firewall has to be present to safeguard the Internet should the honeypot node been
taken over.
The next diagram shows for illustration the following honeypots’ purpose in a set of
attack decoys, different setups on different machine types, the variety offers a grea-
ter “playground” for an attack to happen. The diagram shown is a possible setup of
a honeypot combination at figure 3.4. It shows an attacker over the Internet with the
honeypot hosts on a number of host computers, again a firewall is present to safeguard
the backwards possible attack after taking over a honeypot component. The advantage
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Figure 3.4: Several honeypots are reachable via Internet
Figure 3.5: WSN honeypot illustration
is, that attacks to a variety of system components running under different operating sy-
stems can be detected, in principle it is possible to have just a single host device, that
appears as a variety of virtual hosts as described in the literature by Provos & Holz
(2007).
As a summary, administrators can gain additional knowledge about the course of an
attack. Afterwards they can improve their own response and safety procedures. There
are plenty of reasons that really speak for the use of honeypots, and those reasons are
justified, supported and conclusive. For wireless networks, literature has shown, that
the concept in wireless networks is found to be in a circle structure, due to the wireless
signals being stronger at the center. The most important parts of the honeypot are lo-
cated there, for instance the devices that log every information to disk, see section 3.3.
In the paper discussed there, the deception in depth approach with a honeypot core
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needed to be productive and other parts of the honeypot grouped around it was pre-
sented. This approach is proposed for the wireless sensor network honeypot as well, in
later parts of the thesis this is described. However, for illustrative purpose, an overview
is presented as follows, see figure 3.5.
3.4 Feasibility of the Solutions
This chapter takes a look at the solutions and discusses whether they seem to be useful
for a wireless sensor network setup or not. During a previously undertaken literature
review it was made clear, that with WSN setups the costs differ from other installations.
Some solutions are easily implemented or have been input to other standards, other
solutions need additional network components or in some other way additional resour-
ces, an overview is presented.
3.4.1 Costs in the Various Standards
The authors Jin-Shyan Lee & Shen (2007) compare the wireless standards IEEE
802.15.1, 802.15.3, 802.15.4 and 802.11a/b/g based on their technical specifications,
and refer to their throughput, cost, and specific throughput as to cost. They emphasise,
that they do not give recommendations, as every wireless network has its own purpose
and the scope varies from use case to another.
The design of wireless sensor networks relies on low power consumption through low
computational need as well as low transmission power. Any security mechanism in
these networks should therefore be lightweight. Researchers have focused on light-
weight security mechanisms to address this fundamental need for security together
with power saving features.
The security features of ZigBee also limit their ease of use and render interoperability
problematic: Encryption details have to be distributed and managed, requiring a bigger
feature set as well as more network traffic (Faludi 2010).
The paper by Fabbricatore et al. (2011) describes these problems in the area of smart
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homes. The authors see several problems for existing home automation solutions invol-
ving ZigBee. They propose using additional cryptographic extensions on top of ZigBee,
or to change the protocol, should ZigBee remain too insecure for their purposes.
A defence mechanism such as intrusion detection should react early on, due to the
fact, that an attacker will continue the work on the system until an attack is successful.
Ignoring an attack completely is in general not advisable (Cole et al. 2005). Counter-
measures like ignoring a part of the wireless sensor network for the time a detected
attack takes place, helps to save some of the limited amount of battery power (Wood
& Stankovic 2002).
3.4.2 Cost of Encryption/Improvements
In ZigBee, several security features are implemented by design. But due to the increa-
sed computational effort and a higher amount of data transmitted, these improvements
result in a higher power consumption.
This is because security needs computational power and thus results in a higher energy
consumption (Faludi 2010), therefore this is in direct conflict of nearly every WSN task
and feature.
Successful attacks might last as long as the attacker wants, even when encryption is
used to protect the communication. These attacks can not even be analysed, because
usually, there is no log of network activities and hence, attackers will leave no traces.
There is no “packet capture” of attacks, and the probed exploit code is not available in
the wake of an intrusion attempt. An attacker will thus not get noticed and therefore, will
remain unidentified. It is hardly possible to gather the leftover information for forensic
analysis (Cole et al. 2005).
There is hence a need for an intrusion detection system, and also for a system reporting
the break-in attempts.
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3.4.3 Cost of Hardening
Having blind faith and trust in the existing countermeasures is greatly unjustified. Rad-
mand et al. (2010) showed in their comprehensive paper, that the cryptography used
in ZigBee is not encompassing enough to cover all possible attacks. Some of the chal-
lenges, like confidentiality, are solved encrypting the data stream. Yet, issues on the
network layer such as replay attacks still remain. They also state, that the manufac-
turers should provide a minimum of security, due to challenges with encryption keys
stored in plain-text in the nodes. These could be extracted by an attacker tampering
with physically captured wireless sensor network nodes.
Several issues were solved according to research conducted since the release of Zig-
Bee PRO 2007, but a few issues still remain. Also, a flaw in the key distribution al-
gorithm of ZigBee 2007 was formally proven in a publication by Yüksel et al. (2011).
Conceptual issues cannot be solved through hardening, when staying compatible with
the standard is necessary.
Hardening a system to resist an attack will not stop the attack itself from taking place.
There are clearly still challenges left in the process of improving the security features
of wireless sensor networks (Yüksel et al. 2011).
3.4.4 Cost of Intrusion Detection Systems
Processing every packet, its inspection, and the detection of attacks by matching pat-
terns all require a lot of resources. In the context of WSN networks, and therefore
battery driven network nodes with very limited resources, this is a clear drawback of an
intrusion detection system approach in wireless sensor networks.
3.4.5 Cost of Honeypots
One of the drawbacks of a honeypot system approach in wireless sensor networks
could be that it exposes additional targets which might get corrupted and then be taken
over by an intruder. But since any other part of the net could equally get compromised,
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this is a small drawback. The advantages of a honeypot far outweigh its hypothetical
disadvantages.
The installation and maintenance of a single honeypot or of a distributed honeypot
network clearly requires additional effort. Yet, this effort should be made on top of
common improvements to the wireless sensor network like configuration hardening and
regular firmware updates. Some implementations that offer over-the-air programming
features for updating nodes already exist (Unterschütz & Turau 2012).
3.4.6 Legal Aspects of Attack and Defence
The legal aspect of security is worth of discussion, but will not be done very compre-
hensively in this thesis, as it references jurisdiction, ethics and morale, all location-
dependent. This topic is not the focus of this work, nevertheless some of the aspects
are shown and presented here that can be found to be written by computer science
researchers. When an attack is happening it is allowed to defend, which is true for our
real world scenario as well as for a “cyber”-scenario (Koch 2008). This means, that it
is also allowed to prepare for an attack. But the usage of hacking-tools for defence is
only found to be legal during the time-frame of an attack. In the time-frame right next
to the attack, before that and afterwards it tends to be not allowed, and if an attack
is not happening, if is not allowed at all. This means, the usage of such hacking-tools
and methods is very limited (Koch 2008). Another way of a so called “hackback” is the
shutdown of malware-networks, which are established with criminal intention, devices
in a network are taken over and various methods are used to create a benefit for the
attacker. To shut down such networks, specialists work together to analyse such mal-
ware-components and to find ways to disable them from spreading, in the best case
to shut down the whole malware. Analysis f.e. for the Zeus botnet can be found from
(Andriesse et al. 2013). This Zeus derivative was taken down in 2014 and further rea-
ding is found at Sandee (2015).
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3.4.7 Legal Aspects of a Honeypot
The work of Radcliffe (2006) and Radcliffe (2007) describes the legal aspects on ho-
neypots, with a focus on US laws. Those readings are proposing the use of honeypots,
but every step has to be documented. Also, a recommendation to get a management
approval is given. With this documentation and an approval the legal system in the US
is satisfied, should it be necessary to defend the action taken to set up a honeypot.
Legal issues in using honeypots were also described by Rubin & Cheung (2006). They
focus also on the ethical aspects of putting honeypots into production. The author po-
ses a set of questions besides the general recommendations and legal discussion that
is seen in other papers, too - they discuss the subsequent steps, which have to be
done once an attack was monitored by a honeypot. There is no guidance by them on
what to do then they even argue, that this does not have necessarily to be reported to
other parties such as law enforcement, especially if nothing of value is in conflict.
Further reading can be done in the paper by Scottberg et al. (2002). It presents a
number of legal issues and concludes with:
“The sociological and legal issues behind the use of honeypots in cyber-
space present new challenges that do not have direct precedents in the
physical world.”
Another paper describes the fact in US law (Mokube & Adams 2007). The authors state
that there are three core concerns when establishing honeypots with regard to legal
operation. The first one is so called entrapment, which is present when the honeypot
is set up and running for some kind of government-owned institution. So, entrapment
can not be used when the honeypot is running for a non-governmental administrator.
This is also true for non-governmental organisations with regard to privacy concerns.
As long as a normal user is not monitored, it is not considered privacy relevant. With re-
gard to liability there is a potential issue when the honeypot could be used to carry out
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further attacks. The authors state, that this can be solved by documenting everything
the honeypot does beforehand and then going into development and implementation.
They conclude, that when due diligence is conducted properly, then the law is obeyed
and there is just ’a minor issue’ remaining (Mokube & Adams 2007).
Additionally the diploma thesis of Baumann (2002) contains a chapter about legal as-
pects of honeypots in Switzerland. It states, that
“Running a honeypot in a legally safe way is nearly impossible.”
Continuing reading other authors are focussing on legal aspects of honeypots (Dornseif
et al. 2004). They state that administrators setting up a honeypot have a special respon-
sibility that the honeypot is not used as a stepping stone to attack others. In criminal
law they argue that if a honeypot is used to attack a third party, then the administrator
might be punished if this help was performed willingly. So if the honeypot is set up very
precise and accurate, then there is no intention for it to be a stepping stone. Therefore,
they deem this not intentionally and argue that tort law is not applicable.
Further reading, another author is focussing on legal aspects of honeypots and honey-
nets (Sokol 2015). This states that there are two main concerns when using honeypots.
The first is privacy and the second one is liability. The paper then continues with a lot
of details in EU law on these topics and suggests to use a banner when a connection
is established, that every connection by an authorised user is recorded. It is also re-
commended to make sure the EU territory is not exited by data traffic, so that there is
unambiguous certainty which laws have to be applied. Regarding privacy law they con-
sider an attack in the knowledge that every step performed on any system is logged.
Every attacker therefore is already accepting that each and every step is monitored.
Liability of the administrator remains an issue, when the honeypot is used to carry out
other attacks without being noticed. When being detected in a timely manner, this is
deemed unproblematic.
The next paper discusses civil and criminal liability for honeypots. It also presents a
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section of attackers ’liability as well as administrators’ liability(Sokol & Andrejko 2015).
On the topic of civil and criminal liability the paper discusses issues of liability and how
they can be targeted.
A further paper is regarding privacy topics in honeypots. It supports a basis for the
processing and collecting the data that is captured at the honeypot with regards to EU
law (Sokol et al. 2015). It focusses on data processing as well as data collection. With
regard to EU law the topic of privacy is discussed for honeypots. A special interest is
put on data retention, as the requirements of data retention differ for EU members due
to the EU Data Retention Directive.
As a summary, the paper by Sokol & Host (2016) can be seen as a survey on the legal
aspects of honeypot in the EU. It describes the evolution of honeypots, and connected
to it, the changes in the legal aspects with the honeypot changes. It is the first paper by
the authors which has also a forensic focus on digital evidence retention. It emphasises
to anonymise evidence before they are published to the public. A further paper focus-
ses additionally on the privacy issues that can be generated by the use of honeypots
and honeynets, with regard to the GDPR (Sokol et al. 2017). Especially with the need
to anonymise IP addresses that can be logged by the honeypot, there is further rese-
arch suggested. Also sharing the honeypot data across borders need further research
for a thorough position and recommendations.
With regard to local law an article by Fraunholz et al. (2018) gives a deeper insight into
german law with an outlook to EU legislation. They are the first to bring up the topics of
copyright and self-defense into the legal discussion on honeypots. Their conclusion is
following afore-mentioned recommendations, namely to make sure for a honeypot ad-
ministrator that it is documented accordingly and that applicable local laws have been
determined and addressed accordingly in the honeypot setup and configuration.
However, wireless honeypots are still an under-represented topic, also in the legal
issues.
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3.5 Summary of Findings in the Literature Review
The previous chapter featured the wireless sensor network standards and the security
and defence solutions if available to possible attacks on WSN and their countermea-
sures as well as the costs for the security.
All the previously shown information, considered as a whole, shows that a lot of re-
search has already been done in the field of securing ZigBee networks, regarding
integrity and confidentiality. Defending on attacks regarding availability still remain a
topic of further research.
Summing up what has been seen in the last chapters, a lot of research and develop-
ment has been done on honeypots in wired networks, and security research in WSN is
ongoing as researchers see further need in developing practical and usable intrusion
detection for WSN.
This chapter continued the basics review of literature and similar works. This division in
theory in the previous chapter and practice in this chapter appeared and still appears
as sensible, so that the amount of information could be presented adequately. The
following sections were intended to collate the known and partly standardised security
functions in wireless sensor networks, the reliability and the defensive possibilities, in
order to assess the still missing components. Furthermore, an outlook on the topic
of honeypots was presented with a section on maintenance. A first discussion on the
honeypot subject has taken place, with the maintenance measures and the elements
of the necessary resources of the defence strategies presented, and general insights
were given. The subject of legal regulations rounded off the chapter and finally a
summary was presented.
A first look into the research method is needed here: this it is a research method that
was postulated by Schneider (2011) in his paper called “Blueprint for a Science of
Cybersecurity”. As an expert in this field of research he recommends using legitimate
principles to improve the security of computer systems. He encourages system develo-
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pers to use these principles as tools for creating systems. The approach is that security
can be compared to this types: multiple assets, multiple attacks, and multiple identities
and countermeasures, so that it is possible to create data sets in which researchers
have a knowledge base on the principles listed above. This means, that he collected a
set of work-steps to be performed and gave guidance on how to continue working on
them, with examples for further clarification. A system developer should first be clear
about what the system needs to be capable of, what it should do, and what avoid. It
is necessary to be aware of what should not be done, but at the same time also how
this could be determined to be an attack, so that countermeasures can be taken. The




AS a summary of what is presented in the previous chapter so far, a lot of researchand development has already been done for honeypots in wired networks, also
security research in WSN is going on. Other researchers found that more has to be
done in practical and usable intrusion detection for WSN. The further reading is exactly
about that, the practical approaches and the tools and techniques that are further de-
veloped than theory or simulation.This chapter is dedicated especially to the topic of
honeypots in wireless environments. The deployment is of interest, various details of
the attacks and their analyses are explained, as well as a series of reflections on as-
sessability presented. The chapter will then continue with the first drafts of a honeypot
for wireless sensor networks, followed by a discussion of the methodology, inspired by
Fred Schneider, who, with his publications, provides a basis for viewing the science of
cyber security.
4.1 Introducing the Research
The general objective of this research project is to create an advanced monitoring
architecture assisting in detection of security incidents in wireless sensor networks
(WSN). This, as a first goal, is intended to be an additional protecting element that is
far beyond a simple “works for me”-approach, which will improve the security of WSN
users through continuous monitoring.
The second goal is that of generating undetectable or even transparent or hidden de-
tection of attacks, which is deemed to be the appropriate way in order to prevent mali-
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cious users from learning of their detection and also of their attack being monitored for
further analysis.
Such a system only needs a limited amount of administrative tasks; as it is running
autonomously, it only needs interaction when malicious activities occur. Operational
status would indeed not need permanent administrative interaction.
This system is intended to be useful for many usage scenarios. For a start, it could be
an interesting approach to have perimeter security with this system. This means, that
the production systems are still in the centre of the network, but have a safeguarding
monitoring system spun around them. In the example of a building, a picture can be to
have the production network inside the building and the monitoring systems attached
to the building. Therefore an attack has to pass those to reach the production network.
The primary user of the system is not defined in total, he is seen as an example of an
owner of a smart home. Another user could be the security manager of a production
plant. By safeguarding the perimeter, an outside attacker is spotted in a timely manner.
Also insider attacks could be localised.
Honeypot techniques have never been adopted in a WSN yet. Many details of the
research depend on the findings collected during all stages of development. Yet, the
main intention and scope of the hypothesis is clear. The conduction of research me-
ans to explore hitherto unconsidered and unregarded aspects, in this case of security
threats against wireless sensor networks and new defence mechanisms with the use
of honeypots, because no one has ever applied honeypot methods in a wireless sensor
network up to now.
The challenge presented to such a novel defence lies in the detection of the attack
process. Only then will it be possible to develop new countermeasures and defence
mechanisms, possibly also leading to a new hardening concept of the whole WSN and
its system. The detection is the job of dedicated network sensors. A honeypot is a
part of the network which appears to an attacker as a valuable point of interest. Yet,
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the honeypot has only one goal: to attract an attacker with the purpose of collecting
information about attacks on the network and to report the attack. This also includes
new attacks and their attack procedure.
A major aspect of the research is to determine the need for such systems, including the
capabilities of software using wireless sensor networks as a carrier. The concluding
part of the research makes use of the collected results of research and the research-
findings data for the consideration of an appropriate design of such honeypot for wire-
less sensor networks. This shall be done not in the traditional meaning of an IDS in
a LAN or a honeypot in a LAN, but rather in the context of wireless sensor networks,
featuring new detection mechanisms and new countermeasures.
The use of honeypots is described in the primary literature as an attraction for the at-
tacker (See 3.3). They are set up to be attractive to an attacker, but are also capable
for the purpose to monitor and detect an log the events. Classically there is no im-
mediate defence mechanism in a honeypot, no defensive reaction to the intruder. By
the honeypot, there will be no automated response; there will be no new information
generated by the honeypot; no update of the system by its own, or any hardening
mechanism developed and sent to other participants in the network.
Recalling the case of Wardriving in Dartmouth from section 2.3.2, where in almost
every home ZigBee-enabled devices could be found because of most electricity meters
having been upgraded to smart meters with wireless option, that were reachable by
default. Right now, a critical point in time has come, and a bridge should be built
by comparing WSN security with a related topic: There are studies on resistance to
viruses and worms as seen in 2.2.6.3, which show clearly that attacks by a worm will
stop almost never.
This is also the statement from above in section 3.4.2, where it was shown that an
attack can take place and continue as long as no one will notice it and consequently
nothing is done about it. So this is the main point of the whole story about IT security:
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the threat must be recognised and the vulnerabilities need to be analysed.
With the ensuing chain of inferences it has to be proposed that a honeypot is suitable,
in fact, to improve the security of ZigBee based networks. There are host-based ho-
neypots in classic literature. These are in a network, wait for an attacker; they pretend
to be a service, which can be exploited 3.3.1.1.Such a host-based honeypot, as it can
be established for the wireless sensor networks, would even so be a way to learn about
attacks. However, there is a big difference in practise from the host-based honeypots
for wired networks to WSN honeypots: the distance and the linking or its connection.
In the former, it will not matter where in the world the attackers themselves are; via the
Internet, they can access any reachable host. If it’s a honeypot on a corporate Intranet,
then an attacker who has gained access to this Intranet probably wants to examine all
of the hosts one by one and thus also the honeypot.
In a WSN, it is assumed, that there will be just the radio link distance between attacker
and honeypot. By using this wireless connection only a limited distance is possible.
The physical distance is thus lower, reduced to several metres or a few kilometres.
If an attacker would target now at all ZigBee devices in the city of Plymouth, would
anyone notice it later? One could examine this only if there would be at least one
honeypot for ZigBee in Plymouth. Similarly, one can also speak of the Dartmouth case
of wardriving mentioned above.
Some researchers say, as cited in the sections 1.3 and 3.4.1 that in the context of smart
homes this is absolutely serious, because the dwelling thereby becomes an additional
point of attack which must be considered for its security. As already posted previously
in this thesis 1.3 there are critical voices that reject the use of ZigBee and even warn
about ZigBee to use as a communication medium in smart homes. In the previous
literature research in section 3.4.1 it was mentioned that the use of ZigBee technology
appears to many researchers as no suitable medium for the smart home. In one of
the quotations in this thesis in section 3.4.1 it was already referred directly to these
regarded issues in the smart home. There, a change from ZigBee is proposed.
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For the smart home, one could be thinking this idea further: If the home, flat or house is
exposed to a general threat, such as a burglary with an universal key or a con artist who
opens a door and holds it open for others: should one not learn about these attacks as
well as the technical side of countermeasures?
Since just the possibility to already control a door or window from a distance is already
sufficient to gain access to a building, the consequences when a large part or even all
of the devices can be remote-controlled and manipulated are obvious.
In future there is the need to detect such attacks; the attacker is having a clear ad-
vantage because the hurdle of security implementation is not hung high enough, yet.
Safeguards of the apartment can outsmart an attacker mechanically; for smart homes
though, there is also the possibility to technically outwit the safeguards from afar. The
hypothesis now is that traditional security measures no longer stand and the question
must be asked whether new approaches are needed.
The intention during this research project was to achieve a prototype through definition,
then product design; and by this the integration and validation of a monitoring solution
capable to safeguard wireless sensor networks. This result is achieved by a clear
structure, beginning with the basics of wireless sensor networks, their purpose and
use, and the possibilities that are thought to be available for permanent monitoring the
security of these wireless sensor networks.
This work is done in the following five steps.
Analysis of monitoring methods and procedures for wireless sensor networks
The first step consists of looking at the IT security basics, which lead to a discussion
of the usefulness of monitoring WSNs. A deep knowledge about the necessity of tho-
rough monitoring for a WSN lead further to a justification of improvement in monitoring
methods and procedures in wireless sensor networks. Throughout this step, a look at
several methods and procedures is necessary. This thesis focusses on a lot of topics,
one analysis of the presented is on monitoring methods. The background research was
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introduced in section 3.2.2. It was further elaborated in section 3.3.
Determining whether these monitoring methods and procedures are suitable for
use in wireless sensor networks With the knowledge from the first step, the next
one consists of an extensive research of recent monitoring attempts in literature and
available products. This step is then clearly laid out, to dive deeper into the monitoring
methods and procedures especially with regard of establishing them in an environment
of wireless sensor networks. During this step, multiple methods and procedures are
determined to be suitable or not. The ultimate goal of this step is to gather a number
of research attempts that can be refined and combined to improve monitoring WSNs.
Furthermore, the discussion was concluded in a recent chapter, on the topic of costs
in 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 with all of its details.
The design and evaluation of a new monitoring method and procedure for wire-
less sensor networks with the goal of improved permanent safeguarding The
objective of permanent safeguarding by a monitoring solution for WSNs is necessary
to strengthen the security of those wireless sensor networks. With the background of
previous steps that addressed multiple methods and procedures, a resulting new met-
hod and procedure is in consideration. The comparison of all the investigated attempts
led to the result that a single method and procedure is seen as constructive:
If it is possible to monitor a malicious user and the underlying networking
patterns, which is also known as packet analysis, it would enable for any
WSN the opportunity to secure it.
This would be starting at the first detection of malicious users based upon receiving
a networking packet or broadcast message, requesting access to a network or ge-
nerating and broadcasting a new network. Nonetheless, despite the fact that such
technology has been proven with a good level of success on standard networks, the
accuracy is unknown on wireless sensor networks. In a WSN the networking and
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interacting differs as compared to wired networks; thus they are expected to have dif-
ficulties to operate at a similar safety and reliability level. As a consequence, this third
step, the evaluation of a monitoring analysis technique within a wireless sensor net-
work, is done. The term honeypot will be introduced herein as a type of monitoring.
This work is presented at the end of this chapter in section 4.5 as well as section 4.6.
The architecture design necessary to run the new monitoring method and pro-
cedure for wireless sensor networks Here, the necessary level of meaningful ho-
neypot analysis is presented, which would not be suited to all WSN hardware. Not all
of the WSN systems have sufficient resources to handle these requirements, therefore
rendering the effort infeasible for those systems. The provided insight from initial stu-
dies of honeypot capabilities and their analysis is that the performance would not have
proven reliable enough to be deployed in every situation and setup. It has to be chosen
wisely and this work wants to give help for the decisions. So the design of a monitoring
architecture for a set of wireless sensor networks, using a larger number of monitoring
techniques that draw upon the different hardware components of a WSN node, namely
a honeypot for WSN, is part of this step. This step is focused on in section 5.1 as well
as section 5.2.
Implementation and evaluation of a prototype including a test in real world en-
vironments to showcase the useful application The final step was to design and
evaluate a prototype of the monitoring architecture. This is presented in section 6.1.
4.2 Wireless Sensor Network Honeypot
Honeypots are as shown divided into high-interaction honeypots, most often on real
hardware with real services, and the ones called low-interaction honeypots running
mostly virtually and with simulated services on top. This chapter first of all focusses on
the task to find a location for honeypots in wireless sensor networks. As it was stated
already before, a WSN is different from other networks in structure and capabilities.
With a look to the common categorisation in the scheme of wirebound networks a set
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of topics need to be considered. The following questions are arising.:Where will a WSN
honeypot be localised in this scheme; where does a WSN honeypot belong to? Under
a now initial first assumption that in such as a non firewalled or filtered network in a
WSN theoretically all nodes can communicate with each other, there is no difference in
a WSN honeypot as to the placement. It should be connected to the network, in WSN
speak be part of the personal area network (PAN). When additionally the transmission
range is considered to be important, then it should be considered to put a production
network in place and a set of detecting honeypot nodes around it.
Will a honeypot for wireless sensor networks work in the scope of high-interaction
honeypots, or will it be in the category of low-interaction honeypots? This is an interes-
ting topic to find a comment to. In general, in wire-bound networks, a high-interaction
honeypot is a real system, that however is specially safeguarded in the sense of the
gathered data to not be deletable and that after a compromise the system cannot be
used as a hop to attack others. Whereas a low-interaction honeypot means, that the
functionality and the interaction with the system is not really existing as in a given ex-
ample, the shell-commands issued are not executed on the system, just the responses
given to make it look for the attacker that a real interaction with the systems is hap-
pening. In this situation, giving a prediction where a WSN will be found, deciding on a
high- or low-interaction honeypot the answer can only be: it depends! For the high-in-
teraction honeypot this is considered to be the right decision, because the WSN nodes
do not allow a node simulation or virtualisation easily, which would be assumed in a
low interaction honeypot. This however is not considered to be true for all scenarios,
low-interaction honeypots are considered to be more stable in an attack scenario. A
clear either-or statement thus cannot be given.
What techniques lead to the research goal now? This needs to be answered with help
of the research method. It is not considered to be quantitative or a qualitative research.
Where should large numbers of test users come from in a field where something new
is considered to be created first. A qualitative research could possibly be doable, if the
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possibility exists to find a test case scenario and a number of experts for a survey. The
latter is kept as a possibility in consideration.
Will it be at the end of the creation of an entirely new and innovative own technique?
Possibility exists, that at the end of the research the outcome is not the same as fores-
een and expected. However, the choice of all the work-steps is considered and written
down in the following pages, and will lead the route to the product to have experiments
on for evaluation.
Will it be a high interaction honeypot, or a low interaction honeypot? Will it be the
combination of the two techniques? Should a hybrid honeypot approach for WSN
be examined, incorporating a mixture of high-interaction and low-interaction honeypot
techniques? This is an interesting question, or set of questions, leading towards a di-
cision. As stated three paragraphs above, this is not so easy to answer, but the current
assumption is that the line of separation of these two categories is not that easily ap-
plicable to wireless sensor networks. As a result, it could be, that a decision between
the one and the other is not possible, because, neither of them exist in a WSN in the
classic meaning and definition, but in the end the single solution will have aspects of
both of the categories incorporated. This topic is also found to be written about in the
paper (Markert & Massoth 2015) and to be found in die Appendix of this thesis.
A detailed discussion on the definition and wording of WSN and the use of honeypot
functions was put to a conference paper (Markert & Massoth 2015).Several implemen-
tation details were already discussed there, like the cloning feature (see also section
3.3.1.3). Virtual cloning of additional devices can of course only be solved “virtually”.
ZigBee offers some security features out of the box. The level of security offered by
ZigBee, along with its weaknesses, has been explored only in part to the present day.
Merely a few people have been doing research in this area at all.
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4.3 Honeypot for Security Enhancement
This thesis follows a defined structure with aims and objectives that were presented
in the first chapter. Although the structure is given, it is found to be important to give
an insight into the questions that are asked during development of the honeypot. From
the literature review and all the projects running on wireless sensor networks security
from recent time until this thesis research it was evident, that no viable honeypot for a
wireless sensor network was found. There was, however, a set of attack tools found,
and attack types seen defined.
Furthermore, it is of interest whether the paradigms from a honeypot as seen in 3.3
remain in a WSN honeypot and exist unchanged. If they do not, it is of interest what
changes are needed to the paradigms, such as if the WSN honeypots are valid, or what
changes in their definition should be.
An estimation of the results needed to be discussed in two steps beforehand. The first
discussion gives insights on the possibilities regarding the attacks that can be detected
with a honeypot for WSN by definition (Markert & Massoth 2014). The second discus-
sion to be mentioned focusses on the wording and general definitions of a honeypot
for a WSN (Markert & Massoth 2015).
There are a number of attack vectors on wireless sensor networks, like they were
shown in section 2.2. On wireless sensor networks they have been exemplified and
roughly summarised there. But why is this a problem, for whom, or in what context?
The solution to the above stated attacks is clear on one hand: listening. Let the attacker
romp around and learn from it. And the second aspect: from the patterns learned,
improvements must then be worked out. Honeypots are by definition a playground for
attackers, their stored logs can be further on used to develop countermeasures.
With the assumption that a honeypot can be a solution, the advantages and disadvan-
tages of this technology shall be determined.
106
4.3. HONEYPOT FOR SECURITY ENHANCEMENT
Another example would be the following: a honeypot is a traditional environment re-
sponsible for the attraction of attackers from the environment. So a honeypot for wi-
reless sensor networks should really be of interest to the attacker, who look for this
for an intrusion. One question is then, do the assumptions hold for the attractiveness
of a honeypot (wired, IP V4, etc.) even with a WSN honeypot? The first thought on
the scientific nature of this PhD research project is: there is no honeypot for wireless
sensor networks as yet! It has never before been shown or proved by anyone that
you can build a honeypot for WSN. There has never before been written in detail how
someone established one. There have been vague suggestions that you can think of
such a thing existing, but never a result.
According to the research seen at 2.3.2.3 it is very important to have a productive WSN
and a WSN with honeypot purpose at the same type of WSN hardware. A very skilled
attacker could otherwise make use of the "‘stealth mode"’ attacks on WSN nodes as
described in the literature. The paper cited describes the possibility to generate data
packets that are read by one type of WSN transceivers, but not by other types (Jenkins,
Shapiro, Bratus, Speers & Goodspeed 2014). To reach this the authors made use of
changing the packets sent in the sequence they are constructed. This is done in four
variations, namely Preamble change, Franconian Bridge, Franconian notch as well as
Cumberland Gap. The first one is is the change of the packet preamble, which means,
that the packet initialisation sent to get transmitter and receiver synced is defined by
the standard, but it was shown that receivers exist, which receive packets even if the
preamble was not standard-conform, containing a shortened set and not eight symbols
as defined. The Franconian notch is a variation on the preamble content, there exist
chip-sets, that react on packets transmitted even if the preamble is not following the
notation specified in the standard. Franconian Bridge means, that between a valid pre-
amble and the per the standard then following start of the packet content a number of
randomly chosen symbols is inserted. The start of the packet is defined by the infor-
mation called SFD (start of frame delimiter), a value set generally to 0xa7h. This then
is a mixture of both techniques described before. Also, here the tested devices were
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responding differently. The Cumberland Gap is logically connected, it is the variation of
having a valid preamble, then a wrong SFD value, followed by a number of random sym-
bols, then another preamble, a valid SFD, then the usual remaining packet structure.
The devices tested did provide different responses to this test-case. As a conclusion
the authors pointed out, that fingerprinting WSN devices was shown to be possible.
For further work the authors pointed out to build a database on test results and refine
the software for automated fingerprinting. Additionally they have further fingerprinting
techniques in consideration and would like to push forward to intrusion detection eva-
sion. The content was extended for a conference paper on the topic (Jenkins, Shapiro,
Bratus, Goodspeed, Speers & Dowd 2014).
The question primarily starting all the following is: “How to track hackers in wireless
sensor networks”. So, this is a primary concern, and it is asked at the beginning of the
research and further questions are all stated with this in mind. First of all, on the dif-
ferent attack types it is important to know the capabilities of attack detection methods,
which approaches exist, which can be used in a WSN? Which attempts are known
and which are under research for the detection of new and for unknown attacks? For
attack detection, is an IDS suitable for a WSN, and are there limitations? Is there a
possible approach to transfer the concept of a honeypot to wireless sensor networks?
Would it be possible to establish such a honeypot in a wireless environment of wire-
less sensor network nodes with typical network structure and under the restriction of
limited system resources and have reasonable output for detection? Is the recent de-
velopment of attacks and tools supporting the research question, is its importance and
the need to develop countermeasures such as an attack detection or honeypot given
by actual attack surface or vectors? Is a smart home integrity part of this research,
should something be said on this topic? Is it measurably secure or safe in a wireless
sensor network with a honeypot? Is a honeypot an improvement? Can the recognition
behaviour of this system be specified, and how can requirements be formulated for a
honeypot which describe the improvement? How can the requirements be tested to be
met, can it be tested for completeness? How can consistency be checked? Are there
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existing definitions of honeypots sufficient in order to protect the wireless sensor net-
works? Are there restrictions in the current definition of honeypots, is there something
on their definition, wording, and in its way it is implemented somehow limited? Is the
transfer from wire-bound honeypot to WSN honeypot possible, does this change the
wording or notation?
This work refers to the issues and makes use of methods from the existing technology
systems that are inherently related. It is a goal to identify ways to support the requi-
rements for security in wireless sensor networks with the use of honeypots. Such an
approach will in the future by increasing deployment of intelligent technology in homes
and dwellings and through the addition of more and more interfaces become more
important.
There were quite often attempts to improve WSN security in theory, so it is clear that
direct comparison is not possible due to the lack of resulting solutions. Since there
is currently no implementation, answers to the above questions can not be given as
yet. A demonstration that a WSN honeypot supports security is in fact necessary, to
validate its usefulness.
4.4 Honeypot Proposal
All the previously discussed points about a honeypot for WSN target the initial research
question: “How to track hackers in wireless sensor networks”.
And the honeypot for WSN as a solution has been discussed and shown to be worth
conducting research on. First of all, a detection of an attack by a hacker is of crucial
necessity. And of course, this is clear as well, the collected information is without
value if nothing is done with it. Data needs to be processed, the information has to be
analysed!




4.4.1 Deployment of the Honeypot
For the deployment of the honeypot sensor, that needs to be laid as allurement to
attract and catch hackers during an attack, several details have to be regarded. The
references that were shown earlier (3.4.1, 1.1) often came from the topics of the smart
home and smart metering. This is one application out of many.
This setup shall be discussed in more depth as well, because it is one of the most
common used application scenarios for the use of the new wireless technology ZigBee,
and because these ZigBee based network nodes can work together in wireless sensor
networks.
When the smart home and as well the security of smart meters are currently under
attack, or are assumed to come under attack in the future, then sensors for attack
detection should be available. Also, they should be deployed in the smart home, or at
least in the same region as the attacked WSN.
A possible solution for the installation of intrusion detecting sensors is to deploy them
in several places in every street, to be precise into street lamps. There is a project in
Hampshire, where the following picture 4.1 is taken from; they equipped their street
lamps with ZigBee compatible devices.
Those are about perfect, due to the fact that they are placed homogeneously about
20 meters apart from each other, so they could additionally create a meshed network
for communication. Also, they are grid powered, so the batteries of a node could be
charged and they would never run out of energy.
Furthermore the lamps are high enough above ground to get a good connection to each
other as well as a good connection from street level up to the attic of a normal house.
Skyscrapers in larger cities would of course need additional installation of repeaters.




Figure 4.1: The street lamp Mayflower installation
4.4.2 Attacks via Internet
A short digression into so-called search-engine driven attacks, sometimes also called
google-hacking: it is a known and common method to search with a web search en-
gine for patterns, which are used by for instance web-cams or network printers. Recent
development has shown, that this is also the fact for some implementations of smart
home gateways. They are equipped with standard user-name and password combi-
nations and are reachable via the Internet. So there is definitely a security issue with
these smart home gateway implementation as shown in 2.2.
When it is supposed that it is possible to detect an attack, the obvious next question
which is immediately following: what will result due to this detection? In some ways, the
attack must ultimately be signalled, and the resulting findings are processed. Several
options can be discussed then, which are then divided into categories.
Signalling: For a detected attack, a visual or audible alarm is triggered, though this
notification only works in close proximity to the sensor that detected the attack. Hence
it is also evident that the attacker can also become aware that the attack was detected.
This does not yet explain how a possible benefit may be drawn from knowledge of the
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attack. In order not to signal locally, the information about the detected attack has to
be transferred over a medium to a remote location. Another possibility here is a wired
connection for audio or visual signals or a bus system which transmits the signalling.
The signalling could furthermore, take place on a device that the user uses daily. It
is conceivable, for example, to signal in the categories via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi or ZigBee
from the sensor to the user’s smartphone or tablet. Short range communication such
as NFC is not seen as useful, due to the limited range of a few centimetres. More on
the signalling will be described in a later section called “Signalling and Managing” (see
section 5.2.1.4).
All of the above-mentioned circumstances, of course, require that a notification can be
displayed on the users device, so an application has to be created for this, which can
display the alert in an signal format that is appropriate. From there, one could think of a
packet distribution scheme by the smartphone to a worldwide honeynet that conducts
research on the attacks on wireless sensor networks.
A key point of further work will therefore be to answer questions arising from the above-
mentioned considerations. How urgent is automation for the signalling of an event? Is
a flashing light considered sufficient enough or does it have to be a text message to
the user’s mobile device? Other possibilities like an email or a phone call could be
considered, too.
4.4.3 Metric to Measure the Results Discussion
The last thing that has to be considered for the research question is how to measure
the work done. A metric is needed to show results. What can this metric be, then?
With regard to this metric, the following statement can be given. When an improvement
is the targeted goal, then it is necessary to find out the status quo and also what would
be an improvement. In this case the following assumption can be done: when an attack
happens to a WSN, then it is either not recognised at all because it is an attack type
that has no outage as a result, or possibly the WSN is affected in some case, that can
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be recognised by an operator. Still, the operator does usualy not know details, whether
it is simply interference with other networks. So the capability to detect an intrusion is
a must, and when these can be counted, this results in the first possible metric, the
number of detected intrusions.
If for test case reasons the attack on the WSN and the honeypot is done in a lab test-
case, then the occurrence of the attack is known for sure. If in this case the attack is not
detected and reported accordingly, then it is obvious, that it was overlooked. So if the
total number of attacks in the lab is known and the number of attacks found is present
as well, then a comparison between these two is possible. This means, that a ratio can
be determined.
The same tactic can be used for another nice measurement. If the time an attacker is
present at the lab is known, then also the time of the measurement of the honeypot
can be compared to that. As long as there is interaction with the honeypot, some in-
formation should be present, and this is true for the time an attacker is working with
a honeypot. This time can therefore be possibly known. And it is also a good way of
measuring the distraction of the attacker from other attack goals by the honeypot.
If there is some way of finding out something on new attack types, then this would be a
great success. It depends on the honeypot at the end, whether it is capable of storing
enough information about a new attack type or not. As the outcome of the research is
unknown beforehand, it is assumed to be possible, but unsure that new attack types
will be definitely found. These were the possibilities found:
1. Total number of detected intrusions.
2. Ratio of detected intrusions to not detected intrusions.
3. Time the attacker was working on the honeypot nodes.
4. Number of new attack types recorded.
Summarising the above lines, it is stated that the number of detections as well as the
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ratio of detections and non detections could be taken as a measure, also the time-
frame in which an attack is occurring, until it is reported. This was discussed, as
well as, necessarily, the number of unforeseen attack types detected. The metrics
were written down as a possible tool to determine accuracy. When looking at the last
one then it becomes clear, that this cannot be taken as a metric, because the total
number of different attack scenarios is essentially unknown. And if the total number
is unknown, the number of new detected attack patterns could be seen as possibly
growing to infinity.
4.4.4 Risk Analysis of the Data an Attacker Might Gather
According to 2.2, the authors differentiate the data that has to be secured. On a low-
level view of the attack, this information could for example be a kind of interpreted view
of the data, for instance a number. On a mid-level view, it could be for instance financial
data, and seen from a high-level abstraction, it could be a process of snooping.
4.5 Honeypot Sketch
The presented literature research emphasises the development of a wireless sensor
network honeypot. The following project sketch is basically a preliminary outline. The
description and requirements of the project are provided with goals and ideas. First
rough use cases are created and described features can be planned. All this is then
put together in a detailed specification.
Whenever a honeypot is attacked it records the attack and causes the attacker to as-
sume that he is actually attacking a worthy network, the targeted node seems to be part
of the wireless sensor network. This concept requires the detection of malicious parties
as well as malicious network traffic, likewise it is described in the work by (Prathapani
et al. 2009) before in 3.3.
The work presented by Mostarda & Navarra (2008) in 3.3.1.2 and (Das 2009) 3.3.1.2
proposes changing roles in the network. This is seen as an supplemental possibility
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to enhance a honeypot for WSN in the future, but for the initial work a fixed set of
productive nodes and a fixed set of honeypot nodes seems to be more sufficient.
This will help to keep results separated from productive network traffic so the the con-
clusion will then be that the detection of new attacks and their methods is possible with
honeypots. Once attackers engage the honeypots, the functional part of the network
will be left with additional time to perform normally while preparing countermeasures.
This should increase the reliability and availability, fulfilling the main purpose of ho-
neypots described as seen in section 3.3 by (Gupta et al. 2012).
Unknown attacks can also be found and screened for reporting. The development
of new countermeasures will only be possible with the detection of unprecedented
attacks. The honeypot concept for wireless sensor networks is designed to feature new
detection mechanisms and new countermeasures compared to traditional approaches.
The implementation of a honeypot for wireless sensor networks is a new way to deal
with new attack scenarios in the field of WSN communications. It deals with the ex-
pected upcoming contributions in the field in the area of WSN regarding security flaws
and could also lead to be a part of a new kind of alternative approach to improve
security within WSNs.
4.6 Honeypot Concept
The proposed honeypot concept is presented in this section, along with a description of
its features and design. It has been shown in the previous section that a honeypot could
indeed help enhance the overall security in WSNs. Several ideas were presented, and
cited. This section will combine these ideas and put them together to a concept for the
honeypot in WSNs. The ideas were described for nearly all of the WSN layers up to
the ZigBee layers. Some were regarding the hardware, some the basic transmission,
others were regarding the improvement of packets and their reliability and some of
them were regarding the upper software layer for the users. So the honeypot has to be
described on several layers and the proposed features are a set on all of the layers.
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Following is a list of features that seem to be suitable for a honeypot proposal and
therefore are going to be incorporated into the design of the features to be put into the
prototype. Some of the ideas of the literature research are referred to as they seem
to be a practical proposal also for a wireless sensor network honeypot. More on the
details is then found in the later sections in chapter 5 and 6 then.
1. The first look is to the hardware. For a security related piece of network part
it should be clear, that it should be a hardened system that is well sealed and
tampering with the hardware should not be made easy with for instance expo-
sing the debug-connectors externally. There exist rules and suggestions like the
ones presented before from the that of the BSI in section 3.3.3 can be taken into
account. Also the suggestions by Singh & Verma (2011) that were presented in
section 3.3.3 can be taken into account.
2. The system additionally features a feedback channel for reporting attacks. This
can be probably done via a covert channel or other medium via a gateway. This
might be done on other frequencies or channels like for instance GSM, 5GHz
Wi-Fi, 868 MHz ZigBee, LAN and others. For a first implementation these hidden
feedback possibilities do not need to be implemented. This is considered as not
being necessary as a matter of research, as it is a trivial task which only requi-
res to have a feedback channel attached. As an example such features exist as
modules to be connected via a serial connection and in an example of GSM be
battery powered, thus the data transfer is not a scientific task any more. Modules
for reference are commonly available in stock, which have a small form factor,
and just need power and control via serial interface to set up a connection with a
SIM card inserted to the board.1
3. A honeypot must not be recognisable as such to an attacker. An attacked ho-
neypot should therefore react in the same way as any other attacked part of the




same. For safety and reliability reasons, it could be equipped with a larger battery
or a wired power supply. It was shown by researchers that it is possible to do a
fingerprinting of devices, meaning, that if device has a different transceiver, then
a different behaviour could possibly be observed. As the transceiver is most often
bound to the processing capabilities, such as increased computational power or
more memory, increasing these details could then result a priori to a detection as
being another type of device, which an attacker might not want to interact with.
(See section 2.3.2.3 and 4.3)
The features listed above are considered useful for a production network and can be
seen as a minimal set of features that makes a prototype honeypot into a first field
test honeypot. The difference to be shown is that during the research it is irrelevant
whether the honeypot is specially shielded to be tamper-resistant or not. In the lab it
is considered not useful to improve on this topic, as no real world attack scenario is
considered during research. The same is true for a suggested hidden feedback chan-
nel. During the tests it is considered to be sufficient that the packet transmission to
a central honeypot-component is out of band on a serial connection. Whether this is
later on changed to a connection on WiFi, GSM or laser-link is irrelevant, as the data
transmission stays the same by the time the connection is established and data trans-
mission is working. The third point is important already in the lab, because the devices’
limitation that were discussed to be the same as any other WSN devices have to be
considered to be important during the prototype creation. Limiting resources after a
product is running is not seen as a good practice.
The requirements for the wireless sensor network honeypot evolve from the above ar-
guments, of which the first one is that the honeypot core components in production
should not expose sensitive access mechanisms. This requirement means to be jus-
tified by the hardening aspect in computer science. So the question here is what this
means on an abstract level and what this should mean in the implementation. For the
overview it means, that the components that do the intrusion detection at the honeypot
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are seen as important, thus it is necessary they keep their work up and running and
they guard the data they gathered. In detail this means that access to the hardware and
also to the software should be restricted. The question to address is then the actual
details on how restrictive can such a core component be set up. This question will be
taken up again in the next chapter where the requirements list is to be found.
The second point that was given above is the requirement that detection is meaning-
less if it has no effect, in the sense of that no action will ever be done. This requirement
is on an abstract level; there must be the possibility to read and understand the gathe-
red data, which for this purpose has to be sent from the node where the intrusion was
detected to a system component that can store securely or alert an operator.
The third point given means, that the productive network in all of its parts has the requi-
rement to be set up coherent with similar system components. The single requirement
derived from this statement means, that the use of the same or at least comparable
hardware for the transceivers is needed, as the hardware tends to react differently.
More on this fact and the meaning of it for the further work with a discussion on the
chips in the testbed is found in a further chapter.
As a summary, the next three points will not be regarded further, as their implemen-
tation is impracticable for an experimental prototype setup. They should therefore be
taken into account for further research.
1. Like it was presented in the previous section 3.3.1.2 the authors Mostarda &
Navarra (2008) suggest assigning roles in the WSN with changing roles, which
seems to be a very good idea for future research, but does not necessarily has to
be implemented at early stages. This feature should be part of the WSN honeypot
in future development as well.
2. Sharing the opinion of the authors (Huang & Lu 2012) in section 3.3.1.3, the
idea of a feature of cloning and replication is not practicable for a WSN, because
nodes with identical signal strength and location could reveal that they are there
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as a bait. (It seems to be better for Wi-Fi or LAN.)
3. The proposed scheme by (Qassrawi & Hongli 2010) from 3.3.1.2 is not suitable,
because as said previously, scheduling and changing roles is not going to be
implemented in a first version of the honeypot for WSN, but could be the part of
a subsequent research work.
Moreover, the recording of unknown attacks will undoubtedly lead to the development
of new countermeasures and hardening. The proposed honeypot concept for WSNs
combines new detection mechanisms offering new countermeasures for the stability
and reliability of the network.
As said previously in this chapter, the detection of an attack by a honeypot and the in-
sight in the behaviour of an intruder can be used to devise appropriate defence mecha-
nisms or to generate updates for the complete network. Considering the publications
over the recent years that were discussing new attack schemes, there is an expected
growing market for researchers to do research on security flaws simply due to the also
growing opportunities for intruders to have a focus on the WSN 2.3.2.3. Honeypots
will help in detecting and resisting these unavoidably upcoming attacks. It should be
understood, though, that the security of a WSN network is not static, but rather an
ongoing process to be kept up during the WSNs whole lifetime.
4.7 Methodology
The research methodology is a very interesting topic, especially in computer science,
which is different from other sciences. Other research areas are is commonly differenti-
ated between qualitative and quantitative research method. The first one is based on a
large number of measurements. It is assumed that the more data is generated or found
during the research, the more precise the result can be. This can be done especially
in various types of sciences, where the result that is found in an experiment can be re-
peated and not random. In a set of experiments an assumption is tested to be valid; if
this hypothesis is significantly shown to be correct, then new knowledge can be found.
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In the area of computer science when something new is considered to be created at
first, this approach is difficult. Especially for this thesis, an experimental setup where
a quantitative approach can lead to a result could not be foreseen. Also the use of
quantitative research needs a proof to be correct, therefore control groups are needed
to see any bias. With regards to qualitative research this is a more user centric way of
doing research, which often consists of to interviews and user behaviour observation, it
is not aimed at finding an exact number for the research, but to find a correct algorithm
for a question. It could be possible to do qualitative research with a honeypot, if there
is a group of test users that run a honeypot, and also test attackers to do attacks, and
then these groups fill out a survey of their user experience, which results can then be
used for improvement. As written, this needs groups of people that are proven experts,
which is needed for the quality in qualitative research, and a proper survey. This at-
tempt was taken into consideration throughout the thesis but not done due to the lack
of possible test case scenarios and the low number of experts available for filling out
a survey. However there was a paper found during literature research on doing cyber
security research by a method for cyber security that was found to be promising, and
the focus was set to work with this research method.
First, the research method is evaluated here, a summary of the paper “Blueprint for a
Science of Cybersecurity” by Schneider (2011) is given.
Essentially, its author is concerned with improving the security of computer systems by
using generally valid principles. He wants to give system developers these principles
as tools to create such systems.
His point of view is, that security can be compared as follows: there is a number of as-
sets, a number of attacks and a number of detections and countermeasures, therefore
it is possible to build a dataset, where researchers can contribute to a knowledge base
regarding the principles listed above.
According to his point of view, a system developer must first of all be clear about what
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the system to be developed has to do, with what it should do it, and what it should
refrain from doing.
In order to ensure that the system does not do what it is not supposed to, it is necessary
to be aware of what should not be done, but at the same time to be aware of how
this malfunction could be achieved by an attack and to provide appropriate related
countermeasures and regulations.
He postulates that these generalisations help to use defences, countermeasures and
rules in the case of the always-same attacks by category, and also in combinations of
these, the compilation of various measures.
The author states, that laws can be generated. These laws build the basis for the
science of cybersecurity, meaning, that it is possible to understand the logical con-
nection between attack, policy and defence in such a way that statements are valid like
“defences in class D enforce policies in class P despite attacks from class A” (Schnei-
der 2011).
In detail, the science of cybersecurity according to Schneider consists of three building
blocks. First of all, the author suggests that all interfaces of a system must be known
and listed. This means that the obvious interfaces have to be thought of, i.e. the ones
existing by intention. Furthermore, there are interfaces that are unintentional (so to
speak a side-channel) and there are still interfaces that cannot be seen as such at first
glance (for instance by freezing the memory of a system to reach a cold boot attack
scenario). Those who know the interfaces also understand the possibilities of attack,
according to the author. The final step of this analysis is about the roles of the people
involved.
In his paper he describes that after the knowledge of interfaces the classes of attacks
are going to be determined. Afterwards it is necessary to know the assets to be sa-
feguarded by the three principles Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA), or if this
does not fit, probably a necessary new definition, as an example hyperproperties are
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given as introduced by Clarkson & Schneider (2010). When it comes to the protection
mechanisms, he structures the defence into the three categories: Isolation, Monitoring
and Obfuscation.
For isolation, he does not present an own law but states that these are virtualisation
and sandboxing topics.
Moreover he describes two mechanisms as examples of laws for safeguarding sys-
tems. The first one is the reference monitor example, where he describes so to say
a wrapper, where each and every execution is granted only when the system will not
reach an invalid status. His “inline reference monitor” solution needs one instance per
executed program.
The law about “Attacks and obfuscators” means, that diversity is important to reach a
resilient system setup. If systems are build equally, and programs running on them are
the same, then this setup is very likely to be attacked, all in one go. A vulnerability that
can be used to propagate a worm by exploiting other systems in the same setup could
lead to a loss of security on all systems at once. So the obfuscator law means, that it
is good to use tools and setups to guarantee that variations of programs exist to make
them resilient to attacks.
According to Schneider the science of cybersecurity can lean on existing knowledge
such as formal methods, byzantine fault-tolerance and experimental computer science.
Formal methods are a set of mathematical proofs that are used to guarantee a program
does exactly what it is supposed to do. While this method sounds perfect its use of
resources and computational power increases with the size of the proof. However, it is
used for routines that are not allowed to fail, for safety critical reasons as an example.
The byzantine fault tolerance is a simple way of generating security by redundancy,
very simply spoken. But as vulnerabilities then would also be replicated, the author
suggests using the obfuscation law presented above.
Regarding the topic “experimental computer science”, he is of the opinion, that: “So
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just as experimentation is useful in the natural sciences, we should expect to find ex-
perimentation an integral part of computer science.” (Schneider 2011). He further
concludes compared to other sciences, that “(..)experimentation for a science of cyber-
security will require test-beds where controlled experiments can be run.”
To other researchers he concludes with “Since a science of cybersecurity should lead
to new ideas about how to build systems and defences, the validation of those propo-
sals could require building prototypes. This activity is not the same as engineering a
secure system. Prototypes are built in support of a science of cybersecurity expres-
sly to allow validation of assumptions and observation of emergent behaviors. So, a
science of cybersecurity will involve some amount of experimental computer science
as well as some amount of experimentation.” (Schneider 2011).
4.7.1 Research Methodology by Schneider
So, as a conclusion after reading and comprehending the paper, this research work will
be based on top of this science of cybersecurity blueprint written by Schneider (2011),
which seems a very good summary to build upon. Thus, the research here will be
using his assumptions, work steps and arguments, also to accept his recommendation
to include experimentation as a reliable step in the science of cybersecurity.
This includes first to describe the interfaces that are possible. Secondly, it is necessary
to understand the policies in wireless sensor networks, what can be achieved and
possible ways to do it.
4.7.2 Following the Method of Schneider
As the title states, the research method is based on the method Schneider (2011)
suggested. Therefore the goal of this section is more on writing about this research
methodology, which is thus based on the work of Fred B. Schneider.
First of all the interfaces of the WSN wireless sensor networks will be described. Accor-
ding to Eckert (2009), the possible ways to exchange information are called channels,
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and she separates legitimate and hidden channels. Such channels (or interfaces, ac-
cording to the wording of Schneider) are used by systems and users for interaction
with procedures, services and processes. For wireless sensor networks, an analysis is
needed to understand the type of channels or interfaces that can be used, upon this the
work then concludes. The analysis is done in section 4.6 as well as a paper (Markert
& Massoth 2013) that focussed on interfaces at all network layers.
The procedure for gaining knowledge is seen as eventually resorting to experiments.
It is a system to be discussed, designed, developed and implemented, it is a prototype
to obtain a measurement result from. The research underlying this work is performed
on the basis of an exemplary implementation of a method.
This chapter was dedicated to the topic of honeypots and showed immense challenges
in their application in wireless networks. Guidance aids were presented for the instal-
lation in a realistic scenario. Furthermore, a number of findings on the assessability
of the quality of a metric have been identified. The chapter started with a design of
a honeypot for wireless sensor networks. Furthermore, the work of Professor Schnei-
der was acknowledged, who, with his work ’ blueprint for a science of cyber security ’,
created an inspiration for the work to be done here. His work emphasises the science





THE following chapter addresses the concepts of the wireless network and dis-cusses the basic concepts of the experiment. This chapter also deals with
the applied construction of the prototype. The chapter starts with a basic design, the
analysis, the concept and the specification, before it continues with the planning of
implementation and validation, up to a viable prototype. This is followed by a discus-
sion on the treatment of attacks, together with an evaluation of how to deal with the
attacks. Next is a series of technical details on the testbed for the prototype, consisting
of various wireless sensor network components, all of which are necessary for the test
setup, followed by a detailed discussion of the attacks that can be executed with the
testbed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the testbed part used for detection
of attacks.
5.1 Overview
The research started with a survey of relevant literature to gain solid background know-
ledge in WSN technology. A summary of the current state of WSN security is provided
in chapter 4. This reflects the initial research into the state of the art in WSNs, and
currently existing security threats to them. With regard to the classical information se-
curity requirements the need in WSNs was formulated. Essential recent improvements
in WSN security were composed and remaining tasks identified (see chapter 4). The
results found were presented in a talk and revealed the gap in WSN security. One
of the essential steps was working out the categorisation of attacks on WSNs (see
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chapter 4). This was done with regard to security mechanisms present in the ZigBee
PRO published in 2007. The findings were categorised and hints from other authors
regarding shortcomings noted to focus on later in the research. A sketch of possible
improvements was done by introducing intrusion detection systems (IDS) and the topic
of honeypots. Improving security methods to detect misuse of a network can be done
in two ways, using an intrusion detection system, or alternatively a honeypot. It is a
fact that there are already theoretical intrusion detection mechanisms that are able to
detect a distinct intrusion scheme with the use of pattern recognition in an invariable
network structure. The potential for IDS with special regard to honeypot architectures
was shown in an internal workshop paper at SEIN 2011, titled “Attack Vectors to Wire-
less ZigBee Network Communications - Analysis and Countermeasures” (Markert et al.
2011), describing the results by then. This presentation of the problem with security
and a possibility to improve it leads over to the next work step, the specification.
In the previous chapters emphasis is placed on the need for enhanced security in wire-
less sensor networks, combined with the demand for some kind of ongoing monitoring,
looking for unusual events in the traffic seen. The determined urgency of the approach
using honeypots for WSN security is suggested.
The requirement for the network nodes in an IDS approach is high on resources in
memory, computational power and energy consumption, this is estimated as counter-
productive as other mechanisms during an attack that were described in 3.4.1 and as
a result would be lowering the overall performance of the WSN. With this in mind, it
is important in the design of a security enhancement to regard the performance and
resource needs. The detection of misuse is possible solely with ongoing monitoring of
the network. To reach this goal, the system therefore has to make available a detection
mechanism, combined with methods for reporting and notification.
For the full function honeypot a complex implementation scenario can be foreseen, with
a widely distributed honeynet, collecting information from lots of member honeypots.
An early prototype for this honeynet will be rather reduced in the number of available
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interacting networking nodes in hardware, and tested in a laboratory environment first.
To be more specific, if misuse of a network is detected by a honeypot node, then an
alarm event will be triggered and the current notification routines are activated, may
they be local, or signalling to a remote user, as well as forwarded to a central alert
system. Indeed, showing an alert is one of the aspects, which will be the focus in
this research. In the end, the efficacy of this honeynet will be quantified in testing and
evaluating the prototype implementation.
In the course of these studies and research throughout the thesis, the goal has always
been to implement and test the honeypot principle in a WSN with a reporting system.
5.1.1 Wireless Honeypot Model
Due to the research goal of a process of attack detection, a step by step approach
seems feasible to generate an intuitive user experience. The process from the attack
happening until the user gets notified is presented in a sequence of steps that is also
shown in the next figure. It contains four parts that were determined in the analysis.
This model is refined as it is the basis for further development.
For the design of a honeypot for wireless sensor networks the components need to be
determined. In previous pages an outlook to some of the details was already given.
In section 4.4 the need to have a detecting component was initially described. Then
the data of the detection needs to be collected, put together, and be combined by the
honeypot. It is assumed, that there could be more than just one detecting component.
The third component is to process the data and report the output to a central compo-
nent that then in a fourth step will signal the alert to the operator. This is a diagram and
list of requirements for honeypot that was generated in the previous pages, see 5.1:
Figure 5.1: UML diagram
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So as shown above, these are the steps in the process of realising the prototype:
• Detection of the attack and initiating the collection of relevant message content
• Combining relevant information to generate a report to be sent
• Reporting the event to a system that has a user interface.
• Signalling the event reception to the user of the honeypot
The previously noted points are fulfilling the requirements that were presented above.
The first requirement definition is beginning in the section 4.3 where it is stated, that
it has to be regarded that the recognition is possible, with the understanding of the
restrictions, what the flexibility of the prototype is, how to test for completeness and
what the need of the prototype is with regard to resource usage.
Furthermore, in a later section 4.6 of chapter 4, there are 6 points listed, that appea-
red in the discussion as the requirements of a honeypot prototype. They are precise
and very short, helping to determine, whether the prototype of the honeypot fulfils this
measures.
1. hardened and sealed system
2. additional feedback channel for reporting
3. must not be detectable
4. assigning roles in the honeynet
5. cloning and replication
6. scheduling scheme.
Likewise it was already written in that section about these six specification criteria, the
first three are indeed attainable and could be regarded as an ambitious goal.
So, the question is what there is in the pertaining literature so far.
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5.1.2 Wireless Honeypot Discussion
The Honeynet Project released a set of requirements at their website as a result of
their internal discussions on the content and the standards of a honeynet collaboration
(Honeynet Project 2004).
As these requirements and others stated before (see section 3.3) are obviously made
for a honeypot in a wire-bound environment, they need some slight interpretation to
make them fit to wireless sensor networks, which has to be done with the goal not
to change the intention of the requirement! This will be followed by a necessary first
discussion.
Thus, an interpreted and modified requirements list based on the work of Grimes
(2005) in section 3.3 for wireless sensor networks honeypot would be:
1. Store the capture away from the sensor nodes. You want to keep the data even if
the node gets damaged or stolen.
2. Don’t let the hackers discover your monitoring devices. If your monitoring tools
are discovered, the hackers could disable them, delete the collected data, or just
avoid the honeypot. (unchanged)
3. A honeypot should strive to look like a production asset. (unchanged)
4. A honeypot system should be designed to prevent a compromise to other net-
works. This means, that by hacking the honeypot the hacker can not have access
to production data, production systems, or production accounts.
The requirements as presented above need a discussion, whether or not these can be
fulfilled. This is done in the following lines, and afterwards the requirements summari-
sed for a related applicability.
The first item means, that the honeypot needs to be designed to forward the data of the
attack. For this to be in a manner not detectable by the attacker, this obviously needs
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to be at least on another frequency or channel, even better done on another medium
entirely.
This conclusion of the first item was put into design of a hidden transport channel.
If other channels or medium is needed to be used an evaluation of these medium is
needed. The remainder of this section will be a discussion about an overview of the
possibilities.
Costs occur if the techniques used need special hardware; commonly used hardware
is for instance Ethernet, more costly are wireless chip-sets (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Zigbee,
GSM), most expensive are fibre channels. For the discussion of the throughput, which
depends on the technique used, and also on the noise ratio of the medium a dedicated
feedback channel has the highest reliability. With a view on the hidden factor, which is
higher if a service is attacked, when communication on this channel is made impossi-
ble. So an attacker cannot recognise the communication spontaneously. If a transport
is used on the same channel or frequency, it is very likely to be detected by an attacker
and it has another problem, too: if the attacker performs a denial of service attack, then
communication on this channel is not possible any more. So it is clear, that the overall
usefulness depends on the hidden factor, also it depends on the cost of the solution.
The result of this discussion is, that the attack detecting component should ideally be
wire-bound to the analysis module to deliver best results.
The second item from the list above on non detectability is important and does not in-
terfere with the requirements so far, as it was also shown in section 4.6 as item number
three and also found to be important. Also the third item in the list above has the same
context as well and fits to the same item number three in section 4.6.
The fourth item in the list above is connected to the first item of the list in section 4.6
and contains the system configuration. However, it gets more specific here to not allow




Figure 5.2: HoneySpot design by the Honeynet Project
5.1.3 The Wireless Honeynet Definition
Now a discussion on wireless sensor networks is necessary. Here, the separation of
networks is not possible. One cannot possibly put firewalls on wireless sensor network
nodes due to resource and other restrictions. Well, but what if it were made possible,
would it help after a compromise? For this, one has to look at the design of a wireless
sensor network node, as compared to the picture shown by Siles (2007), see figure
5.2.
The picture makes it clear like it was shown in the design phase, for a wireless honeypot
the important aspect is to have a standard out of the box productive network, that, if it
is compromised holds the first assumptions of honeypots:
Data control
So, the productive wireless sensor network is destined to get attacked, but when at-
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tacked, this should not lead to the possibility that other parts of the network or even
other wireless sensor networks can get attacked. In theory, this could be accomplis-
hed, although it seems to be a very hard task. In wireless networks each participant in
communication can move and change the network structure when reachability to one
or other network nodes improve or deteriorate. It has been shown that there wireless
sensor network worms are possible (Gu & Noorani 2008), and one of the latest results
was an Internet of Things worm draft for the Philips SmartLink light bulbs and other
similarly controlled devices (Ronen et al. 2018).
The image above 5.2 shows the components WAP, WC, WMON, WDA and WI.
• WAP (Wireless Access Point) module: the wireless network infrastructure for
clients, decoy for attackers to connect to as the target.
• WC (Wireless Client) module: these are legitimate end user devices that connect
to the WAP. They are a requirement to generate network load and make it look
just like a normal network to an attacker.
• WMON (Wireless Monitor) module: this device collects all the wireless traffic for
analysis.
• WDA (Wireless Data Analysis) module: analyses network traffic from the WMON,
necessary to determine the attacks and make sure the details are captured.
• WI (Wired Infrastructure) module: this is the “wire-bound” part of the production
network, it is an optional element containing services a network commonly has
for authentication and routing to other networks.
The WAP in a wireless sensor network honeypot can be seen as the coordinator of the
network (probably routers, too, which will be found out). The WC in a wireless sensor
network can be seen as the end-devices. The WMON in a wireless sensor network can
be seen as the central honeypot component, reading all the traffic from the wireless
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medium and forwarding it for analysis. The WDA in a wireless sensor network is the
analysis part that is controlling data storage and triggers an alerting component for the
security administrator. The WI in a wireless sensor network is uncommon, as in lots
of wireless sensor network installations there are no Internet services used within a
wireless sensor network.
With these components of the wireless honeypot Siles (2007) proposes to do data
capture, control and analysis.
The Data Capture element from the requirements from Honeynet Project (2004) is
done within the WMON, whose challenges are:
1. to be set up similarly to the WAP, meaning that the technical parameters are
similar.
2. to forward the data capture as fast as possible due to the limited local storage
capabilities.
3. to be on the same channel as the WAP.
4. to cover with the WMON receiver at least the WAP area; the author suggests to
deal with the receiver sensitivity and the antenna for the WMON.
5. to reliably discern legitimate traffic of the end devices and exclude these from
analysis consideration.
The Data Analysis element from the requirements of Honeynet Project (2004) is imple-
mented within the WDA. The WDA challenges are:
1. to be set up to have a direct communication channel to the WMON.
2. to receive all data in a technical standardised PCAP format.
3. to give an overview of the network status
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4. to have storage capability at least as much as the WMON storage.
5. to have storage capability for a suggested period of several weeks.
The Data Control element from the requirements by Honeynet Project (2004) is imple-
mented in the WI module of the wireless honeypot; its challenges are:
1. if designed to be a public wireless network, to be set up to have a channel to the
Internet to make it look like a real wireless network or an Internet emulation.
2. if public, to make sure that Data Control holds, it is more important than Data
Capture.
3. to provide additional services in an Intranet.
As stated above, the WAP, WC, WMON and WDA components can be added to a
wireless sensor network honeypot and there is limited modification needed to the re-
quirements. However, the challenges remain, that now there is a completely other
medium, and solutions cannot simply be adopted from 802.11 to 802.15.4 networks.
Moreover, the “Data Control” element must be discussed. The WI as described by Si-
les (2007) is not mandatory, and also, the Internet uplink is not mandatory, therefore
the Data Control attribute of the definition of Honeynet Project (2004) is not always
present in a wireless network as designed for HoneySpot, and it is possible to argue,
that the Data Control element is therefore also not to be required in the wireless sensor
network honeypot if there is no Internet uplink.
5.1.4 Problem Definition and System Specification
First of all, the problem is defined, that is intended to be solved. This will be presented
in a simple, natural language and is intended to be completely independent of the
computer science world.
The goal accordingly is: “Therefore a system is going to be developed, that has the
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Figure 5.3: Honeypot sketch
capabilities to act as a decoy. It is defined as a honeypot1 for wireless sensor networks.
More components are defined up to the signalling of the attack.”
A sketch of a honeypot is presented in picture 3.2. This is a very abstract sketch
and does not involve a view to the different hardware components, it is more a logic
combination of abstract components that form together a honeypot. The system com-
ponents that were introduced until this point are now put together. Also the components
are enhanced with a specification of the hardware modules that were considered, so
that there is a chain of system components working together. Further work was done
to get a more precise image of how a honeypot for ZigBee should look like, see figure
5.3.
The capture and detection of wireless transmission of an attack is intended to happen
with the use of the AVR Raven component as shown on the diagram. The further step
consists of a refinement; the system broken into parts.
5.1.5 Analysis of the Demands on the System
The system needs to have the following parts. Like it was presented in the system spe-
cification, the parts of the honeypot are listed and shown here in detail. The proposed
honeypot is a set of components that have to work together in order to achieve a goal
of incident detection and handling.
The Honeypot Sensor is the first component that has to be designed, consisting of an




The requirements analysis is the first approach to precise the system. It has to stay
there for a long time, at least it should run one year on battery. It has to be a good
reception area for an attack, so it is going to be equipped with an aerial for good
reception. The notice that an attack is happening has to be transported to a destination
where it can be shown. This has to be in time and reliable, realtime-reporting it not seen
as necessary. It might sound strange, but an alarm within less than a minute can in a
discussion be seen sufficient.
The better and more detailed the requirements are listed, the less functionality must be
changed during programming, which would be time consuming and error prone.
The following is a set of requirements that are hard facts to be implemented.
REQ 1 - the detection has to happen on a node-class device.
REQ 2 - the detection and the production net have to be of the same type of devices.
REQ 3 - the detection is not allowed to be found out by the attacker.
The requirements above exist due to a set of logical conclusions. The first require-
ment needs explanation: REQ 1 exists because of the possibility of attackers to directly
physical interact with devices. In a production network of node-class devices the com-
ponents are commonly set up in a way that is different from a test setup such as open
access to the hardware, debugging functionality enabled and connection to their ports
enabled. A production network has to be secured, and the detection components have
to be secured as well. The node class device also means, that it has the same ca-
pabilities as a regular node with regards to computational power or system memory.
This concludes with the second requirement which focusses on the networking. As it
was shown by researchers, wireless transmission can be crafted in a way that it is
only read by a type of transceivers chipsets, but not by others. Therefore, the detection
components have to have the same type of chipset as the production network. Diffe-
rent chipsets would make no sense, as attacks could happen without a detection. The
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third requirement might seem obvious, as an attacker may have different reactions to
finding out being recognised. It depends, whether the recognition happens before, du-
ring or after the an attacker had interaction with the honeypot. If before, the attacker
might possibly refrain from attacking. As an alternative possibility, the attacker might
also choose to do something that was not planned, such as something that gives non-
sense information to the honeypot. However, there might also be the possibility, that
nodes get compromised or stolen, if this scenario is possible. This is a situation that
should be avoided.
Following is a list of components that are involved in the honeypot in total.
COM 1 - decoy devices of honeypot
COM 2 - detecting component that forwards data for analysis
COM 3 - analysing component
COM 4 - alerting component
The component 1 has the purpose to attract an attacker. Be it a real productive system
or just a WSN without a real use, it is important that the decoy is present, that net-
work traffic is existing as a wireless transmission. An attack should be detected by a
honeypot node, a so called sensor. This is the component 2. The attack is then pre-
processed and of course forwarded to a node where it is going to be post-processed.
The data is transferred from the wireless sensor network away to another platform.
At this component 3, the analysis takes place. Then it is sent to its destination, that
destination can be enriched with a visual interface, a buzzer or light-signal, it can also
use the message and forward it. There are enough message gateways possible that
can be thought of, messenger, email- or SMS-gateway or what ever the medium for the
forwarded message will be. In the event of an attack this has to be told to the operator
of the honeypot. Whereas the last step at component 4 is seen as purely optional for
the detection and analysis, it is important for a honeypot operator. This last step of
signalling is important, but to be defined later, because it is the last and assumed to be
the most trivial task.
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Figure 5.4: Component view for illustration
For illustration purposes the components are drawn here. This also includes a descrip-
tion of the components, see figure 5.4. More on the components is found at a later
section in this chapter.
The first component, the decoy wireless sensor network has to run on standard WSN
components. Also the second component, the sensor, has to run on standard hardware
by Atmel, used here on AVR Raven boards and the Atmel ZigBit modules available.
The second component is preferably the ZigBit USB stick, because it will be running
on a gateway system, which is represented by similar hardware with serial interfaces.
The third component is a processing component, this will run on a host computer which
will then forward the data to a PC. This is the fourth component.
5.2 From Concept to Design Solution
In the section of the problem definition and resulting demands the need of a honeypot
for wireless sensor networks was made clear. It is described in the requirement analy-
sis that the detection as well as a graphical user interface is desired. The system could
as an extension be designed to have an API interface component to work with other
honeypots with the intent to allow communication between multiple honeynets.
The specification of this distributed honeynet architecture was discussed in section 4.4
of this report and will rely on the results named there. The goal is to specify complete
details for implementing the system in all of its parts, in the network as well as in the
users’ node. Section 4.6 focused on concepts and section 4.4.2 looked at the details of
the technical prerequisites; the full functional specification will give an explicit overview
of the system design as a whole.
To provide details for the next step, drafts of the graphical user interface and other
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connections will be determined and drawn (see section 5.6.5). This is going to be done
for all of the central elements of the system: the detector, the reporter, the combiner
and the signaller. It is expected, that formal development of these central elements will
depend (or rely) on these details.
As the previous section described the layers of components to be worked at, this part
describes the honeypot. There has to be a destination for the alerts a honeypot ge-
nerates, and these alerts should also be reacted on and used to develop appropriate
countermeasures. Therefore there will be a host based client component with a graphi-
cal user interface to display those alerts and reports. This client’s hardware will be a
standard laptop, connected to the honeypots via a gateway. Alternatively a mobile
device could be thought of.
The development of a honeypot prototype will start with implementation of the mecha-
nisms to the design of the proposed product. As development platform the Atmel AVR
(and former Meshnetics) products called Raven (see Figure 5.5) and ZigBit (see Fi-
gure 5.6) seemed to be equipped with state of the art chipsets and a well established
developer community, also regarding ZigBee related topics.
In total a set of five MeshBean2 boards from Meshnetics as well as four AVR Raven
USB sticks and eight AVR Raven mobile nodes will be used for this task. The deve-
lopment boards contain the same chipsets and are already code compatible by the
microcontroller used: an Atmel ATmega 1281 and Atmel ATmega 1284p, as well as
the by chipset used for wireless communication, an Atmel AT86RF230. The Atmel
AT90USB1287 features additional on-chip USB capable communication for the Raven
USB stick.
As such, it is a classic situation from transmitter to receiver, in which the sink is always
the coordinator, the gateway to the host. The question which arises at this point is the
amount of detail necessary. The participating modules are shown here schematically.
The Raven (see Figure 5.8 and 5.7) and Meshbean (see Figure 5.9) modules come
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Figure 5.5: Atmel AVR Raven development kit
Figure 5.6: Meshnetics MeshBean2 board with ZigBit module
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Figure 5.7: Diagram of AVR Raven USB stick
Figure 5.8: Diagram of AVR Raven module
Figure 5.9: Diagram of ZigBit module on MeshBean2 board
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Figure 5.10: Atmel AVR JTAGICE mkII
with details as to their design, this makes the credible statement that these are in
principle based on the same hardware and software.
Also the used programs, tools and techniques should be listed at this point. For pro-
gramming the Atmel AVR Studio 4 with debugging functionality will be used. Its use
is free of cost and therefore ideal for development in a low cost research setup. For
debugging purposes an Atmel JTAG device was bought (see Figure 5.10).
The AVR JTAGICE mkII is manufactured by Atmel. It is a very powerful development
tool for programming and can also be used to debug the programs directly on the micro-
controller via JTAG interface. It is very important to mention this, because development
without a serious and proper debugging hardware is nearly impossible, using OTAP
and just serial programming is really very slow.
From a basic design with the sketch of the honeypot in this section (see Fig. 5.11)
where a redirection attack is shown to happen, a more elaborated design can be deve-
loped. This will be shown after the introduction of its parts.
As described previously, the nodes have to be configured in a way that an attacker can
not distinguish between “normal” nodes and the ones with honeypot functionality.
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Figure 5.11: Basic concept of honeypot showing an attacker in a WSN
5.2.1 Architecture of the System Design at a Higher Level
The features on a high level of abstraction are defined in an architecture specification.
These parts are an overview of the modules and their interaction. This involves im-
portant data structures for data storage. The communication must be documented in
detail. For the most crucial key components the decisions are defined. For example
this could be an algorithm decision or a threshold value or retry counter definition. The
solution principles of the crucial key algorithms are defined.
The system consists of different components, some are hardware-centric programmed
with the given C/C++ language, the signalling component is going to be implemented
with an object-oriented solution in Java for Android. The host based application is going
to be implemented in C++ aswell.
Therefore in the detailed design the discussion is about objects, modules, processes,
network components and is much finer and more structured.
In this design the client computer has to be connected with the monitored network.
In the development phase this should not be cost-intensive, so it is clear that this is
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done ideally via a direct connection, for instance by serial communication. All the
transferred data could of course also be provided for example via GSM network, SMS
based texting or email communication via the Internet. Due to the increased costs this
is not done in the research phase. The capabilities of the MeshBean2 boards make
these an ideal network component for this task as well an ideal gateway due to their
possible USB connection for serial communications.
5.2.1.1 Detector / Sensor
The detection part is developed within an Atmel microcontroller environment. When
the honeypot nodes are up and running and the individual nodes are reporting to the
central component of the network, then a basic honeypot functionality is achieved.
This detection will determine any misuse of the detector as a part of the honeypot. This
will be done according to different levels of interaction according to the description in
section 4.4.2.
The misuse detected will be differentiated and reacted upon correspondingly. The
simplest case would be for instance a probing of a honeypot device, which can also be
caused by an automatic service by another device. High interaction with the honeypot
device, though, would be medium on the scale. The highest level of misuse is the
deploying of new firmware or other code, which behaviour should always be regarded
as a direct violation of all security rules. The honeypot detector as described in the
previous sections 4.6 is responsible for a permanent and ongoing security detection,
more precisely a misuse detection and categorisation, so that the security can be kept
on a level.
With an ongoing security enforcement, a foundation stone is laid for the benefit of
WSNs. The honeypot detector has a reporting scheme that could also easily be adop-
ted for other research groups’ projects, so additions to this work are kept open and an
exchange of research outcome is possible with these research groups.
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5.2.1.2 Reporter
The implementation of the Reporter is a set of functions to report the event that was
triggered by the misuse of a honeypot system, and will be reported to the combiner to
forward it for signalling. Forwarding the information shall take place in a secure manner,
and end to end encryption of the report is to be considered in the prototype state of
the reporter. The reporter can be part of the honeypot host, but can be also seen as
separated due to the fact that the reporting network traffic could take place on another
medium like GSM networking.
5.2.1.3 Combiner / Collector
The Combiner or Collector is the sink of the honeypot network, as it were; the place
where all the detected anomalies from the honeypot sensors are collected and will be
forwarded for signalling. Being a very important part of the network, it is clear that it has
to be secured in a hardened and very fail-proof manner. The Collector shall also get
more than enough storage to buffer accumulated data until it can be forwarded to the
signaller; when there is no direct connection currently possible, the collector’s buffer for
security incidents should be designed to handle the information and therefore should
not run out of memory.
5.2.1.4 Signalling and Managing
The implementation of the signaller is a prototype, and its purpose is to show the ho-
neypot status to an operator. An evolution to completion can be handed over to project
groups for further development. The fundamentals of the signaller are signalling alerts
complete with misuse categorisation and the overview of the total honeypot network
status. Later development could implement authenticated update mechanisms for the
devices and further analysis options for the reported alerts.
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5.2.2 Design: Detailed Design
In software design, a detailed plan is created, by which the program system should be
implemented.
In the design phase, all final decisions are made in the ideal case, which determine
the behaviour of the software in every possible operation case, the algorithms for its
execution and the data structures of the underlying information.
During the design, a general model of the final honeypot is created that is independent
of the programming and its language.
The model must contain all the key elements such as classes, objects, states, ope-
rations, and attributes. The model must show all the relationships between the key
elements to them, which are responsible for the problem solution or program manage-
ment.
It is basically divided into problem-specific conditions and needs at the application level.
At the application level, for example, objects may be needed to manage the user input
and classes for the graphical, structured output.
All interaction sites and interfaces between functionally separate software modules are
designed far-sighted.
With the demands on the system and a first idea of the system in the previous section,
now a class design is created. The figure 5.12 shown below was created with the
premise that all components can be shown, even if no program or routine exists at all.
The design is in this class diagram, the figure 5.12 shows a class diagram of the parts
of the honeypot system for creating the WSN honeypot.
This diagram shows on the upper left the honeypot used by an operator via a graphical
user interface, where alerts are shown to the operator providing additional details. For
this the honeypot with the GUI makes use of the stored attacks in a database, which
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Figure 5.12: Honeypot class diagram
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Figure 5.13: Beekeeper overview diagram
were stored including type of attack and additional information. Between the operator
centric component and the wireless sensor network the data is exchanged over a serial
connection. Such connections are often called a gateway, when data from the WSN is
transported to a kind of personal computer or similar device. The core component in
the diagram is shown as honeypot-root, and it receives the attack information of con-
nected honeypot-nodes. The attacks are initiated by an attacker and result in data of
the attacks being monitored and given to the node, then the root, and the application
with GUI for storage to the database.
Further information on this design was made irrelevant as less than a year after provi-
ding this information a software called beekeeperwids was presented by researchers,
which was taken into consideration to be a basis to build further work on. For com-
pleteness this software is shown in detail, starting from an overview down to a class
diagram view, too.
The graphics of the honeypot have to be regarded as a holistic approach as said before,
the following diagrams however are the result of further work, and as development went
on further, the graphics had to be revised again. Following is a diagram as presented
by the researchers connected to the beekeeperwids, see figure 5.13.
This is an overview, showing the capturing components, the filtering components, the
storage and analytics as well as the alert presentation component. Following is an ex-
planation with more details. The interface is a system component such as the AVR
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Raven stick with sniffing capabilities. It captures the packets and forwards them to a
drone component. The drone has the purpose to do a specific type of work steps ac-
cording to a type of filter plugin that is loaded. In the case of attack detection there is a
plugin running that does filtering of packets. The drone component then gives relevant
packets to the central beekeeper daemon component, which does store to a central
database. Also, at the central beekeeper component there are modules running, which
can check for an attack matching.
But other plugins in the drone could also be implemented, such as automated pac-
ket replay, sending random packets and so on, but this is not the way that the drone
is intended to be used. The beekeeper daemon is offering services via an API. The
drone is sending packets to the destination of packets that follow the filtering rules.
Four modules were provided by the authors to detect malbehaviour on the WSN:
• Bandwidth usage detection,
• Beacon request detection,
• Denial of service detection,
• Disassociation detection
An analytics module and a base module class is implemented.
The beekeeper is a tool that lays the foundation for detecting intrusions on a wireless
network. This tool is open source and was released under the GPL. Following now is
a set of class diagrams to explain the components that were used as a foundation and
then to be extended with additional features. The diagrams can be read just as normal
UML class diagrams, meaning that at the top is the name of the class, below are the
attributes and on the bottom the operations, see figure 5.14.
This picture gives a complete overview on the Beekeeperwids. The overview is inten-
ded to be a basis for discussion on the components. On the left-hand side there is the
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Figure 5.14: Beekeeper overview class diagram
description of a database. It is filled by the packets that are received from the moni-
toring system components, the so-called drones. After pre-processing to refrain from
forwarding valid network traffic to the database the data is put into the databases and
stored there. It is possible to tell drones to actively search for attacks. It also is possible
to tell the Beekeeperwids to repetitively scan the database of captured packets for an
attack pattern. Those are written into rules such as for instance: If there is a capturing
of network-requests, then the amount of those requests shall be checked for a thres-
hold; if this is exceeded, then an alert must be given. As shown in the diagram above,
the packets in the database have all the relevant information with them, such as packet
content or the signal strength.
This following diagram 5.15 explains the drone component of the honeypot. Such as it
was stated above, a drone is a system component that has direct access to a sniffing
component. All network traffic is received by the drone from the sniffer. It is well known
what is valid network traffic in the WSN, so the focus is to store only unusual network
traffic. By eliminating known traffic from storage, lots of resources are kept available
from the limited resources. The class BasicPacketFilter is a component of each drone,
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Figure 5.15: Drone class diagram
and each of its plugins helps to forward relevant data for analysis. With regard to com-
munication, the drones are part of a network, because each drone sends the new
relevant data that was captured to the core component. In a lab environment this is
an IP based network, all components have an IP address and a port. The configura-
tion is seen above in the class DroneClient. This setup is a possible implementation;
for every possible setup another configuration is plausible. Arguing and discussing net-
work topologies is as told not the preferred domain of this thesis. What remains open for
discussion is the connection to Killerbee; the framework has far more possibilities than
what is known to the public. For instance, it is possible to give each system component
its location coordinates by using the global positioning system (GPS), and this data
could be forwarded to the core component of the honeypot. This could be implemented
in the future, as the GPS coordinates could be included in the Killerbee frameworks
data, they are prepared already in stub-alike codings, such information would then just
be forwarded.
This diagram 5.16 shows the function of the analytic module, whose main purpose is
the configuration of the monitoring scripts that are intended to run on the data sub-
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Figure 5.16: Analytic module class diagram
mitted from drones. This means the data that was captured by a drone needs a first
decision, whether it is relevant to be further processed and if so, be forwarded for a
further work step. This is done with the goal to have only relevant packets forwarded
to the central component and there to be stored in the database to be the basis of an
alert. For clarification, normal network behaviour, such as the reporting of environmen-
tal parameters to the WSN gateway is not intended to be seen as a possible attack.
However, if the monitoring scripts are configured, they run an analytical task on the
captured packets in the database. Whenever an attack pattern matches, there will the
operation generateAlert be running.
It is a wish to generate knowledge using the honeypot. This is not only intended to
be the knowledge that an attack has happened, Furthermore, there is the wish to le-
arn something about new attacks. Those new attacks can be detected. However, this
is resource costly. The explanation is as follow for a honeypot that is set up in a real
production system. For unknown attacks a full capture must be made, meaning that all
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packets received by the drone must be stored to the database. If the existence of an
attack is assumed to have happened, but still is unknown because it did not generate
an alert, but a strange behaviour of the wireless sensor network has been observed,
then there still is the full packet capture that might give more information to the opera-
tor. This means, especially in real production system installation of a honeypot, that if
unknown attacks shall be detected, then a well dimensioned data storage must exist. At
non-production honeypots, also known as scientific honeypots, it is easier because the
amount of data can be configured to a low number of data packets regularly sent, for
instance only transmitting environmental parameters every half an hour and be silent
in between. So, if the attack has now been written to the database and this attack has
then been analysed by the operator, then the likely found underlying attack pattern can
be understood and appropriate countermeasures can be developed. Those should be
given back to the community as a monitoring module for the beekeeper. An automatic
scripted solution for analysis and update can be considered for further research.
5.3 Realisation
In the realisation the above defined structure is described with the syntax of the pro-
gramming language. As the structure from the beekeeper is already given, the task is
to enhance it for the desired purposes. Likewise, it was stated before, a possible at-
tack is seen on the ZigBee networks, and as an example for an application there is the
Philips Livingcolors that uses Zigbee Light Link (ZLL). In the upcoming sections there
will be shown, what can be done from an attack point of view. However, the beekeeper
is by default not capable to handle ZLL. Therefore, here an addition to the beekeeper
is needed to be implemented to detect attacks to the ZLL. By gathering information
around the attacks it was seen that some ZLL transmission routines are implemented
for secbee and z3sec. The attacks on ZLL executed later in this chapter are for a simple
example the ZLL identify, where a ZLL device starts blinking for a timespan between 1
and 65534 seconds. During this timespan, the device can be controlled remotely by a
user, but then continues the identify action by blinking. Only a hard reset of the device
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renders it operational again. The now following implementation shows how the attack
detection is done for this example.
5.3.1 Implementation: Software Engineering, Programming
To implement the predefined software concepts, the modules and program routines are
programmed individually into a sequence of commands according to specification.
The following is part of the implementation and is shown on the following pages as
sketch (see figure 5.3) as well as pictures taken of the testbed setup. This is later on
followed by screenshots of attack and detection performed.
The beekeeper cannot by default handle ZLL for detection. It is very simply stacked.
When the Identify packet is going to be generated, it follows the way through all the
stack levels: The ZLLIdentifyRequest is bound to the ZigbeeZLLCommissioningCluster.
The ZigbeeZLLCommissioningCluster is bound to ZigbeeAppDataPayloadStub. The
ZigbeeAppDataPayloadStub is part of the ZigbeeNWKStub. The ZigbeeNWKStub is
part of the Dot15d4Data. The Dot15d4Data is bound to Dot15d4FCS and Dot15d. A
Dot15d4FCS packet is data, that is already validated to be actual network traffic, no
random signals are expected here. Dot15d4 is the same without check. Thus, an at-
tack pattern is generated by the following code (excerpt from touchlink-lib of z3sec):
1 def create_identify_request (self , dest_addr , duration =0 xffff
):
2 """
3 Create a touchlink identify command frame .
4 Parameters
5 ----------
6 dest_addr : int
7 The IEEE address of the device to which the command
shall be sent .




9 duration : int , optional
10 The duration of the identify operation . A value of 0
aborts a
11 previously initiated identify operation , 0 xffff lets
the target
12 identify for a default time . All other values in the
range of 0 to





18 # create IEEE 802.15.4 layer
19 mac = Dot15d4FCS () / Dot15d4Data ()
20 mac . fcf_security = 0
21 mac . fcf_ackreq = 1
22 mac . fcf_pending = 0
23 mac . fcf_panidcompress = 0
24 mac . fcf_srcaddrmode = 3 # long
25 mac . fcf_destaddrmode = 3 # long
26 mac . dest_panid = 0 xffff
27 mac . dest_addr = dest_addr
28 mac . seqnum = self . seqnum
29 mac . src_panid = self . src_pan_id
30 mac . src_addr = self . src_addr_ext
31
32 # create NWK layer
33 nwk = ZigbeeNWKStub ()
34
35 # create AppDataPayload layer
36 app = ZigbeeAppDataPayloadStub ()
37 app . delivery_mode = 0 # unicast
38
39 # create Light Link Commissioning Cluster frame
40 com = ZigbeeZLLCommissioningCluster ()




43 # create Identify Request command frame
44 cmd = ZLLIdentifyRequest ()
45 cmd . inter_pan_transaction_id = self .
inter_pan_transaction_id
46 cmd . identify_duration = duration
47
48 self . update_sqn ()
49
50 return mac / nwk / app / com / cmd
It makes use of the definition written for scapy to generate the following code:
1 ## This file is for use with Scapy
2 ## See http :// www . secdev . org / projects / scapy for more information
3 ## Copyright (C) Ryan Speers < ryan@rmspeers .com > 2011 -2012
4 ## 2012 -03 -10 Roger Meyer <roger . meyer@csus .edu >: Added frames
5 ## This program is published under a GPLv2 license
6
7 """




11 import re , struct
12
13 from scapy . packet import *
14 from scapy . fields import *
15
16 ... snip
17 bind_layers ( Dot15d4 , Dot15d4Data , fcf_frametype =1)
18 ... snip
19 bind_layers ( Dot15d4FCS , Dot15d4Data , fcf_frametype =1)
20 ... snip
21 class Dot15d4Data ( Packet ):
22 name = " 802.15.4 Data "
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23 fields_desc = [
24 XLEShortField (" dest_panid ", 0 xFFFF ),
25 dot15d4AddressField (" dest_addr ", 0 xFFFF ,
length_of =" fcf_destaddrmode "),
26 ConditionalField ( XLEShortField (" src_panid ",
0x0), \
27 lambda pkt :
util_srcpanid_present ( pkt )),
28 ConditionalField ( dot15d4AddressField ("
src_addr ", None , length_of =" fcf_srcaddrmode "), \
29 lambda pkt : pkt .
underlayer . getfieldval (" fcf_srcaddrmode ") != 0) ,
30 # Security field present if fcf_security ==
True
31 ConditionalField ( PacketField (" aux_sec_header
", Dot15d4AuxSecurityHeader () , Dot15d4AuxSecurityHeader ),
32 lambda pkt : pkt .
underlayer . getfieldval (" fcf_security ") == True ),
33 ]
34 def mysummary ( self ):
35 return self . sprintf (" 802.15.4 Data ( % Dot15d4Data .
src_panid %:% Dot15d4Data . src_addr % -> % Dot15d4Data . dest_panid
%:% Dot15d4Data . dest_addr % )")
36
37 def guess_payload_class (self , payload ):
38 if ord ( payload [0]) & 0 x01 and ord ( payload [0]) & 0 x02 : #
Inter - PAN Frametype
39 return ZigbeeNWKStub
40 ... snip
41 class ZigbeeNWKStub ( Packet ):
42 name = " Zigbee Network Layer for Inter - PAN Transmission "
43 fields_desc = [
44 # NWK frame control
45 BitField (" reserved ", 0, 2) , # remaining subfields shall
have a value of 0
46 BitField (" proto_version ", 2, 4) ,
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47 BitField (" frametype ", 0b11 , 2) , # 0 b11 (3) is a reserved
frame type
48 BitField (" reserved ", 0, 8) , # remaining subfields shall
have a value of 0
49 ]
50
51 def guess_payload_class (self , payload ):
52 if self . frametype == 0 b11 :
53 return ZigbeeAppDataPayloadStub
54 ... snip
55 bind_layers ( ZigbeeAppDataPayloadStub ,
ZigbeeZLLCommissioningCluster ,
56 profile =0 xc05e , cluster =0 x1000 )
57 ... snip
58 bind_layers ( ZigbeeZLLCommissioningCluster , ZLLIdentifyRequest ,
59 command_identifier =0 x06 , direction =0)
60 ... snip
61 class ZLLIdentifyRequest ( Packet ):
62 name = " ZLL : Identify Request "
63 fields_desc = [
64 # Inter - PAN transaction identifier (4 octets )
65 XLEIntField (" inter_pan_transaction_id ", 0 x66666666 ),
66 # Identify duration (1 octet ):
67 # 0 x0000 : Exit identify mode
68 # 0 x0001 - 0 xfffe : Number of seconds to remain in
identify mode
69 # 0 xffff : Remain in identify mode for a default time
known by the receiver
70 XLEShortField (" identify_duration ", 0 xffff ),
71 ]
72 ... snip
To add the detection to the beekeeper, additions had to be made on these files: ine
wids-daemon.py the module had to be entered to the module list during startup and




2 from beekeeperwids . wids . modules . identify_flood import
IdentifyMonitor
3 ... snip
4 def loadModuleClass (self , module ):
5 ... snip
6 if module == ’ IdentifyMonitor ’ : return IdentifyMonitor
7 ... snip
After these prerequisites, the new file for monitoring called identify-flood.py was imple-
mented as follows:
1 import time , logging , signal
2 from time import sleep
3 from scapy . all import Dot15d4FCS , Dot15d4CmdDisassociation ,
ZigbeeNWKCommandPayload
4
5 from multiprocessing import Process
6 from datetime import datetime , timedelta
7
8 from beekeeperwids . wids . modules import AnalyticModule
9 from beekeeperwids . utils import dateToMicro
10
11 class IdentifyMonitor ( AnalyticModule ):
12 ’’’
13 This plugin attempts to detect the identify - attack , making
ZLL devices blink for n seconds .
14 Tools such as z3sec perform this scan .
15 ’’’
16 def __init__ (self , settings , config , shutdown_event ):
17 AnalyticModule . __init__ (self , settings , config ,
shutdown_event , " IdentifyMonitor ")
18
19 @staticmethod




22 performs validation to ensure the neccessary settings
are present
23 ’’’
24 required_settings = [’ channel ’, ’ module_index ’]
25 for setting in required_settings :
26 if not setting in settings . keys ():
27 error = ec. ERROR_WIDS_MissingModuleSetting
28 data = settings
29 return ( error , data )
30 return (None , None )
31
32 def run ( self ):
33 self . logutil . log (’ Starting Execution ’)
34 self . active = True
35 channel = self . settings . get (’ channel ’)
36 time . sleep (3)
37 self . logutil . log (’ Submitting Drone Task Request ’)
38
39 # Task drones to capture ZLL packets .
40 parameters = {’ callback ’: self . config . upload_url ,
41 ’ filter ’ : {
42 ’fcf ’: (0 x0300 , 0 x0100 ),
43 ’ byteoffset ’: (9 , 0x03 , 0 x01 )
44 }}
45
46 uuid_zbnwk = self . taskDrone ( droneIndexList =[0] ,
task_plugin =’ CapturePlugin ’,
47 task_channel = channel ,
task_parameters = parameters , module_index = self . moduleIndex ())
48 if not uuid_zbnwk == None :
49 self . logutil . log (’ Successfully tasked drone with
task : {0} ’. format ( uuid_zbnwk ))
50 else :
51 self . logutil . log (’ERROR : Failed to Task Drone ’)
52
53 # Get packets from database and run statistics
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54 while self . active :
55 # filter the packets back from the database more , by
time , etc as needed
56 pkts = self . getPackets ( uuidFilterList =[ uuid_zbnwk ],
new = True )
57 self . logutil . debug (" Found {0} packets since last
check .". format ( len ( pkts )))
58
59 # perform the analytic
60 for pkt in pkts :
61 self . logutil . debug (" Got pkt from DB: {0} ". format
( pkt ))
62 spkt = Dot15d4FCS ( pkt . pbytes ) # scapify the
packet ’s bytes
63 self . logutil . debug (" Content of spkt from pkt :
{0} ". format ( spkt )) # debug ausgabe
64 # self . logutil . log (" This is an example log
message .")
65 # TODO publish events or alerts to the database
as needed
66 if ZLLIdentifyRequest in spkt :
67 if spkt . identify_duration > 0 x000F :
68 self . logutil . log (’ Generating Alert :
IdentifyAttackDetection ’)
69 self . generateAlert (’
IdentifyAttackDetection ’)
70 self . registerEvent ( name =’
IndentifyAttackDetection ’,
71 details ={ ’ channel ’: channel , ’
pkt ’: pkt })
72
73 # This is the ( approx ) interval at which the
database is queried :
74 time . sleep (30)
75
76 self . shutdown ()
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The same sequence of work steps at the identify detection is performed at the join
request. With this request, a device is asked to leave the network and join another
network. After this step, it is configurable by the new network. This means, that this
ZLL device will loose the pairing and can be remotely controlled by the new network.
This attack follows the way through for join through these stack positions: The ZLLNet-
workJoinRouterRequest is bound to the ZigbeeZLLCommissioningCluster. The Zig-
beeZLLCommissioningCluster is bound to ZigbeeAppDataPayloadStub. The Zigbee-
AppDataPayloadStub is part of the ZigbeeNWKStub. The ZigbeeNWKStub is part of
the Dot15d4Data. The Dot15d4Data is bound to Dot15d4FCS and Dot15d. The attack
pattern looks like this:
1 def create_join_router_request (self , dest_addr , channel ,
2 encrypted_network_key , network_address ):
3 """ Create a touchlink join router command frame .
4
5 Request the target device to leave its current network
and join an




10 dest_addr : int
11 The IEEE address of the device to which the command
shall be sent .
12 This address can be obtained form a scan response
frame .
13 channel : int
14 The channel to which the targed device switches
after receiving and
15 accepting this command .
16 cnrypted_network_key : byte string (16 bytes )
17 The encrypted network key of the new network . Pass
random bytes if




19 but want to dissconnect the target from its current
network .
20 network_address : int
21 The short network address the target should use
after joining the
22 new network . However , the target might ignore this
value and assign






29 # create IEEE 802.15.4 layer
30 mac = Dot15d4FCS () / Dot15d4Data ()
31 mac . fcf_security = 0
32 mac . fcf_ackreq = 1
33 mac . fcf_pending = 0
34 mac . fcf_panidcompress = 0
35 mac . fcf_srcaddrmode = 3 # long
36 mac . fcf_destaddrmode = 3 # long
37 mac . dest_panid = 0 xffff
38 mac . dest_addr = dest_addr
39 mac . seqnum = self . seqnum
40 mac . src_panid = self . src_pan_id
41 mac . src_addr = self . src_addr_ext
42
43 # create NWK layer
44 nwk = ZigbeeNWKStub ()
45
46 # create AppDataPayload layer
47 app = ZigbeeAppDataPayloadStub ()
48 app . delivery_mode = 0 # unicast
49
50 # create Light Link Commissioning Cluster frame
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51 com = ZigbeeZLLCommissioningCluster ()
52 com . transaction_sequence = self . transaction_sequence
53
54 # create Network Join Request command frame
55 cmd = ZLLNetworkJoinRouterRequest ()
56 cmd . inter_pan_transaction_id = self .
inter_pan_transaction_id
57 cmd . pan_id_ext = self . src_pan_id_ext
58 cmd . key_index = 4
59 cmd . encrypted_network_key = encrypted_network_key
60 cmd . network_update_id = 1
61 cmd . channel = channel
62 cmd . pan_id = self . src_pan_id
63 cmd . network_address = network_address
64 cmd . group_id_begin = 0
65 cmd . group_id_end = 0
66 cmd . free_network_address_range_begin = 0
67 cmd . free_network_address_range_end = 0
68 cmd . free_group_address_range_begin = 0
69 cmd . free_group_address_range_end = 0
70
71 self . update_sqn ()
72
73 return mac / nwk / app / com / cmd
For detection of a network join command by the attacker, the following code was writ-
ten:
1 import time , logging , signal
2 from time import sleep
3 from scapy . all import Dot15d4FCS , Dot15d4CmdDisassociation ,
ZigbeeNWKCommandPayload
4
5 from multiprocessing import Process




8 from beekeeperwids . wids . modules import AnalyticModule
9 from beekeeperwids . utils import dateToMicro
10
11 class JoinAttackMonitor ( AnalyticModule ):
12 ’’’
13 This plugin attempts to detect the join - attack , making ZLL
devices belong to a new controlling device
14 Tools such as z3sec perform this attack .
15 ’’’
16 def __init__ (self , settings , config , shutdown_event ):
17 AnalyticModule . __init__ (self , settings , config ,
shutdown_event , " JoinAttackMonitor ")
18
19 @staticmethod
20 def validate_settings ( settings ):
21 ’’’
22 performs validation to ensure the neccessary settings
are present
23 ’’’
24 required_settings = [’ channel ’, ’ module_index ’]
25 for setting in required_settings :
26 if not setting in settings . keys ():
27 error = ec. ERROR_WIDS_MissingModuleSetting
28 data = settings
29 return ( error , data )
30 return (None , None )
31
32 def run ( self ):
33 self . logutil . log (’ Starting Execution ’)
34 self . active = True
35 channel = self . settings . get (’ channel ’)
36 time . sleep (3)
37 self . logutil . log (’ Submitting Drone Task Request ’)
38
39 # Task drones to capture ZLL packets .
40 parameters = {’ callback ’: self . config . upload_url ,
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41 ’ filter ’ : {
42 }}
43 uuid_zbnwk = self . taskDrone ( droneIndexList =[0] ,
task_plugin =’ CapturePlugin ’,
44 task_channel = channel ,
task_parameters = parameters , module_index = self . moduleIndex ())
45 if not uuid_zbnwk == None :
46 self . logutil . log (’ Successfully tasked drone with
task : {0} ’. format ( uuid_zbnwk ))
47 else :
48 self . logutil . log (’ERROR : Failed to Task Drone ’)
49
50 # Get packets from database and run statistics
51 while self . active :
52 # filter the packets back from the database more , by
time , etc as needed
53 pkts = self . getPackets ( uuidFilterList =[ uuid_zbnwk ],
new = True )
54 self . logutil . debug (" Found {0} packets since last
check .". format ( len ( pkts )))
55
56 # perform the analytic
57 for pkt in pkts :
58 self . logutil . debug (" Got pkt from DB: {0} ". format
( pkt ))
59 spkt = Dot15d4FCS ( pkt . pbytes ) # scapify the
packet ’s bytes
60 self . logutil . debug (" Content of spkt from pkt :
{0} ". format ( spkt )) # debug message deact
61 # publish events or alerts to the database as
needed
62 if ZLLNetworkJoinRouterRequest in spkt :
63 if spkt . network_update_id != None :
64 self . logutil . log (’ Generating Alert :
JoinAttackDetection ’)
65 self . generateAlert (’ JoinAttackDetection ’)
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66 self . registerEvent ( name =’
JoinAttackDetection ’,
67 details ={ ’ channel ’: channel , ’
pkt ’: pkt })
68
69 # This is the ( approx ) interval at which the
database is queried :
70 time . sleep (30)
71
72 self . shutdown ()
A detection of network interference was developed as a module, the following lines




4 from multiprocessing import Process
5 from time import sleep
6 from datetime import datetime , timedelta
7
8 from beekeeperwids . wids . modules import AnalyticModule
9 from beekeeperwids . utils import dateToMicro
10
11 class InterferenceMonitor ( AnalyticModule ):
12 ’’’
13 This plugin attempts to detect missing frames , which could
be an indicator of jamming attack by
14 attempting to make the network not functioning any more .
15 Tools such as scapy packet generator and other transmitting
tools perform this attack ,
16 also random transmission on the channel can be the cause .
17 ’’’
18 def __init__ (self , settings , config , shutdown_event ):
19 AnalyticModule . __init__ (self , settings , config ,




21 def run ( self ):
22 self . logutil . log (’ Starting Execution ’)
23 self . active = True
24 channel = self . settings . get (’ channel ’)
25
26 time . sleep (4)
27 self . logutil . log (’ Submitting Drone Task Request ’)
28
29 # Task drones to capture data packets .
30 parameters = {’ callback ’: self . config . upload_url ,
31 ’ filter ’ : {}
32 }
33
34 uuid_task1 = self . taskDrone ( droneIndexList =[0] ,
task_plugin =’ CapturePlugin ’,
35 task_channel = channel ,
task_parameters = parameters , module_index = self . moduleIndex ())
36
37 if uuid_task1 == False :
38 self . logutil . log (’ Failed to Task Drone ’)
39 else :
40 self . logutil . log (’ Successfully tasked Drone with
UUID : {0} ’. format ( uuid_task1 ))
41
42 # Get packets from database and run statistics
43 while self . active :
44 datetime_now = datetime . utcnow ()
45 datetime_t60 = datetime_now - timedelta ( seconds =60)
46 datetime_t120 = datetime_now - timedelta ( seconds
=120)
47
48 n60 = self . getPackets ( valueFilterList =[( ’ datetime ’,
’>’, dateToMicro ( datetime_t60 ))],
49 uuidFilterList =[ uuid_task1 ],
count = True )
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50 n120 = self . getPackets ( valueFilterList =[( ’ datetime ’,
’<’, dateToMicro ( datetime_t60 )),
51 (’ datetime ’,’>’,
dateToMicro ( datetime_t120 ))],
52 uuidFilterList =[ uuid_task1 ],
count = True )
53
54 mean60 = n120 /2.0 # 60 -120 seconds is a 60 second
range so 2 * 60 sec intervals
55 self . logutil . log (" debug : Found {0} data packets in
last 60 seconds , and {1} per 60 secs average over the prior
60 seconds ( absolute {2}) .". format (n60 , mean60 , n120 ))
56 # Calculate average of number of packets typically
seen in a given timespan ,
57 # and if new number is significantly lower ( than 20%
before ) give alert message .
58 if n60 < ( mean60 *0.1) :
59 self . logutil . log (" >>>>> ALERT : Noticed decreased
data packets . ( n60 ={0} , mean60 ={1}) ". format (n60 , mean60 ))
60 self . registerEvent ( name =’ InterferenceDetection ’,
details ={ ’ channel ’: channel , ’n60 ’:n60 , ’n120 ’:n120 , ’ mean60 ’
: mean60 })
61 self . generateAlert (’ InterferenceDetection ’)
62
63 time . sleep (10)
64
65 def cleanup ( self ):
66 pass
5.4 Validation
Thorough testing is necessary on the algorithms, the functionality and the collaboration
of all components at the end, too. This happens in the algorithms, the modules and the
system as a whole. The setup for validation is found as a lab picture taken, see figure
5.17. For a further clarification whether an algorithm works as expected, a packet cap-
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Figure 5.17: Productive part example for honeypot decoy
Figure 5.18: Setup of the detector showing packet capture with Raven stick
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Figure 5.19: Identify attack detected at debug log
turing device with the same transceiver specification is suggested in parallel, such as
it is shown in figure 5.18. More on validation steps and results is found at the end of
this section.
5.4.1 Testing and Evaluation of Algorithms Used
During the verification, the algorithms used in the implementation, as well as algorithms
established in the design phase must be checked to see whether they work, are correct
and error-free. It should also be at least still considered here, whether other, similar
algorithms can partly solve the problem better. For illustration purpose this is discus-
sed at an example of an attack that is expected to be detected by a drone. For the
algorithm testing and evaluation the debug output of the drone was considered. When
the attacker in this example is causing the sending of an attack pattern for ZLL Identify,
then the beekeeper is wanted to perform the capturing of the attack, too. If this algo-
rithm of the drone is working as intended is then proven by the drone; as it captures
correct, a system log is written. The prove is then, that this debug log is expected to
contain the detection. To show an example, in the screenshot there is the result of the
detection as an example of identify patterns sent from the attacker, see figure 5.19.
5.4.2 Testing of Each Module
Each module and each practical related software component still must be tested for
proper functionality.




During the testing the modules were inspected for parameter defaults.
5.4.3 Test of the Entire System
Then, the collaboration of the whole system is tested. The description in this section
provides an outlook to a preferred testing scenario of the implementation. Running
tests with attacks to the network will provide necessary results to be interpreted and
used to improve and refine the prototype. One of the key aspects next to functionality
is the system’s effectiveness. The testing of functionality under previously considered
attacks and duration is essential. When the assumption that use of the honeypot yields
efficiency of detection of attacks this will be a success of the proposed solution. The
result will be a well tested honeypot for wireless sensor networks prototype. A very
challenging aspect is due to the fact that no one ever succeeded in presenting a wor-
king honeypot system for WSN. Papers and reports on a vague idea of this system
were presented and also cited in this chapter, but the challenge here is to provide a
running prototype and to present the tests and their results that were based on this
new honeypot system.
5.4.4 Validation description
The validation description is following, describing the setup and the test that has to be
done to show the function that now can be performed. First of all, for the setup:
1. there is an attacker environment set up,
2. also there is a productive wireless sensor network and
3. the honeypot detection is running.
First, the validation test routines:
1. In a first test the honeypot is loaded with the existing detection schemes.
2. Then an attack is undertaken.
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3. This is validated by inspecting the attack result as it can be seen on the attacked
devices.
4. The expected result at the detecting component is that the attack was not de-
tected and
5. The devices have reacted to the network commands of the attacker.
This result should be run repeatedly several times and also with all the available de-
tection modules, i.e. with three modules and five tests each, this would be a set of
15 test results for the attacks on the setup without the detection scheme. The results
should be put into a table to document what has been done and what the result was.
In a subsequent step the new attack detection scheme should be run, and the attack
should be undertaken once more. The setup remains the same, but the results are
expected to be different, as the attack should be detected, captured and reported ac-
cordingly.
1. In the validation test the honeypot is loaded with the newly written detection sche-
mes.
2. Then an attack is undertaken.
3. This is validated by inspecting the attack result as it can be seen on the attacked
devices.
4. The expected result that is that the attack was detected and captured and
5. the devices have reacted to the network commands of the attacker.





This is to present the validation results. It was estimated, that 15 test results for the
attacks on the setup without the detection scheme should be found in a table. The se-
cond row of test results led to a packet capture for analysis for the second row of tests,
therefore, the validation is seen completely with the result as follows.
Launched Attack Loaded monitor Detected
Identify BeaconRequest 1 alerts of 5
Rejoin BeaconRequest 2 alerts of 5
DosAesCtr BeaconRequest 0 alerts of 5
Table 5.1: Validation results with attack detection
See table 5.1 for the test results in the lab at the first validation testcases described
and the next table 5.2 for the test results with another run as explained. The false po-
sitives in the first overview were produced by the complexity of the attack pattern, the
rejoin and the identify do send out a beacon request during the scanning for the device
by default. However, as this is a low number of scans it just sometimes triggers the
threshold of the BeaconRequestMonitor. The next screenshot shows a packet capture,
there it can be seen, that the identify in this case first sent three broadcast requests
before an answer was sent by the ZLL device. And these broadcasts triggered the false
positive reaction of the beekeeper, see figure 5.20.
Launched Attack Loaded monitor Detected
Identify Identify 5 alerts of 5
Rejoin Rejoint 5 alerts of 5
DosAesCtr DosAesCtr 5 alerts of 5
Table 5.2: Validation results with expected attack detection
5.5 Operational
Also operational systems need to be maintained. The maintenance includes operatio-




Figure 5.20: Identify packet capture with broadcasts
5.5.1 Care and Maintenance: Error Correction
Even a flawless functioning software system requires maintenance. New errors may
occur after a while. It is necessary to add some more lines to the current version of the
honeypot prototype, because it deviates a little from the original idea in some places.
5.5.2 Improvements: Revise System
There are often changes and improvements to any system, even in embedded sys-
tems.
From the latest sections, it is found that the setup needs changes.
5.6 Testbed Setup
The lab setup is as follows. A description is necessary for all of its parts. This section
is describing the parts of the working place, it is not one working place, there are three,
one for each component of the honeypot, because the different WSN components have
their own development environment each. The AVR Ravens are set up with the libra-
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ries for Ravens. The Meshnetics Meshbeans have their Meshbean environment. The
TazTag TazPad also has its own development environment with libraries and runtimes.
The following lines provide an easy to follow setup of a testbed, with a simple structure
of necessity with the following elements: A network as bait is needed. Additionally there
has to be a network for detection, running on appropriate hardware. The recognition
network passes on the data for evaluation. As soon as this results in a detection, this
is displayed. Hardware is also required for evaluation and display. All the points listed
here can be represented in a diagram with a sequence of steps to take as follows:
1. Production network




6. Evaluation and alarming
a clear architecture and the discussion on each of the testbed components:
1. The testbed consists of a productive network to describe this. The testbed con-
sists of a production network. This production network is made up of the Meshnetics
ZigBit. This is also described, images are also shown, and the test setup becomes
visible. A measurement software runs on the production network, which is responsible
for capturing the environmental parameters of all subscriber nodes of the network and
forwarding them to a computer. So, there is a transition from the wireless network via a
gateway to a host computer. The Meshnetics ZigBit have a chipset, as described in the
previous section, by means of an Atmel AT86RF230, which allows transmission on 2.4
GHz. This also corresponds to the configuration of the detection hardware. Here, too,
a detection is carried out on 2.4 GHz using Raven USB stick. Exactly the same with
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the attacking components these also consist of the Raven USB sticks, which send the
attack packages on 2.4 GHz. So much at the beginning about the send and receive
built-in chips in the testbed.
2. The testbed also consists of a network for detection. The testbed, as mentioned in
this section above, consists of an area of the detection network. This detection takes
place in the components of the receiving module. There, the signals are decoded, and
then placed as data packets on the serial interface. These data packets are received
by the USB controller on the gateway computer and fed to the detection software.
3. The testbed exists for detection with this hardware. The detection hardware is as
follows. The data packets are taken at the beginning from the drone, where they ori-
ginate. They come almost directly in the frequency band and channel via the receiver
chip of the Raven USB stick via the serial interface to the drone. This can be completely
passed through or even be filtered to achieve a reduced number of packets because
only a single attack pattern is planned to be detected; for example, if a detection pat-
tern for an overload is to be detected, the total number of data transmissions that have
been received is communicated. Furthermore, if an excessive use of broadcasts, for
example, this is also communicated as follows: The drone passes the detected data
via a network protocol to the central component which then passes on this data. This
filtering on the drone might be necessary in order to pass on a reasonable amount of
data and not to feed everyday traffic to the analysis in the first place. The hardware can
be an ordinary host computer but can also be a computer on a single chip. Correspon-
ding attempts with a Raspberry Pi were performed. This is a single chip computer, or a
very ordinary host PC, important is an operating system runs on it, in this case this is
Debian with GNU/Linux kernel. In the tests it was possible to use a Raspberry Pi 3B.
4. The testbed also needs an attack target which can be attacked by the attacker with
various tools. This attack target is present in test setup 1 as an example of the Meshne-
tics network. Flooding with data packets turns the individual network nodes into an
unusable state. In another trial setup and test, a wirelessly controlled lamp of a smart
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home system is decoupled, which was coupled with a remote control and even has
protection mechanisms.
5. The testbed has a component where the detection takes place in the core compo-
nent. There, all packets of the database can be examined for anomalies. These anoma-
lies can be defined in program themselves. In this core component, multiple detection
filters can run in parallel. It consists of a populated database and the analysis methods
that examine this database. The hardware required for this is scalable. Importantly, a
Linux operating system, as with the drone, should be used. But just that the detection
via the data packets can take place is important. This is the setup of the test bed as
far. As the last step, which is now following, the alarm in the test bed.
6. The testbed, where the alarm takes place: The alarm is posted on the host of the
core component by issuing an alarm on the console. An example output on a mobile
device was also developed, during the research the reduction of interference due to
many different components at the testbed it is recommended. The console is much
better suitable, also in terms of error reduction.
5.6.1 Lab Setup Considerations
The setup in the lab for hardware related programming is based on a Windows instal-
lation installed. It is used for programming the firmware of the hardware in accordance
with manufacturer recommendations. For the development of the attack and defence
part of this research a GNU Linux distribution of Ubuntu is used with XFCE in ver-
sion 16.04 LTS. The z3sec attacks were working Ok in this setup, for the beekeeper a
previous Xubuntu version was used.
5.6.2 Setup Considerations for the Hardware
The development kit is a AVR Studio 4.18 SP3 for Meshnetics Meshbean and AVR
Raven. This is due to the fact, that a newer installation is dependent on a newer
build scheme of the projects. The development kits used in this work, the AVR Raven
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kits, were built and designed for AVR Studio 4 which runs best on a Windows XP or
Windows Embedded machine. It was possible with a few workarounds to get it running
on Windows 7, but this was not experienced to be a very stable setup. Windows Vista
is told to be the setup for “AVR Studio 5” then, and the then called “Atmel Studio 6”
is the Windows 7 IDE (integrated development environment. Alternatively, as XP has
run out of mainstream support, the sibling OS Windows Embedded can be considered
to be used which is still supported with updates until April 2019 if there is a concern
about using unsupported OS. The AVR Studio version 4.18SP3 was chosen over other
setups, even though version 4.19 is available, because all the other setups were not
guaranteed to perform well. This is due to the fact, that the new version has another
C compiler built in, that is not the one that is supposed to be used and might lead to
trouble. In hardware development, experience in the project work has shown that it is
better stay close to the configuration the manufacturers told to use. The AVR Ravens
were first announced in 2007 and were available in 2008. The setup as described was
state-of-the-art back then.
5.6.2.1 Experience with AVR Raven Default Setup
The results proved to be interesting; the AVR Raven evaluation boards were working
out of the box with the demo environment provided by Atmel (WSN Demo for Stick,
Router and Coordinator for the modules.)
5.6.2.2 Experience with Meshnetics Meshbean Default Setup
The combination of Windows 7 and Meshbean2 did not work well at all when coming
out of the box. The AVR Studio 6 took a long time until it was running properly, but
trying to port the demo applications failed. Also with AVR Studio 5 this failed. What
was working in the end was installing AVR Studio 4 in Safe mode with WinAVR and
then using the original eZeeNet from 2007 or ZigBeeNet from 2008.
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5.6.2.3 Possible Wireless Sensor Network Stack Versions
Explanation of eZeeNet, SerialNet and ZigBeeNet:
• eZeeNet features simple-to-use networking for sensing or control application, ba-
sically it is a ZigBee-based private profile and works with mesh or tree topology.
It comes with an Application Programming Interface (API) and offers security fe-
atures, too.
• SerialNet is an out-of-the-box solution with serial interface, no ZigBee-specific im-
plementation or programming is necessary. It is controlled via serial commands
and works with star or mesh topology, together with optional security features.
• ZigBeeNet offers the full control over the ZigBee stack. This includes no limitati-
ons but is due to the possibilities available the less trivial to work with.
Regarding the wording of ZigBee, ZigBee Pro and later ZigBee 3.0, this is simply put
the wording for marketing purposes. For the development these descriptions are not
commonly used. A ZigBee PRO stack is compatible to the revision of the first ZigBee
versions, the improvements were called PRO. BitCloud is an implementation of such
an ZigBee Pro stack and was made by Meshnetics, then bought by Atmel in February
2009 (Atmel Corporation 2009)
5.6.3 Meshnetics Meshbean
The step by step installation of the Meshnetics Meshbean will be here at the beginning.
5.6.3.1 Meshbean Installation Procedure
The installation is meant to be a guide for verification purposes and to let other resear-
chers understand the work steps.
1. Unpacking the Meshnetics Meshbean Kit, having a closer look at documents and
the CD-ROM with additional Software.
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2. The Meshnetics website is shut down already, but there is a copy of the needed
files in an Internet archive2.
3. Installing the complete development kit v2.0.0.1
4. Installation of Compiler the WinAVR from 2010.10.01
5. Installing AVR Studio 4 with update to 4.18SP3.
The IDE for Meshnetics Meshbeans is ready to use after performing these steps.
5.6.4 AVR Raven
The installation of the AVR Raven will be described in two parts, for network driver and
serial driver.
5.6.4.1 Raven Network Driver Installation Procedure
The installation is meant to be a guide for verification purposes and to let other resear-
chers understand the work steps.
1. Unpacking the AVR RZ RAVEN Kit, studying documents and the CD-ROM with
additional Software and to the RAVEN website3.
2. Study the AVR2015 document (8120.pdf) regarding installation.
3. Unzip the AVR2017.zip. Install AVRWirelessSetup.exe from May 2008.
4. Regarding AVR2015 installation of the USB device driver.
5. This was done before establishing the Wireless Sensor Network like it was pre-







The AVR Wireless Service uses an architecture described in the following document:
doc8120.pdf (avr2015). The driver is implemented as a network driver and opens a
socket by default at port 27000 on the local host. The software Wireless Service opens
a TCP/IP connection on this service for interaction. The AVR Raven modules are
running software, which is also in the firmware package. As described in the documen-
tation provided, it was verified, that by default the Raven USB Stick has the blue LED
turned on.
5.6.4.2 Raven Serial Driver Installation Procedure
An other setup possibility is providing access to the AVR Raven via a serial connection.
1. Unzip Bitcloud AVR RAVEN 11.0 zip file
2. Flash the containing firmware on USB Stick and Raven modules.
3. Install the WSN demo 2.2.1.62 from the 11.0 zip file, alternatively use the 2.2.1.92
from 14.0 zip file, this was a working example, too.
4. for the USB stick the 6119.inf device driver has to be installed.
This will lead to a serial connection of the USB stick, attached to e.g. COM port 5 on a
Microsoft Windows system.
The AVR Raven stick has a blue, a red and a yellow LED turned on when connecting
to USB and a blue and a red LED when used in the WSN demo. The WSN demo
application is a graphical demo of the modules interacting with each other.
5.6.5 TazTag TazPad
The fact to use the TazTag TazPad arose in the course of the year 2012. In 2006 the
slides of the ZigBee Alliance already spoken about a mobile phone with ZigBee. It is
pioneering to be able to interact with ZigBee devices from a single everyday object.
In the past, the fact that buying a mobile phone or tablet with these properties was
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impossible, as a workaround there was the reason to use other techniques to get data
from the ZigBee network. Now, from the year 2012 on, it has arisen that TazTag as
manufacturer is offering a smartphone and a Tablet for developers that involves ZigBee.
This development platform consists of a smartphone or tablet with Android operating
system. Android is a relatively new OS and provides an open source platform. A Linux
is the basis, all functions of the phone are established in the case of applications that
run in a closed system, a so-called sandbox.
The TazTag TazPad is a Tablet PC with new features in the mobile market. It is equip-
ped with a fingerprint reader for user authentication and is capable of using NFC, Zig-
Bee, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and GSM as wireless communication. It can be extended with
LAN adapter for stationary use and has a HDMI video output. This feature set is a per-
fect combination for being the mobile graphical user interface for the WSN honeypot.
The Tablet is running Android and could therefore be used to program own applications
like they are wanted. The provided SDK for developers gives access to all necessary
interfaces.
Some of the interfaces were provided by the Android OS, others are coming from Ta-
zTag. TazTag does not give full access to the source code, of course, it is provided as
precompiled libraries.
TazTag provides access on an Atmel ATmega128RFA1 chipset5, an architecture cre-
ated especially for mobile applications, their functionality still allows for a low power
consumption at the other site. The use of mobile devices has a simple reason, it is
simple and very practical and convenient to use existing structures, therefore the use
of a mobile phone or Tablet PC is very preferable, because it is the notification of a user
about an incident which affected the security of a wireless installation. As a conclusion
the user is in the current design to be the receiver of a message and the notification is
sent directly to the user and not elsewhere. It is not just a flashing light, not an alarm




tone is what the user would like to have or will install but simply a notification on their
everyday device, the smartphone.
The first steps with the TazPad device were the following:
• unboxing, check
• installation of environment, work in the development environment:
Eclipse IDE
Android SDK 4.0.3 (API 15)
TazTag libraries 1.0.14_RC1
• first test runs with the sample programs.
With regard to the user experience the device was tested with regard to:
• the use of the device,
• its visual properties,
• haptic features and
• possibilities using audio.
The tests were promising and showed very good handling and stability, during many
month of usage no system crash occurred. In standby mode with the display turned off
the tablet was running for several days. For permanent usage a power connection is
recommended. The tests started from unboxing and were done up to the application
usage, see figure 5.21. The user experience was found to be acceptable, as the de-
vice contains the following features: it has an android operating system and is using a
touch screen functionality, its tablet form fits to everyday usage and the rechargeable
battery is considered good, the haptic is excellent due to different soft click sounds up
to strong vibration features of the device, also it is equipped with a loudspeaker and
audio connectors, see table 5.3.
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Figure 5.21: TazPad with accessory
User experience item Present Details
Usage Good readable Tablet with touch screen
Visual Properties tablet with touch screen Android OS
Haptic vibration feedback different strengths
Audio Properties Loudspeaker and connectors HDMI and 3.5mm audio jack
Table 5.3: Hardware summary of TazPad
This was confirmed also by using the device and by reading its patent and specification.
The software visuals that need to run on the TazPad were designed as follows.
The alert should give the user informations:
1. In an overview mode
2. In a detail view
The first mode is the normal view, presenting a list of events that include the information
of timestamp and the message category. The categories are either information relevant
for the log, or they additionally present an alert.
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In the detailed view the informations on each entry need to show timestamp, origin,
system component, details on attack pattern.
5.6.6 Design Discussion for Specification of Testbed Setup
The availability of the IDE for Ravens and the IDE for Meshbeans posed a fundamen-
tal design question. Different parts of the network are best suitable for some kind of
hardware. This leads to the question of a discussion about redesign of the used setup.
When the development with Meshbean and Raven leads to the valuable insight, that it
is easier to develop on the Raven platform, then the Ravens should be used as the ho-
neypot network and the Meshbean Modules should be used as the productive network
that has to be protected. In this setup it is more likely to have a stable environment that
can be investigated. So the new setup is to have the testbed setup like this in the lab,
the following setup was used to make the captures:
• Meshbean Modules Running WSNDemo
• Windows PC with Meshbean as Coordinator and WSNDemo Java application
• Linux PC with AVR Raven USB Stick as packet sniffer
• Linux PC with AVR Raven USB Stick as attack tool running KillerBee.
The tools that are available for experimental purpose are specialised to a distinct har-
dware setup. For example they have restrictions to the chipset that can be used for
packet sniffing or they make use of an experimental operating system. This was the
reason to first have a good literature research and afterwards buying the hardware that
was used throughout the research. The AVR Raven and the Meshnetics hardware as
well as others are chipset compatible.
The design changing decisions were made on the basis of different requirements.
Some of the requirements were quite simplistic. For example, the AVR Raven bo-
ards have as the default power supply for the button cell. Button cells are known to
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have a low capacity, so some of them have been used up and a prospect of possible
alternatives has been sought from resource-saving measures.
The MeshBean boards have the identical radio chipset as the AVR Raven, but come
with a connector for power supply or AA batteries therefore. Therefore it was useful
for efficiency reasons to raise the production network on the basis of the MeshBean
boards.
A network of MeshBean board represents the productive network in this structure.
There should be no connection between the production network and the detecting
network node. There are also other nodes on the production network that monitor
network traffic.
Mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a single objective was pursued. The goal
is to check network traffic, this can also be called monitoring. No matter how a tool is
called, the functionality of monitoring is now a key criterion for a wireless honeypot.
The aforementioned nodes use monitoring to detect attacks. In this setup the data
transfer from the receiver to the evaluation is done serially via USB interface. At the
end of the research an outlook was started to the evaluation on a Raspberry Pi 3 with
Raspian set up, the computational power appeared surprisingly well. Therefore, here
is an emerging topic for replacing a honeypot node with a Raspberry Pi obviously the
next conclusive step.
5.6.7 Honeypot Process
Process flow of honeypot functionality:
• In normal operation the honeypot regularly reports its status to a central point the
so-called signaller. In the case, it is necessary to use the Coordinator of ZigBee,
once holding the data, until they can be accepted by a Tablet PC network as a
relay.
• An attack is recognised by a honeypot node can be started directly with the noti-
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fication. The channel should be permanently blocked in this case can be decided
over three ways: 1. had been waiting, 2. switch to alternate channel, what be
previously defined or 3. select an alternative way of notification, which must have
been defined previously. (example: Wi-Fi or GSM)
• The Coordinator of the honeypot reached the message is evaluated and made
available to the user. For this are several options to consider. This can be done
through ZigBee or other channels.
5.7 Experiment Setup Revision for Attacks
The setup in use is based on a productive network of nine ZigBit Devices with the
RF230 Chipset. They build a network and its Coordinator is connected to a host ap-
plication running a Software displaying the sensor readings. Another testbed is the
“Philips LivingColors” hardware as stated in a previous research proposal paper (Mar-
kert & Massoth 2013).
For the attacks as stated before the AVR Raven are used. Together with the firmware
of the killerbee framework they were confirmed to be an ideal attack tool-set for the re-
search purposes. Other researchers have written examples in additions to the killerbee
framework, one of its additions from the Api-Do (2.3.2.3) extension found its way to be
officially included, other researchers have written additional modules to attack such as
the secbee or the z3sec (Morgner et al. 2017) attack toolset.
For the above stated target setup the following attacks were conducted.
5.7.1 Attack 1 - Passive Eavesdropping
Wireless is a shared medium, transmissions within short distance and good signal
strength always can be read if they are received undisturbed. The killerbee framework
allows passive eavesdropping, simply listening to the transmitted information. The
following is an example of the output with the victims network, showing the information
transmitted high-lightened (see figure 5.22).
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Figure 5.22: Temperature (red) and brightness (green) sniffed plaintext
The first value (red) the sensor node transmitted shows that 26 degree Celsius were
read by the temperature sensor. The second value of the surrounding brightness in the
lab as a value between 0 and 0xff (255).
5.7.2 Attack 2 - Sending a Crafted Packet
Right after the killerbee framework was initially released the wish to transmit informa-
tions manually and with a high degree of freedom in the packet structure led to the
development of a ZigBee extension to the network tool scapy, a python driven toolset
where network packets can be generated “by hand”. The following is an example code
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Figure 5.23: Response from a ZigBee light link device




5.7.3 Attack 3 - Scanning for Networks
Whenever ZigBee nodes receive a broadcast request, they send out the network in-
formation, meaning the ZigBee version, the Network identifier (PAN-ID), details about
the structure and security aspects of the network. This feature can be used to identify
networks actively, by setting the packet capturing device to a random ZigBee channel
and sending a broadcast as described in the scenario two above.
The screenshots above were taken with use of the zbstumbler.
5.7.4 Attack 4 - Re-Transmit
If the steps one to three were successful beforehand and a working channel was deter-
mined the targets can be chosen. One of the attack patterns is re-transmitting packets
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Figure 5.25: Zbdsniff showing OTA key example
that were read and inject them again. This attack was described as replay-attack in the
literature review of Wright & Cache (2015) and is done in killerbee with the following
setup:
juma@juma:~\$ sudo zbreplay -r lightswitch-onoff.pcap -f 20 -s .1
zbreplay: retransmitting frames from ’lightswitch-onoff.pcap’ on
interface ’001:003’ with a delay of 0.1 seconds.
4 packets transmitted
As seen, the packet from the file containing control sequences for home automation
get re-transmitted and result in a repetition of the actions.
This attack is only working when the old ZigBee version is used, since ZigBee PRO it
has a 4 byte frame counter in the auxiliary header of the network layer.
5.7.5 Attack 5 - Get Key
Obtaining a network key might be simple if the implementation is implemented inse-
cure. There exist examples where it is possible to request the secret with the goal of
then further attacks, such as un-encrypting traffic or interfering the session.
5.7.6 Attack 6 - Disturb Attack
In this attack scenario a lot of beacon requests are sent in a short period. The requests
are small in frame size, the responses are extensive. This makes it possible to send a
lot of small attacks, and the responses are more resource costly. This has the desig-
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ned result, that the WSN nodes get far more requests than they can send responses,
with the wanted outcome to crash the system by overloading its buffers with response
packets that are crafted but cannot be sent fast enough.
zbfakebeacon -c24 -p 0x7610 -e 0x1234 -g
The first testing resulted in a crash of the attack tool and a crash of the sniffer that
wanted to capture the attack (it was a virtual machine). The productive network crashed
and the routing WSN devices needed reboot. The Enddevices did not crash. The
Coordinator did not crash.
zbfakebeacon -c24 -p 0x7610 -e 0x1234 -g
The second testing testing resulted in a crash of the attack tool and a crash of the sniffer
that wanted to capture the attack (it was a virtual machine). The productive network
crashed and the routing WSN devices needed reboot. Some of the Enddevices were
unresponsive. The Coordinator did not crash.
zbfakebeacon -c24 -p 0x7610 -e 0x1234 -g
The third testing resulted in a crash of the attack tool and a crash of the sniffer that
wanted to capture the attack (it was a virtual machine). The productive network crashed
and the routing WSN devices needed reboot. Some of the Enddevices did crash. The
Coordinator needed reboot, too.
5.7.7 Attack 7 - Disconnect Attack
Using scapy with the killerbee framework attacks are possible. An example that was
stated by researchers is a DoS attack by setting the CTR AES command in ZigBee.
A script was released that makes use of this attack called “dos_aesctr_replay.py”, it
was written by the makers of Api-do, see section 2.3.2.3. Another disconnect attack
example is performed with the use of zbassocflood script.
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Figure 5.26: Zbassocflood lab example
zbassocflood -p0x7610 -c 24
For the output see figure 5.26.
Attacks are running the best if the devices are not virtualised. The attacked network
remains productive after the attack is closed, it gets back to a normal working and
operational state within short time that is commonly used to build a network when
powered up.
5.7.8 Attack 8 - Key Extraction
SecBee is an attack framework made by researcher Zillner (2015). It includes a num-
ber of attack scenarios to the network key. Its purpose it to extract the key material
during the key exchange. This key can then be used to interfere with the encrypted
communication.
As the tool was initially not designed to run with Killerbee devices a number of changes
were needed to be done to get it working with Killerbee. Further changes then were
needed to get the Killerbee framework together with the AVR Raven hardware running
with the setup in the testbed.
5.7.9 Attack 9 - Attacks with z3sec Tool
Z3sec is an attack tool, that uses the knowledge from secbee. It is designed to run with
Software Defined Radio (SDR) or the Killerbee framework with TmoteSky hardware.
Numerous attacks are possible on the ZigBee Light Link specification. As the tool
was initially not designed to run with AVR Raven devices, a number of changes were
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Figure 5.27: Secbee author example
needed to be done to get it working. Improvements on the z3sec tool introduced as
part of the work here were needed to get z3sec running with the setup of the Killerbee
framework together with the AVR Raven hardware.
Features are:
• Scanning for ZLL devices
• Triggering the identify action (blinking for a given length in seconds)
• Initiate a factory reset of the target
• Request a change of the channel in use.
• Unbind a target device and let it join a given network
• Create a new virtual ZLL device
• Turn light on or off
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Figure 5.28: Scan response lab example
Figure 5.29: Z3sec identify mode
• Change the brightness (and colour) of the ZLL device
Sending packets that are made up and designed as wanted enables to send not only
beacon messages but also commands to ZigBee devices. The following image 5.29
shows the detection of a ZigBee LightLink device and then the command to let the
device run the identify mode. This mode consists of a blinking pattern, and its length in
seconds can be set with the command. This attack was put into the attack tool z3sec,
the identify mode of the device can only be interrupted by powering it down.
An achievement worth mentioning at the end is a stable running version of the attack
tool z3sec on the Atmel AVR Raven hardware, this also included patching the beha-
viour of the Killerbee systemsoftware as a tool used within z3sec. The background to
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this is, that the AVR Raven USB stick is capable of sending and receiving, however, not
simultaneously; in effect using simplex communication mode. Commands to the stick
that are related to the stick configuration, when sent during the transceiver processing
the data, most often previously before the fixing result in a crash of the firmware.
5.8 Experiment Setup Revision for Detection
As stated in the design paper the attacks need to get detected. This was discussed to
be a distributed system, that is capable to detect on a high number of possible locations
in parallel. Also the discussion was about creating the signalling so that attacks get not
only detected but even more shown to a kind of operational centre. Within the year
2014 a toolset was released, that offers the basis for a distributed attack detection
called beekeeperwids6. It consists basically of two components:
1. zbdrone
2. zbwids
The zbdrone is a component that is designed to provide high redundancy as they are
the detectors. They are used to capture attacks. Second component zbwids is the data
aggregating component, where suspicious attack patterns can get analysed according
to definable matching informations.
An example is shown below.
As this tool is designed to enable further improvement it was taken as a basis to build
the detection component of the honeypot upon to. The details, the programming, the
outcome, the testing and the results are the topic of the next chapters and their secti-
ons.
This chapter specifically addressed the concepts of wireless networks and discussed
basic elements of the experiments. The chapter also dove into the applied construction
6https://github.com/riverloopsec/beekeeperwids/
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Figure 5.30: Beekeeperwids lab example
of the experiment in detail. The following basic design, through the analysis, up to the
entire concept and specification, was discussed in this chapter. Then followed the plan-
ning of the implementation via the validation up to a workable prototype. Accordingly,
a discussion on the treatment of the attacks aimed directly at the prototypes, followed
by a controversial discussion about the attacker possibly bypassing the handling of his
attacks.
Subsequently followed a comprehensive list of technical details of the testbed. These
consist of various wireless sensor network components which together were necessary
for the test setup. The discussion of the attacks that can be executed on the testbed
rounded off the chapter and discussing the part of the testbed used for the detection of




THE following chapter discusses the results of the experiments in the testbed andpresents the detection capability on the levels identified in the categorisation of
the attacks. In addition, the results will also be discussed, and the conclusions that are
now being drawn up will be summarised. The collected results so far will be the basis
for analysis of honeypot strengths regarding the outcome of the project work.
6.1 Analysis of the Honeypot System Results
Common attack scenarios are tested on the honeypot for analysis. This is part of
integration and verification. This section is about the research questions posed. First,
there is a test of the honeypot and its reactions to common attack scenarios. Furt-
hermore, it is tested how the honeypot reacts to more sophisticated attack scenarios.
Those primary questions were already written down in previous chapters, as they were
found to be appropriate questions. It is important to remember that those research
questions were considered meaningful. Other research questions were not considered
as appropriate. The appropriateness of for instance a signal jamming for a long time is
not given. Therefore, only such attacks are considered that leave a possibility to react
accordingly. Thus, the requirements from section 5.1.5 are fulfilled. The first requi-
rement states, that detection has to be on a node-class device. This means, that of
the hardware used everything for the detection should be the usual kind of hardware
that is used for common wireless sensor network nodes. For the tests during this re-
seach it was considered and all devices used have the same chipset for the honeypot
198
6.2. EVALUATION AS PLANNED
production system that measures environmental parameters and also the detecting
honeypot components. The second requirement states, that the detection and the pro-
duction network have to be of the same type of devices. This considered, the hardware
used for production and detection needs to be of the same kind. For the tests this was
considered and all devices used have the same chipset for transmission for the ho-
neypot production system that measures environmental parameters and the detecting
USB stick. The third requirement states, that the detection is not allowed to be found
out by the attacker. This requirement is followed in the experiments as the detection is
passive in all of the cases. Therefore, it should not happen by design, that packets from
the attack detection are sent in a manner, which would be obvious for the attacker to
be entrapped. This third requirement is followed in the experiments as to shown in the
following section. These requirements were considered the most appropriate to use,
and these are also the ones that are followed in the experiments.
6.2 Evaluation as Planned
A last but very essential and closing task is remaining then, the summary of all of the
project work, the results and findings of the Evaluation. The structure of this evaluation
is created collating all papers and reports written earlier to give an overview of the
work done. This assessment of the contribution is made to the field of WSN and
ZigBee security. The evaluation is undertaken with regard to the detection capabilities.
A distinction has to be made between a successful attack and detection, as well as
a successful attack and no detection (this would then be a false negative detection).
The category of unsuccessful attack and no detection as well as unsuccessful attack
as and detection is considered to be irrelevant. The tests are performed by checking
for applicability at the network protocol layer, when the question of the attack at every
level of the network protocol is posed. In other words, all the problems of the layers
are examined one after the other. This also makes it possible to check whether the
detection with honeypot works at every layer. These layers were discussed earlier at
section 2.1.7.
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6.3 Evaluation of Prototype Misuse Detection Capability
Subsequent to the development of the detection capability and the integration of the
collector and reporter to the honeypot framework, the whole system is put into testing
and evaluation mode for a series of use cases and attack patterns. With the goal of
detecting a high number of various cases of misuse, the network is guarded by the
honeypot and predefined attacks will take place. All of the attacks will be documented
to a log location and interpreted with the detected ones to establish a rate of success to
failure. This rate can then be compared with others from simulated intrusion detection
systems from literature research. This evaluation comparison will measure the success
of the honeypot system in this work for wireless sensor networks. Together with its
novelty value this will show, that a combination of existing work from different research
topics is applied here to research in the field of honeypots on WSN. What are the
steps of the evaluation, how it was done is presented here. Evaluated is a comparison
between attacks and corresponding detection. These were performed according to the
description in chapter 3. It was desired to know, whether the research questions are
appropriate, and where the WSN honeypot is localised in a traditional network scheme.
This research question has been considered in figure 3.5. The wireless sensor network
honeypot should be located in a production network. For the categorisation into low or
high interaction honeypot, the following can be stated: This is a high interaction honey
pot with real decoys. Using virtual components is not seen as a possibility, as their ex-
istence could be found out. The research techniques were considered to be best when
using experimental research however on a very open idea. This means, that other ot-
her researchers feedbacks are requested. Considered was a user acceptance testing,
but the limited number of researchers on this topic and other so no large quantities of
user experience can be expected for a quantitative approach. The question was whet-
her it will be a fully new technique, but in fact it is more of a well decided combination
of existing system components and the extension of their capabilities to push things
further. The hybrid approach is not found to be true in its traditional meaning. As the
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wireless sensor network as stated above is special, this detection is mostly based on
a high interaction honeypot approach, but as said it is difficult to categorise a WSN
honeypot in those two options, however, in tendency it is due to the production network
as decoy more a high interaction WSN honeypot.
6.4 Evaluation of Prototype Quality of Security Enhancement
The conclusive part of the research takes place when qualitative testing is undertaken
in the wild, as it were. Existing contacts to groups of other researchers will be used
to invite them to test their tools against the honeypot system. This will result in insig-
hts into the stability and operability of the honeypot as an intrusion detection system.
The outcome will be plenty of further logfiles and success rate values for attack and
detection.
As stated in the chapter before, the basis for the detection mechanism is made on the
beekeeperwids. Its design is thus that additional modules can be created that make a
detection possible on basis that can be very well defined. As written, the proposal was
to detect different attack types, and make the detection possible on all of the layers that
can be thought of.
Of course, it was considered to use existing attack tools as a reference to obtain a set
of attack patterns that can be used to generate detection filters. Therefore, a decision
to analyse all of the known attack tools and generate according detection mechanisms
seemed necessary was done. Examples are given below, showing the detection of all
of the known and implemented attack patterns and their layers.
6.4.1 Detection of Attacks to the Physical Layer
As discussed before different attacks can happen to the physical layer (PHY). If there is
a transmitter, which is more powerful than others nearby, then successful other trans-
missions do not happen any more on the frequency. A detection mechanism is possible
in two ways, in a statistical analysis and in mathematical analysis. First attempt is with
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Figure 6.1: Interference code example screenshot
the assumption that communication on the channel is taking place. Detecting a long
period of non-transmissions can therefore be seen as a trigger. Also the circumstance
of the second attempt can be seen as a result of an attack to the PHY: the checksum
of ZigBee frames. If a lot of errors can be read over a specific period of time, then a
disturbance by an attacker is to be expected.
These two possibilities led to the generation of a detection pattern for the detection tool
and the mechanism was tested as shown below.
A lot of configuration testing took place to get a stable result, with the aim of reducing
false positives and rendering a stable detection pattern.
6.4.2 Detection of Attacks to the Medium Access Control Layer
Attacks on the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer were seen in the previous chapter
already. It is possible to generate frames that result in a removal of the associated node
to the network. This attack has a specific pattern that exists as a detection pattern for
the detection tool. The attack and the detection is shown below.
6.4.3 Detection of Attacks to the Network Layer
Attacks on the Network (NWK) layer similar to the MAC layer were seen in the previous
chapter, too. It is possible to generate frames that result in a removal of the associated
node to the network, this is an attack happening to the NWK layer. This attack has a
specific pattern that exists as a detection pattern for the detection tool. The attack and
the detection is shown below.
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Figure 6.2: MAC layer attack detection example
But also the attacks that are used by the tool secbee and z3sec are targeting this
network layer. Therefore additional detection patterns were written and put into the
detection tool. The successful detection can be seen in the screenshots below:
6.4.4 Detection of Attacks to the Application Support Layer
The Application Support Layer (APS) attacks are based on the APS unbind attack, as
shown in z3sec and secbee with which it is possible to let target devices join another
network. This attack has a very special pattern that can get detected, it was therefore
added to the detection tool.
A lot of configuration testing took place to get a stable result, with the aim of reducing
false positives and rendering a stable detection pattern.
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Figure 6.3: NWK layer attack detection example
6.5 Discussion of Experiments Output
It was shown, that it is possible to build a detection system with the purpose to act as a
honeypot for wireless sensor networks. This honeypot was built as a prototype during
this research and has shown, that it is possible to use the honeypot to detect attacks
considered to happen on any layer that can be thought of. Results were shared with
other researchers throughout the process and a concluding paper for a peer-reviewed
conference will be prepared to get even more opinions from the research community.
The prototype was shown to be implemented on all the detection layers that were fores-
een when the research started. Its capabilities are the better the more computational
resources exist and are programmed to react on attacks. It was not shown on a battery
driven network, this is subject for further research and porting the prototype from the
lab to a battery driven testbed. Research after this presentation is not intended to stop,
it is more of a direction of further research and development in further steps that is
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Figure 6.4: Z3sec usage to let a device join a new network
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necessary and can be foreseen for future research groups and projects.
The research was straightforward in the idea, at the same time it was challenging due
to the restrictions present. On one hand, there is the novelty aspect, that the honeypot
approach was not investigated as detailed before in the structure and precision done in
this work, which aspect also means scarce primary references and literature on similar
topics to cite.
As it was presented here, the honeypot in ideal form consists of a normal wireless
sensor network, that seems to perform normal sensing processing and transmitting of
data, with an additional module capable to read all the networking packets.
The networking aspect was indeed crucial, which led to a review of the research goals
and objectives; for instance whenever the wireless sensor network is attacked by a
denial of service attack, then reporting cannot take place on the same communication
link as it is affected by that denial of service as well.
This insight led to these two possibilities:
1. perform the canary approach1, as long as the canary is present, then no denial
of service attack is occurring, or
2. refrain from using the same communication link, i.e. use an extra channel 5.1.2
for feedback.
It is obvious that a research relying on an assumption that is valid only sometimes, is
not a scientific one; therefore the approach to use the same communication link as a
feedback channel on which the attack will occur cannot be seen as a reliable one.
Alternatives for the feedback channel were discussed in section 5.1.2, in the same
medium (frequency and signal encoding) they can be summarised as unreliable; on
another transport medium such as light (laser, infrared and comparable) there could
1The canary in the coal mine is the idea of placing a canary in a mine to detect poisonous gas, in this
case carbon monoxide
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be physical obstacles, for instance a distance too close (in the case of IR) or else
prohibitive cost (with laser).
Further investigation shows, that a honeypot for wireless sensor network most likely
may need to have a wire-bound feedback. This can be seen as a topic for further work
and a future research topic.
In this section the approach will be verified to have conformed to the research goal, to
follow the blueprint for a science of cybersecurity, as proposed by Schneider (2011).
It was shown, that this approach was followed and that the results are promising to lead
to a new direction of a science of cybersecurity; and as this is a new outcome, presents
a novel contribution and is reproducible by performing exactly the steps documented,
additionally the source code written for the detection routines, for the analysis, and for
the conclusion are available on request, and for possible future collaboration, there are
definite opportunities at the research institutes in Darmstadt, where this work began.
6.5.1 Validation of Assumptions
An assumption to start the research was, that there is a need of security in wireless
sensor networks, and honeypots are possible to fill this gap. Thus, more research nee-
ded to be done to present a honeypot for wireless sensor networks. The concepts of
other wire-bound honeypots could be taken for a first start and be refined with additio-
nal recommendations on wireless networks.
6.5.2 Observation of Emergent Behaviours
The upcoming points will now serve to prove, that the vision about generating a pro-
totype that fulfils all the desired specification requirements was realistic. In this case, if
the generation of a prototype is desired, then as stated before, the use of formal speci-
fication and proof of correctness would be the wrong approach. The science of cyber-
security shows a way to generate knowledge by experiments, and the construction of
a prototype will be be failure-free. Therefore the goal is to contribute knowledge, which
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can then be used in a future phase to deliver a product through real-world development
using plenty of resources and possibly years of development time. But before that, a
requirements specification and a couple of metrics is created here, to make sure that
there is a possibility to measure the outcome of such future development. In chapter 4,
there were written a lot of requirements and points that needs to be regarded during the
prototype generation. This is done in the ambitious approach to show the results hold
and provide additional knowledge, that the results that were reached are also confor-
ming to the specification, and for the requirements that were not fulfilled as a whole, to
show the restrictions that are present in this environment of wireless sensor networks,
that make it necessary to find another approach to a solution. This knowledge fills the
section “limitations of the work” and also the section “further research proposed steps”.
This chapter includes the results of the experiments in the testbed. The detection
capability in the layers is shown, which is referring to the categorisation of the attacks
from chapter two. It showes the detection capability on the levels identified in the
categorisation of the attacks. In addition, the nature of the results is incorporated into





AS written in the section 4.7 the path of experimental setup is followed. This isdone with the goal of knowledge generation, which can then be seen as furt-
hering the science of cybersecurity. This last chapter starts with a summary of the
results, then continues with the achievements of this research, in direct comparison
with the goals set in the beginning, up to the topic of the knowledge generated. The
limitations must of course be mentioned and the chapter then ends with conclusions
and recommendations for subsequent further research. The experimental setup in the
testbed shows, that attacks are recognised and captured, and that this is done on all
of the layers that were regarded in theory in the literature research phase in chapter 2.
The attacks that are possible on these layers in chapter 5 result in a basic design, a
specification of a detailed design of the prototype, and then to an experimental setup
as testbed. The conclusion from the results is intended to be put into direct correlation
to the previous report titled “Honeypot framework for ZigBee network architectures”.
This paper will be the conclusion of the project work, especially regarding performance
of the honeypot for wireless sensor networks. One of the topics should be a statement
on the general capability of honeypots in wireless sensor networks. As further planned
paper will target the interpretation of the findings, titled “Results of honeypot framework
for ZigBee network architectures”.
The conclusion of the honeypot for WSN research project is, that it is a takeoff into a
direction of development which proved to be correct. Most of the research assumptions




This thesis deals with such networked systems in the case of "wireless sensor net-
works" and highlights topics on the malicious interaction with those systems. It also
primarily shows an extension of existing security measures by the introduction of a
honeypot for wireless sensor networks.
This is a question of research, whether it is possible to consider the security of a WSN
as endangered and to increase the security in the WSN with the help of additional pro-
tection. It turned out that the literature describes a variety of attacks and that they are
not only academic in nature and can exist in theory, but have actually found a place in
attack tools. The researchers on this topic are working on very different aspects, while
there is the development of hardware on the one hand, on the other hand individual
tools are also produced. But also, by merging several such tools, major projects are
done. An example is the killerbee framework created by a single developer as a ba-
sis. It was promoted by many individuals, supplemented by further tool scripts, and is
maintained today. The question now arises as to whether the research question has
been answered. It is broadly based on sub-items and also includes considerations on
how, for example, improvement can be promoted.
The research aims from section 1.4 were met by the objectives as follows:
Objective 1: Review and summary of the usual strategies for detecting attacks on wi-
reless sensor networks and presenting existing solutions, as well as highlighting
promising strategy.
The review of related work within chapter 3.2 gave a broad overview of the attack de-
tection possibilities and revealed the potential use of honeypot technologies in wireless
sensor networks as a new strategy, while at the same time stating that a new appro-




Objective 2: Perform literature review to understand trade-offs in wireless sensor net-
works security.
Chapter 2 includes a thorough literature review on current wireless sensor network ba-
sics with the goal to include the limitations due to hardware constraints and furthermore
includes lists of vulnerabilities and attacks. Also, it describes the challenges in wireless
sensor networks, and in the section 2.2.7 it shows the categorisation of attacks, which
was done with the goal to get measurable achievements. This is due to a simplification,
because if a category of attacks can be detected, a part of this objective is reached.
Objective 3: For honeypots’ common definitions and setups, perform an analysis and
the concept translation to the wireless sensor network domain evaluation, then
design and implement a prototype.
In Chapter 4, the analysis of the current definition in wire-bound IP based networks was
conducted; additionally the interpretation for wireless IP based networks was comple-
ted to get a solid basis for the following concept translation that was undertaken. Re-
sults of the translation have shown that most definitions from the IP-networks area
could be translated to the wireless sensor networks domain.
Objective 4: Prototype development to detect the proposed attacks as a model of
completeness by using determined scenarios.
Chapter 5 shows the experimental setup in the testbed and the achievements in de-
tection are presented. The results in the model of completeness in the determined
scenarios are shown. As was shown in the chapter on attack categorisation, there are
four attack layers which were taken into account for the honeypot capabilities. The no-
velty of the honeypot prevents a comparison in a direct manner; however, it was shown
that this approach was correct to be a promising one.
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7.2 Key Findings - Contribution to the Knowledge
It is a question of what the contribution to knowledge is here. It can be said that there
was no earlier similar work. The wide-ranging view of all topics of this thesis is a com-
prehensive work. The importance of existing research-outcomes remains, but impor-
tant aspects are added. For example, there is an understanding that the Raven USB
Stick actually works with the z3sec attack tool. Corresponding changes were made in
the context of the thesis. Furthermore, this attack via z3sec was integrated into the
beekeeper’s detection scheme. Signalling to the operator of the network is also an im-
portant additional point. The basis for networking is created. Further effort is needed to
carry out such work. Knowledge again, as stated, is a central part of this section. What
has been contributed to the knowledge that was provided? It has been checked whet-
her rules of the wired network apply, but it is not possible to access, control or protect
data in a central location, because it is a radio network and thus a shared medium. It
is more difficult to introduce security in a radio network. The realisation remains that
similar to a network built with a network hub, corresponding problems exist. This no
longer corresponds to the technique of a wired network that nowadays is built up with
the help of a switch. So, it is to represent a WSN rather with a network that has a hub,
i.e. all devices can read data from all other devices, which basic assumption takes a
researcher much further, and this knowledge carries further remarks as well. If now
there is the knowledge that all networks are essentially of this kind, i.e. they are as
it was 30 years ago in the LANs quite usual, so it is clear that it was in the essential
characteristics of that time which was supplanted by improvements in technology here,
should be considered necessary again. It is also clear that safeguards that were in use
at the time could then be reinstated. However, it is not unfortunately possible to improve
the network here because the fact of the wireless shared medium will not change, as
a result the network properties cannot be changed, the WSN will not be changed to a
wirebound network. This is also with a realisation precisely from this thesis, that there
are other intelligent additional security measures needed to increase security again.
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As a result it is time to talk about the results. To this end, it is necessary to consider
all aspects of the present research. On the one hand it was possible to use the work
of previous research, on the other hand it was possible to combine and supplement it
skilfully. A framework was created with the purpose of a contribution to knowledge. It
consists of a knowledge of the present technique of the knowledge of attacks, about
knowing defences. It is about the knowledge of adequacy and legality. It is about kno-
wing attack and detection, it is also about the knowledge of the functionality and the
functionality of the adequacy, whether it is adequate.
With regard to theoretical advancement, the question now arises as to what the theo-
retical improvement is. Many results suggest that this work is different from what would
have been set up in a LAN with an IP-based network, for example. Concrete impro-
vements are available: in adapting existing attack tools, increasing stability and making
them workable. Furthermore, in the associated possibility to carry out attacks, it was
then also proven to recognise these attacks. In principle, every attack can be detected
when enough data is collected. Furthermore, it is necessary to map detection patterns
to this data. In a pure honeypot, where slightly higher interaction is not expected to take
place, than what the system generates in background noise. So, each additional inte-
raction likely represents an attack. In this way, intrusion detection is always possible.
Any interaction with the honeypot then is an attack. However, if the WSN is a production
network that is actually in operation, making use of a honeypot for this WSN is quite
difficult. In theory, any attack can be identified with a honey pot. Once again, it has
become clear that the approach, as with a wired network, is not effective. In a wired
network, as said not any interaction is a potential attack. However, the goal of a WSN is
in the cooperative action of different components with each other. The protocols require
binding and dissolving the communication partners. It is always possible to assume an
attack in theory. However, it raises the fundamental question of whether the honeypot
for WSN should remain a purely theoretical tool, or whether it is also used for securing
production networks. The aim of this work is to shed light on this theoretical aspect.
According to the present state of knowledge, the difficult securing of the components
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speaks for the use outside of productive networks. Especially with the research paper
of Ronen et al. (2018), it seems problematic to leave the networks vulnerable. Howe-
ver, it cannot be effective to make all networks unproductive. So, it takes a thorough
consideration about what needs to be found out: which compromises in security are to
be tolerated, which losses are acceptable, which overhead is acceptable. Of course,
the easiest way for this work would have been to leave the network completely generic.
However, this is an obstacle, especially in the case of more complex attacks. as an ex-
ample, the network rejoin attack from the z3sec: This runs over several stages. On the
one hand, when the device is hijacked, it is also integrated into a new network, and then
it is under the control of the attacker. This attack requires a lot of data packets to be sent
through the area. If the device is not to be attacked, it does not send a response if the
device does not exist, no replies are sent so the attacker does not receive any feedback,
so the attack remains virtually in its infancy. It may be that the first or second step of the
attack executed, but does not follow the usual steps. This example illustrates quite well
that a purely unproductive network without actual proper interaction cannot be suitable
to detect attacks that show a high level of complexity. Such simulated unproductive
network can be useful however to detect simple attacks and to report. Both scenarios
have their pro and cons, the theory can be put forward with it, as I said, the simple at-
tacks in unproductive networks can be detected, but it is necessary to have productive
networks, because only they can interact accordingly and let the attack be happen
completely in the actual production network. If an attacker tries this, it can then be re-
corded here. This finding was not available before this work. The way chosen here was
an iterative approach. First of all, there was the idea, and a report about it (Research
Proposal). Then, the refinement of this idea and a resulting paper for a workshop about
it (SEIN). Next up, more background research on the topic and a further paper about
the outcome of that (CERC). It was deemed important to work together with others
and thus to start exchanging ideas with other research groups about this topic, which
received positive feedback and suggestions on how to continue. Consequentially, the
approach chosen here and the steps planned to take were presented and a conference
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paper written on it (MoMM). The detection concept on all of the layers was planned,
followed by a paper about it (DEXA). Regarding the fundamentals of a honeypot in a
wireless sensor network, it was deemed necessary to publish a paper to base work
upon (ECSA).
Every system is expected to be failure prone to a certain degree. There are existing
methods for improvement and detection of technical vulnerabilities, where concepts
such as firewalls and malware-detection are well known examples. With regard to
malicious interaction, this is already existent in the “Internet of Things” (IoT). Now, the
environment in the IoT is completely different from WSNs, as IoT devices are mostly
miniaturised and low energy profile devices. These may have an Internet gateway, but
other parts do not need to be wire-bound. Wireless sensor networks, on the other
hand, form networks with mesh routing or star topology.
With the digitalisation of the future so-called smart home, and the Internet of things
forming a network for a comfortable living new attack vectors become noticeable that
need to be addressed during development and runtime. With the honeypot for wireless
sensor networks an important step for improvement has been undertaken.
It was shown to be possible to do the transformation from a wire-bound technology
over wireless implementation considerations to a wireless sensor network setup and to
achieve results.
7.3 Limitations
The limitations exist in different aspects. First of all, the research work was undertaken
with the goal to find out what is possible to do. When asking for the limits this means
that a thorough combination of the limitations that exist in the following places has to
be shown. If it is considered, that the whole knowledge of the work consists of the fact
that on the one hand the background must be shown as to how a monitoring solution
can work at all. It is obvious that these insights can only arise if a monitoring solution
is also operated. The operation of this solution was originally intended as a completely
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new development, but this is of course very meaningless, if there is already a corre-
sponding solution, the beekeeper, which interestingly then also exactly corresponds to
the criteria that also in advance also had been created. And so it just turned out that
the wheel no longer had to be completely reinvented, but many aspects already exis-
ted. Also, that the solution with which is being worked on has already existed in various
areas once the securing of the physical layer came to be. So it is no wonder that a
whole range of sniffers already existed in packet capture tools. These possibilities are
beautiful and all work, and have all advantages and disadvantages. The main aspect
to be named here is the radio band, i.e. the frequency spectrum which is being worked
on, as this can of course change and it is a fact that for common chips, it is just difficult
to be able to do everything at the same time. That’s why researchers then moved on
to monitoring more than one channel by using more than one receiver. These points
were explained in chapters 2 and 3 and it essentially means that there is a limitation
precisely because only one receiver was used in the present test setup. Of course the
whole can be extended here, more can be done, more hardware can also be installed,
more drones can run on different channels.
With a honeypot for wireless sensor networks a new method is introduced with the goal
to contribute to the science of cybersecurity. The following limitations of this research
are present.
The use of a formal specification of a honeypot was discussed in the research concept
section and still seen to be a way into the right direction to get a deeper understanding
of the topic.
In the section 5.1.3 it was discussed that the WI feature is only to be implemented if
there is an Intranet and the Data Control requirement of a wireless honeypot needs
to be satisfied only if there is data that can be controlled. In the case of a research
honeypot, that is primarily set up to understand attackers this internal network does
not exist. It can be therefore seen as a positive aspect, that productive data can not get
lost. This is done through security by isolation, other authors also name it segmentation
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or separation.
For a final and stable product a rewrite is suggested and as this thesis is not meant to
contain pure product development, this step is a point to considered as limitation and
for further research.
7.4 Further Research Recommendations
Further research is seen in the model changing as an automatic feature of a honeynet
as it was discussed in chapter 2 as well as also the use of formal specification. As a
next step in future research the focus should surely be a collaboration platform as well
as a resource downsizing experiment.
With respect to the current work undertaken, a set of new ideas arose in the course
of the thesis. There is the possibility to do more research on the use of single board
platforms such as the Raspberry PI 3 or newer for data analysis, something that has
to be done on a device with the database of captured traffic. This research was begun
already before handing in the thesis, and running a Linux operating system (Debian)
with the killerbee sticks was shown to be working on a Pi model 3B in 2018. The limited
resources were not seen as an issue, although no stress test was done to the platform,
the reliability was experienced as high, but not all tested components were working.
With every tested framework, attack and detection tools, some software dependencies
were not met. No fully working setup could be achieved, always a failure was experien-
ced. To be precise, a suggested research would include the new Raspbian based on
version 10 (Buster) with 64-bit support for ARM, the new Python 3.8, the new Killerbee
2.7.1, and then get the attacks and detection working with all the new dependencies.
Furthermore, there were other new attacks presented at the zigdiggity-tool before this
thesis was finished, which should also in future be evaluated and put into the detection
scheme.
Also, the use of GPS coordinates at the honeypot nodes was considered, especially
when the devices could be mobile, then the location could be of interest. Connecting
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a GPS device to an embedded platform is an easy task and was done before already.
The connection is a simple serial protocol, is specified as NMEA 0183 and in summary
states, that the data is transferred at 4800 baud on a serial connection. This means,
that every GPS device that is compatible to the standard sends the coordinates on the
serial line at 4800 baud and when this is read it sends the new coordinates as well.
GPS chips were bought for the project, namely called SIM18. However, in the end they
were not put into the project, because it was not the main research aim.
Also, the use of other frequencies for the reporting channel was thought of and a com-
ponent for the 900MHz band was chosen, the ANY900 from Dresden electronics. Their
form factor is about the size of the Atmel WSN components. For more computatio-
nal resources, newer development boards from Atmel were tested, such as the AT-
mega256RFR2 XSTK or the EK kit for evaluation purpose. However, switching the
platform was not seen as necessary there.
To simulate a production environment in the wireless sensor network, a device was
thought of that could be safeguarded. With respect to the use of such systems this
could either be a smart home or a smart factory. A device running there was thought
of to be simulated by using a 3D printer, because it is a remotely controllable device
including a computational unit, that is remotely configured and surveilled, to produce
something such as is done by every automatisation technique.
Another idea is the use of high-end devices to receive and to send data at frequen-
cies that are different from the band where the attack is happening. Such devices can
be found in software defined radios (SDR). This means, that the whole receiving and
transmitting is configured by software. Where before the transceiver was basically a
set of electrical circuits with well-chosen attributes, the SDR is capable of sending and
receiving at almost all frequencies and it can be configured to use any modulation and
any encoding on top. This means, that with an SDR it is possible to listen to music at
the FM radio, it is possible to watch TV with DVB, but it is also possible to listen to
the traffic in the WSN. The interest is, whether it could be possible to enrich a WSN
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honeypot with an SDR, to make sure really nothing is overseen at the receiving side of
it.
It would be an interesting test to find out if an appropriately high number of detectors
and sensors can be located at the site for an attack on all channels and whether the
corresponding software can also process this information flood. It is also interesting to
see what possibilities there are, especially when using software defined radio (SDR).
This is a way of interpreting, as already written in another paragraph, to receive sig-
nals, but of course also to be able to send them. The number of channels used by the
receiver as it is currently set up is limited, it is not possible to monitor all channels at the
same time, so it would be an interesting challenge to monitor all channels at the same
time. It would also be an interesting challenge to determine with what number of signal
transmitters, i.e. sensors in the Wireless Sensor Network, this can be accomplished.
This concludes the chapter, which was started as announced with the summary of
results, then listed the achievements of research in direct comparison with the goals
created at the beginning of the thesis in chapter one, followed by the topic of the kno-
wledge generated. Finally, the limitations have been mentioned and after conclusions,
has subsequently recommended further research.
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Abstract
ZigBee is a new communication technology and offers opportunities not only for developers, but also emerges as a possible risk 
containing flaws for an attacker to focus on. There is a trend in this field to develop methods for tracking intrusions and unauthorized 
access by an attacker, and for detecting attempted attacks against the stability of wireless sensor networks with intrusion detection 
systems. These systems represent the current state of the art in the field of research on detecting attacks on wireless sensor networks. 
We therefore propose implementing honeypots for ZigBee networks, which would be an alternative approach to intrusion detection 
systems, and which would prove to be ideal for the development of appropriate countermeasures. We feel that not enough research 
has been done so far in the development of ZigBee honeypots to offer opportunities for specific analysis and intercepting attacks.
Keywords
Wireless Sensor Network, ZigBee, Intrusion Detection System, Honeypot
1. Introduction
The next industrial revolution will be the internet of things, machine to machine communication, “smart homes”, “smart 
buildings” or even “smart cities” (Sorensen 2010). The concept is deceptively simple: Everything can be connected to 
anything else. Anything provides services and can be monitored and controlled. This evolution is already laid out and 
well on its way. IPv6 and other technical prerequisites are already available to cope with the challenge of having more 
and more systems to be addressed in a single network. 
Yet,  these networks don't necessarily have to be wire-bound. A lot of networking technologies have their focus on 
wireless communication channels. Many companies have worked together in the development of Bluetooth as a wireless 
standard.  ZigBee  was  likewise  introduced  and  developed  to  be  an  ideal  standard  for  wireless  sensor  and  control 
networks (ZigBee Alliance 2008).   ZigBee is  an additional  feature set  to  the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and defines 
additional layers on top of it (IEEE 2006). 
IEEE 802.15.4 defines physical radio and a MAC layer, providing a simple packet data protocol for lightweight wireless 
networks. ZigBee adds the layers for logical network, security and application software. ZigBee determines the API, 
and the ZigBee Alliance certifies ZigBee-compatible devices guaranteeing their interoperability (Elahi 2010).
New ways of interaction become available through ZigBee, offering great advantages and a lot of potential to save 
energy and make life much more comfortable, but also requires that underlying structures be robust, reliable, safe, and 
secure. The key aspects of network technologies are commonly the same: application developers are expected to protect 
communications  in  order  to  attain  the  classic  information  security  requirements:  confidentiality,  integrity,  and 
availability.
2. Motivation
The analysis of the security and reliability of ZigBee networks has shown that these aspects have not yet been resolved 
satisfactorily, depending on the chosen implementation. But not all of the above requirements are present in the various 
configurations. The background to this is as easy as might be: the intended purposes of wireless sensor networks vary 
widely. One of them is low power consumption, running independently for the longest possible time, another one is for 
these devices to be as interoperable, compatible and easy to use as possible. This is in direct conflict of nearly every 
security feature, because security needs computational power and thus results in a higher energy consumption. These 
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features also limit their ease of use and render interoperability problematic: Encryption details have to be distributed 
and managed, requiring a bigger feature set, more network traffic.
The paper by Fabbricatore et al. (2011) describes these problems in the area of smart homes. The authors see several 
problems  for  existing  home  automation  solutions  involving  ZigBee.  They  propose  using  additional  cryptographic 
extensions on top of ZigBee, or to change the protocol, should ZigBee remain insecure for their purposes. 
3. Attack categories
Common attacks on wireless sensor networks (WSN) as described in current publications and literature are part of a 
range of working and well-known attacks on ZigBee networks: Eavesdropping, replay attack, sinkhole attack, selective 
forwarding, network flooding, firmware modification and code injection (DePetrillo 2009), (Goodspeed 2007), (Gu & 
Noorani 2008), (Masica 2007), (Wright 2009), (Yang et al. 2008). These attacks can be subdivided into three categories: 
3.1. Resource drain attacks
The first category shall be termed “resource drain attacks”. These attacks target the power of network devices as shown 
in figure 1 (replay-attack). In a battery-driven system, the main goal of an attacker is to exploit the system's power 
consumption against the system itself. An attacker might render wireless sensor network unusable by making parts of it 
run out of battery power through the modification of networking schematics, with the propagation of new routes, and by 
incessantly sending and requesting data.  Batteries  are a limited resource, network capacity is  likewise limited.  An 
increasing network load limits cripples the already limited throughput of the network.
Figure 1: Power drain through replay attack
The authors Raj and Thilagavithy (2012) propose a solution to a specific type of network load caused by so called 
jamming attacks  in  wireless  sensor  networks.  Due to  the  amount  of  commonly  available  radio  channels  in  these 
networks, shifting to another network channel is suggested each time a jamming attack is detected. The authors claim 
that a residual network activity should keep the channel busy for a limited time during the short interval in which the 
jamming is not taking place as to make the jamming attacker believe that the jamming attack is successfully disturbing 
the WSN communication. This behaviour could also be described as deception, or, simply put, a honeypot or honeynet. 
This could even also attract an attacker and act as a decoy for the attacker.
3.2. Network attacks
 
Figure 2: Network redirection for man in the middle scenario
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The second category is called “network attacks”,  describing the attacker's goal of modifying the network's routing 
structure. By this, the attacker aims to gain valuable information through redirection. He becomes therefore a “man in 
the middle” listening to any traffic.
3.3. Hardware-specific attacks
The third category is called “hardware-specific attacks”, standing for the goal to bring the networking nodes under 
complete control of the attacker (e.g. firmware modification as shown in fig. 3). This could be achieved with physical 
attacks like attaching wires in order to extract encryption keys from a network node. Attacks on hardware can also be an 
attack on firmware, resulting to firmware-modification. This is possible through security flaws in  software-components 
of the nodes.  
Figure 3: Firmware-modification attack
All of the three attack types mentioned above already exist. There is even a “proof of concept” worm that exploits 
network node communications and propagates itself over the network. 
Goodspeed et al. (2012) have presented new results in the area of WSN hacking. They improved the killerbee API and 
wrote extensions to  execute “wardriving” scenarios on ZigBee networks. They extended existing tools until  all  16 
ZigBEE channels could be monitored in parallel. They then combined this with a GPS signal logger for “wardriving” 
around the campus of Dartmouth. They also wrote semi-automatic tools to attack the networks with various different 
attack types. This development should make abundantly clear, that the security threats for ZigBee are real and serious 
and it is the conclusive proof that solutions to detect the attacks is are of crucial necessity. 
4. Countermeasures by design
Several security features are implemented in ZigBee by design. “ZigBee PRO 2007” defines security mechanisms for 
authentication, encryption and trust centre functions (Elahi 2010).
Research on these features has however revealed some shortcomings. Security features might be circumvented or their 
imperfection could be used against the system. Successful attacks might last as long as the attacker wants. These can 
even not be analysed, because usually, there is no log of network activities and hence, attackers will leave no traces. 
There is no “packet capture” of attacks, and the probed exploit code is not available in the wake of an intrusion attempt. 
An attacker will not get noticed and therefore, will  remain unidentified. It is hardly possible to gather the leftover 
information for forensic analysis.
There are clearly still problems in the process of improving the security features of ZigBee networks. Having blind faith 
and trust in the existing countermeasures is greatly unjustified. Radmand et al. (2010) showed in their comprehensive 
paper, that the cryptography used in ZigBee is not encompassing enough to cover all possible attacks. Some of the 
problems like confidentiality are solved encrypting the data stream. Yet, problems on the network layer such as replay 
attacks still remain. They also state, that the manufacturers should provide a minimum of security, due to problems with 
encryption keys stored in plain-text in the nodes. These could be extracted by an attacker tampering with physically 
captured ZigBee network nodes. There is hence a need for an intrusion detection system, and also for system reporting 
break in attempts.
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5. Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion attempts are reported in classical network security solutions by so-called intrusion detection systems (IDS). 
They use only passive inspection to  monitor all  network activities  for violation of regular use,  and have no other 
function in the net.  Intrusion detection systems rely on predefined policies describing normal network activity and 
normal behaviour. An intrusion detection system is generally a single point in the network, but it might additionally also 
be distributed on several hosts of the network.
 
Figure 4: Intrusion detection system (IDS) working scheme
It might also stop intrusion or filter or modify malicious traffic as an active part of the network and is in this case most 
often called an intrusion prevention system (IPS). In an IPS, the controlling aspect of figure 4 is much more elaborate 
than in an IDS. All of these setups provide logging and reporting. In an IDS, every data packet has to be regarded and 
analysed. Its purpose is to spot the packets of an attack within a large amount of regular and normal network traffic. 
Processing every packet, its inspection, and the detection of attacks by matching patterns all require a lot of resources. 
In the context of ZigBee networks, and therefore battery driven network nodes with very limited resources, this is a 
clear drawback of an intrusion detection system approach in wireless sensor networks.
Kaplantzis et al. (2007) did a network simulation and had success in detecting  selective forwarding attacks in wireless 
sensor networks by support vector machines (SVM), too. They also concluded that these attacks are the most difficult to 
accurately detect thus verifying assumptions made in previous research. 
Sedjelmaci and Feham (2011) presented a novel IDS for the use in clustered WSNs. Using SVM, just like Kaplantzis et 
al. (2007) did, the essential point is to teach the detector nodes about normal network behaviour, such that they achieve 
a detection ratio of over 98% regarding abnormal network traffic.
Iwendi and Allen (2011) wrote a comprehensive paper on attacks on WSNs and demonstrated a way to simulate attacks 
with the intention of developing appropriate countermeasures. They propose in their conclusion the development of a 
security protocol for defensible WSN.
There is a definite need for security in wireless sensor network communications, and possible improvements should 
involve intrusion detection systems. The emerging outline can be briefly described as a sensor working on different 
network layers. It purpose is to detect anomalies in the net and to report these attacks. This is supposed to provide a new 
technical instrument for reacting to this new attack scheme. This feature set forms the common core of an intrusion 
detection and prevention system, also called a honeypot.
6. Honeypots
A honeypot can be described with a single phrase: It is a trap. It is in general an active system in a network monitoring 
every connection to this part of the network. The results are written to log files and reported accordingly. The honeypot 
looks like a normal node of the network to every system passing by. To an attacker, however, it will appear as a valuable 
target. 
The advantages of a honeypot might be summarized as follows: instead of inspecting and analysing every packet of the 
network like  an IDS,  and then deciding whether  this  has been an attack or  not  a  honeypot simply regards  every 













inspected and filtered for attacks. Even in the context of ZigBee networks and therefore battery driven networks, the 
honeypot system could make do with very limited resources. One of the drawbacks of a honeypot system approach in 
wireless sensor networks could be that it exposes additional targets which might get corrupted and then be taken over by 
an intruder. But since any other part of the net could equally get compromised, this is a small drawback. The advantages 
of a honeypot far outweigh its disadvantages.
Figure 5: Honeypot working scheme
Prathapani et al. (2009) propose a honeypot system for the wireless mesh network standard 802.11s, then still in draft 
status. They set up the network simulator ns-2 and showed in their environment a very significant and successful result 
in network throughput with a high detection and low false positive ratio during a blackhole attack. Although these 
results were not proven to be correct in a real network, we assume that a similar result might be achieved in wireless 
sensor networks based on ZigBee standard communication.
Gupta et al. (2012) propose a honeypot technique for wireless mesh networks. A group of several honeypots are called a 
honeynet. The authors differentiate between different types of honeypots such as honeypots for research and honeypots 
for the productive environment. In detail they propose using a concept called honeyPHARM described by Hassan and 
Al Ali (2011). This solution has been specifically invented for the 802.11s draft. The authors Hassan and Al Ali (2011) 
propose a honeyPHARM, a distributed honeynet for the collection of malware in networks. Collected data will be used 
to discover new attack methods. This will be an addition to the nephentesPHARM system.
The authors Muraleedharan and Osadciw (2009) propose a framework using a honeypot technique combined with 
swarm intelligence for a battlefield monitoring application in a wireless sensor network. They state that traditional 
security schemes can not be applied in the field of WSN due to resource constraints. They had planned to build a 
simulation to prove this proposal, and validate the results.
The summary of all of these ideas leads to a proposed solution development of a honeypot for ZigBee networks without 
the drawbacks of a classical IDS. The concept of the honeypot will be presented below.
Several technical details are worthy of discussion. One of the proposed features of a honeypot should be that it might be 
temporarily part of the net at various different times. It should not always neighbor the same node in the network, 
because these nodes in the net might not be the target of the attacker. 
One of  the proposed features  could also  involve cloning.  Those resources  of  special  appeal  to  the  intruder  might 
duplicate  themselves  virtually  during  the  course  of  an  attack,  expanding  the  target  range  and  thus  reducing  the 
likelihood of an attack on the real network.
The system additionally features a feedback channel for reporting attacks. This can be probably done via a covert 
channel or other medium via a gateway. This might be done on other frequencies or channels like e.g. GSM, 5GHz 
WiFi, 868 MHz ZigBee, LAN and others.
A honeypot system should be a hardened system. Singh and Verma (2011) list a number of possibilities for hardening 
the WSN in the paper “Security For Wireless Sensor Network”. They also show the list of unresolved problems, and 
state that these problems are difficult to solve.
A honeypot must not be recognizable as such to an attacker. An attacked honeypot should therefore react in the same 
way  as  any  other  attacked  part  of  the  wireless  sensor  network.  This  leads  to  the  assumption,  that  its  hardware 
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In their paper, Mostara and Navarra (2008) suggest assigning roles in wireless sensor networks with specific features for 
honeypots. They propose progressively changing the roles of the honeypot nodes over the lifetime of the network.  This 
feature should be part of the WSN honeypot as well.
Regular clients are forbidden from using the honeypots for networking purposes, since connections to these honeypots 
would be regarded as an attack. Since the roles of nodes in this network should change over time between honeypot 
nodes and regular nodes, a predefined schedule will be used to guarantee a low false positive intrusion detection rate. 
This method renders the network harder to attack.  
Detecting new attack methods is definitely possible with honeypots. The rest of the network will be left in a functional 
state while the honeypots are under attack. As an additional benefit, new countermeasures can be prepared while the 
attack is still ongoing. All these presented uses of honeypots are suitable to increase the reliability and availability of 
ZigBee networks.
Moreover,  the  recording unknown attacks  will  undoubtedly  lead  to  the  development  of  new countermeasures  and 
hardening. The proposed honeypot concept for ZigBee networks combines new detection mechanisms offering new 
countermeasures for the stability and reliability of the network.
The installation and maintenance of a single honeypot or of a distributed honeypot network clearly requires additional 
effort. Yet, this effort should be made on top of common improvements to the wireless sensor network like configuration 
hardening  and  regular  firmware  updates.  Some  implementations  offering  over-the-air  programming  features  for 
updating nodes already exist.
The detection  of  an  attack by a  honeypot  and the  insight  in  the  behaviour  of  an  intruder  can be used to  devise  
appropriate defence mechanisms or to generate updates for the complete network. Considering the publications over the 
last year discussing new attack schemes, there is an expected growing market for researchers to do research on security 
flaws simply due to the also growing opportunities for intruders to mess with the ZigBee networks (Cache et al. 2010). 
Honeypots will help in detecting and resisting these unavoidably upcoming attacks. It should be understood, though, 
that the security of a ZigBee network is not static, but rather an ongoing process to be kept up during its whole lifetime.
7. Conclusions
ZigBee offers some security features out of the box. Its weaknesses, however, have been explored only in part to the 
present day. It appears that only few people have been doing research in this area at all, and no one has ever applied 
honeypot methods in a ZigBee network. Our intended research will explore previously unconsidered and unregarded 
aspects of security threats against ZigBee networks and develop new defence mechanisms with the use of honeypots.
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In the field of wireless sensor networks there is a course to
develop methods for tracking intrusions and unauthorised
access by an attacker as well as detecting attempted attacks
against the stability of wireless sensor networks, by using
intrusion detection systems. So far, very little research has
been done in the development of honeypots.Such systems
represent the current state of the art in the field of research
on detecting attacks on wireless sensor networks. It is con-
sidered that insufficient research has been conducted in the
development of wireless sensor network honeypots, thus of-
fering not enough opportunities for specific analysis and in-
tercepting attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
New communication technologies offer new opportunities
for developers. Yet, they also pose new risks via poten-
tial attacks by an intruder. The purpose of this paper is to
present a solution to this current state in the security area of
wireless sensor networks (WSN). The planned improvements
resulting from this research will be illustrated. Wireless sen-
sor networks are a new communication technology and offer
opportunities not only for developers, but also emerge as
possible risk containing flaws for an attacker to focus on.
The major findings from research in recent literature on the
subject regard the improvement of the security features of
these networks, based upon formal specification, simulation
and tests. Another trend pursues the development of meth-
ods to detect intrusions or intrusion attempts conducted by
an attacker against the wireless sensor network. The hon-
eypot for WSN is useful for security purposes in any smart
building. This could be a smart home or a smart technology
complex of a company.
2. MOTIVATION
In the end, an intrusion detection system (IDS) always
needs to be trained in any way with examples. In the past
it was like this: producers of commercial IDS systems have
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been asking for, and purchasing insights about, new secu-
rity weaknesses so that their customers were protected as
soon as possible from the threats. Miller [18] is a security
researcher and describes his expertise with the security mar-
ket. He found vulnerabilities and wrote corresponding ex-
ploits and summarises his experiences while selling a 0-day
exploit. While manufacturers with a “responsibly disclosed”
security hole were still in the process to fix vulnerabilities,
IDS / IPS have already been able to defend against a corre-
sponding attack.
So a honeypot enables a learning effect for network security,
and can help to identify new attack patterns and strategies.
It can help to explore and discover attacks which lead to
privilege escalations like most exploits do. This would be
the obvious way to train an IDS. If a new bug is found, if
a vulnerability is found, that an IDS does not know, then
the IDS security is overridden. Whatever the case, the IDS
/ IPS must always be supplied with actual and accurate
information. The attack recognition must come from some-
where. And this is where honeypots offer a playground in
which attackers can, among other things, try out their new
attacks, providing training information for an IDS/IPS.
Another author has also spoken of a different experience:
what’s much present gets much attacked [28]. This means
specifically that the platforms that are found most often are
going to be studied very hard.
It should be noted that there are several new attacks and
ideas by developers regarding security flaws in the WSN
field. The KillerBee API [27] is a simple but powerful tool,
and it is easy to build add-ons on top of it. This API and the
tools for it provide a basis for further development. Results
may be given back to the community.
15dot4 is a tool to listen to ZigBee and 802.15.4 communi-
cation [19], it provides an input device for the well known
network monitoring tool Wireshark [4] to monitor and cap-
ture the network traffic in realtime. Both tools feature usage
with state of the art development kits, for example the AVR
Raven [2] and they might be ported to other platforms as
well.
Free projects like the Freakduino [6] make it easy to build
WSN components based on the cheap Arduino development
kits. These kits have powerful tools available, bringing WSN
technology to everybody interested in working with it and
doing research on the technology.
With hardware-specific attacks the goal is to bring the net-
working nodes under complete control of the attacker (e.g.
firmware modification or code injection). This could be
achieved with physical attacks like attaching wires in order
to extract encryption keys from a network node. Attacks
on hardware can also be an attack on firmware, resulting
in firmware modification. This is possible through security
flaws in software-components of the nodes.
There is even a “proof-of-concept” worm that exploits net-
work node communications and propagates itself over the
network [9], also in smart meters [5].
New results in the area of WSN hacking were recently pre-
sented. Improvements to the KillerBee API with extensions
to enable“war driving”scenarios on wireless sensor networks
were developed [10]. They extended existing tools until all
16 ZigBee channels could be monitored in parallel. The au-
thors then combined this with a GPS signal logger for “war
driving” around the campus of Dartmouth. They also wrote
semi-automatic tools to attack the networks with various
different attack types.
All of the attack types mentioned above already exist. This
development should make abundantly clear, that the secu-
rity threats for WSN are real and serious and this is con-
clusive proof that solutions to detect attacks are of crucial
necessity.
3. RELATED WORK
Our wireless sensor network honeypot project started with
research into the state of the art in wireless sensor networks
and current security threats to them. The focus was on
information security requirements in wireless networks. Es-
sential recent improvements in WSN security were compiled
and tasks remaining identified.
The potential for IDS with special regard to honeypot archi-
tectures was presented in a conference paper in 2011, titled
“Attack Vectors to Wireless ZigBee Network Communica-
tions - Analysis and Countermeasures” [16], describing the
project results by then. With an initially held assumption of
a lack in security features regarding intrusion detection for
WSN and ZigBee, research on featured or proposed intru-
sion detection mechanisms was done. This resulted in an-
other paper, written in 2012, titled “Attacks to ZigBee and
Wireless Sensor Networks - Honeypots for Detection and Re-
sponse” [15]. The latest steps were taken by generating an
overall design for a honeypot in wireless sensor networks, es-
pecially with regard to the development of the honeypot sys-
tem design. Definition of detection mechanisms, algorithms
and a corresponding reporting system is also put into this
paper, containing early stubs of system components. As a re-
sult this paper was completed to combine the recent project
work.
3.1 Improvements
The authors Pazynyuk et al. [20] propose a QoS scheme
to secure wireless sensor networks. Their evaluation exper-
iments revealed significant improvements. Masica [17] gives
recommendations for WSN using ZigBee. These can be seen
as a transfer of best practices from wireless networks to the
area of WSN. In the article by Khan et al. [13], security in
wireless sensor networks is discussed on pages 43-49, regard-
ing attacks and defenses. This paper is very comprehensive
and gives a good summary of the topic. The authors propose
more research on QoS and Cryptography in WSN.
3.2 Jamming
Wang et al. [25] propose a mathematical model to improve
the survivability of wireless mesh networks under intelligent
attacks. They focus on countermeasures in a jammed wire-
less network and did a simulation on their proposal for eval-
uation.
3.3 Hardening
The authors Lin et al. [14] describe in this paper the pos-
sibilities to increase a wireless sensor network’s robustness
to sustained malicious and jamming attacks.
Gill [8] describes the options to increase a WSN’s security,
especially when used in the field of home automation.
3.4 Mobile phone honeypot
The authors of [7] describe the Smartpot, their mobile
smart-phone honeypot. Their research is based on emulat-
ing a mobile phone for an attacker scanning a network, but
offering no real service. The scanning target itself and pre-
tending to be a mobile phone in an IP network is the honey-
pot functionality. In another paper the authors describe a
honeypot in mobile networks which is using OpenBTS[24].
3.5 Deception
The author Gopinath writes in her thesis about deception
success in wireless sensor networks [11]. She clarifies that
traditional honeypots cannot be adopted to wireless sensor
networks. ”But these theories developed do not translate to
sensor networks, due to differences between sensor networks
and conventional systems.”
3.6 IDS and Honeypot
In the book by Chaouchi and Laurent-Maknavicius [3] the
chapter 15 deals with WSN. After the introduction, a case
study is conducted, and the authors build an exemplary dis-
tributed IDS. The authors Prathapani et al. [21] propose a
novel detection strategy to detect black hole attacks in wire-
less mesh networks. Their work regards this single prob-
lem and a honeypot solution for it in IP based networks.
Therefore, their honeypot for wireless mesh networks is a
valuable source of information, but can not be adopted as
is into the domain of wireless sensor networks. The paper
by Shamsh [22] describes honeypots in Mobile Ad-hoc NET-
works (MANET) and an election algorithm for the honeypot
nodes in the network. Siles [23] defines a HoneySpot as a
Honeypot Hotspot for IEEE 802.11 networks. By the term
Honeytoken the authors White et al. [26] generally refer to
specifically prepared data copied in violation of rules, laws
or regulations. This can for example be an additional en-
try in a database or superfluous extra communications. In
this paper he describes a system with a set of Honeytokens
transmitted as an additional communication ”noise”that can
in-house be automatically filtered out, but pose a problem
for an external attacker.
4. SUMMARY OF WSN HONEYPOT TECH-
NICAL DETAILS
The areas of the research work in its scope is the research
in the area of network security of wireless sensor networks
and their fields of application. It has the border to conduct
research into defensive security instead of development of
new attacks. This shall be done without simulation, but in
a prototype. The focus is precise, the research here should be
centred on novel intrusion detection mechanisms, different
from known solutions in the field. Conceptual, there must
also be a solution for lightweight intrusion detection systems
in the area of devices with only little resources. The assump-
tion of this paper is, that this solution can be found in the
area of honeypots. The goal is to show or falsify a novel
intrusion detection system for tracking hackers in wireless
sensor networks. At the end its about data, to show results,
numbers are needed. The details are discussed further on in
this paper.
4.1 IDS and honeypot
The authors Kachirski and Guha [12] present an effective
intrusion detection with multiple sensors in Wireless Ad-Hoc
networks. This work is an early research in this domain and
can in parts be taken into account for the area of WSN. In
contrast to the intrusion detection system attempts shown,
the use of the honeypot approach is much more comprehen-
sive.
5. HONEYPOT PROTOTYPE
In the previous research stage, emphasis was placed on the
need for enhanced security in wireless sensor networks, com-
bined with the demand for some kind of ongoing monitoring,
looking for unusual events in the traffic seen. To determine
the urgency of the approach suggested, a literature research
was conducted. From the results, required measures were
determined [16] and a perspective shown as to the integra-
tion of the proposed honeypot as a security base for wireless
sensor networks [15].
Improving security methods to detect misuse of a network
can be done in two ways, using an intrusion detection sys-
tem, or alternatively a honeypot. This despite the fact that
there are theoretical intrusion detection mechanisms able to
detect a distinct intrusion scheme with the use of pattern
recognition in an invariable network structure.
The requirement for the network nodes in an IDS approach is
high on resources in memory, computational power and en-
ergy consumption, lowering the overall performance of the
WSN. With this in mind, it is important in the design of
a security enhancement to regard the performance and re-
source needs. The detection of misuse is possible solely with
ongoing monitoring of the network. To reach this goal, the
system therefore has to make available a detection mecha-
nism, combined with methods for reporting and notification.
For the full function honeypot a complex implementation
scenario can be foreseen, with a widely distributed hon-
eynet, collecting information from lots of member honey-
pots. An early prototype for this honeynet will be rather
reduced in the number of available interacting networking
nodes in hardware, and tested in a laboratory environment
first.
To be more specific, if misuse of a network is detected by a
honeypot node, then an alarm event will be triggered and
the current notification routines are activated, which may
be local or signaling to a remote user, as well as forwarded
to a central alert system. Indeed, showing an alert is one of
the aspects, which will be a focus in the ongoing research.
In the end, the efficacy of this honeynet will be quantified
in testing and evaluating the prototype implementation.
With respect to the research draft from the beginning of
these studies, the proposal is to implement and test the
honeypot principle in a WSN with a reporting system, as
recommended in that draft paper.
6. SPECIFICATION OF THE DISTRIBUTED
HONEYPOT ARCHITECTURE
The specification of this architecture is discussed in this
paper and will rely on the results named there. The goal
is to specify complete details for implementing the system
in all of its parts, in the network as well as in the users’
node. The next section focuses on concepts and looks at
the details of the technical prerequisites; the full functional
specification will give an explicit overview of the system de-
sign as a whole.
To provide details for the next step, drafts of the graphical
user interface and other connections will be determined and
drawn. This is going to be done for all of the central elements
of the system: the detector, the reporter, the combiner and
the signaller. It is expected, that formal development of
these central elements will depend (or rely) on these details.
7. HONEYPOT PARTS DEVELOPING
Prototype parts are created to prove the honeypot efficacy,
according to the technical and connector specifications. The
whole system is developed for the current state of the art At-
mel microcontroller hardware and a graphical user interface
using either LabVIEW 8 or 2012 for Windows XP/7 or an
Android app for a TazTag TazPad tablet or a TazTag Tph-
ONE smartphone. TazTag products for the mobile market
are the first to have a builtin ZigBee network adapter compo-
nent. AVR Studio 6 is used for the microcontroller program
code development and Eclipse with SDK is used to provide
Java apps/programs for the mobile world.
All of this development will be at the forefront of current
hardware hacks; the development of a honeypot for wire-
less sensor networks is new, as well as the use of TazTag
technology for the user side elements.
7.1 Detector / Sensor
The detection part is developed within an Atmel micro-
controller environment. When the honeypot nodes are up
and running and the individual nodes are reporting to the
central component of the network, then a basic honeypot
functionality is achieved.
This detection will determine any misuse of the detector as
a part of the honeypot. This will be done according to dif-
ferent levels of interaction.
The misuse detected will be differentiated and reacted upon
correspondingly. The simplest case would be for instance
a probing of a honeypot device, which can also be caused
by an automatic service on another device. High interac-
tion with the honeypot device, though, would be medium
on the scale. The highest level of misuse is the deploying of
new firmware or other code, which behaviour should always
be regarded as a direct violation of all security rules. The
honeypot detector as described in the previous sections is
responsible for a permanent and ongoing security detection,
more precisely a misuse detection and categorisation, so that
the security can be kept on a high level.
With an ongoing security enforcement, a foundation is laid
for the benefit of wireless sensor networks. The honeypot
detector has a reporting scheme that could also easily be
adopted for other research groups’ projects, so additions to
this work are kept open for collaboration and an exchange
of research outcome is possible with these research groups.
7.2 Reporter
The Reporter implementation is a set of functions to re-
port the event that was triggered by the misuse of a honey-
pot system, and will be reported to the combiner to forward
it for signalling. Forwarding the information shall take place
in a secure manner, and end to end encryption of the report
is planned to work already in the prototype state of the re-
porter. The reporter can be part of the honeypot host, but
can be also seen as separated due to the fact that the re-
porting network traffic could take place on another medium
like GSM networking.
7.3 Combiner / Collector
The Combiner or Collector is the sink of the honeypot
network, as it were; the place where all the detected anoma-
lies from the honeypot sensors are collected and will be for-
warded for signaling. This being a very important part of
the network, it is clear that it has to be secured in a hard-
ened and very fail-proof manner. The Collector shall also
have more than enough storage to buffer accumulated data
until it can be forwarded to the signaller; when there is no
direct connection currently possible, the collector’s buffer for
security incidents should not overflow.
7.4 Signalling and managing
The signaller is planned to be implemented as a prototype,
and its purpose is to show the honeypot status to an opera-
tor. This implementation is going to be developed with the
Taztag SDK for a tablet PC running Android. An evolu-
tion to completion can be handed over to project groups for
further development. The fundamentals of the signaller are
signalling alerts complete with misuse categorisation and the
overview of the total honeypot network status. Later devel-
opment could implement authenticated update mechanisms
for the devices and further analysis options for the reported
alerts.
8. DESIGN OF THE HONEYPOT PROTO-
TYPE
With the basic design of the sketch of the honeypot the
detailed design was created.
8.1 Client for Reporting
As the previous section described the layers of compo-
nents to be worked on, this part describes the honeypot
client interface. There has to be a destination for the alerts
a honeypot generates, and these alerts should also be re-
acted on and used to develop appropriate countermeasures.
Therefore there will be a host based client component with
a graphical user interface to display those alerts and reports.
This client’s hardware will be a standard laptop, connected
to the honeypots via a gateway.
8.2 Gateway
The client computer has to be connected with the moni-
tored network. In the development phase this should not
be cost-intensive, so it is clear that this will be done via
a direct connection, for instance by serial communication.
All the transfered data could of course also be provided for
example via GSM network, SMS based texting or email com-
munication via the Internet. Due to the increased cost this
will not be done in the research phase. The capabilities of
the MeshBean2 boards make these an ideal network compo-
nent for this task, as well as an ideal gateway due to their
possible USB connection for serial communications.
8.3 Client for Reporting including Gateway -
Tablet PC with WSN
The opportunity to use the TazTag TazPad arose in the
course of the year 2012. The ZigBee Alliance have already
spoken in 2006 in the presentation slides about a mobile
phone with ZigBee. It would be a wonderful thing to be
able to control all ZigBee devices from an everyday object.
In the past, buying a mobile phone or tablet with these
properties was impossible; as a workaround there was the
reason to use other techniques to get data from the ZigBee
network. Now, in 2012, TazTag as manufacturer is offer-
ing a smartphone and a Tablet for developers that includes
ZigBee. Their development platform consists of a smart-
phone or tablet with Android operating system. Android is
a relatively new OS and provides an open source platform.
A Linux kernel is the basis, all functions of the phone are
implemented as applications that run in a closed system, a
so-called sandbox.
8.4 Tablet overview
The TazTag TazPad is a Tablet PC with new features in
the mobile market. It is equipped with a fingerprint reader
for user authentication and is capable of using NFC, ZigBee,
Bluetooth, WiFi and GSM wireless communication. It can
be extended with a LAN adapter for stationary use and has
a HDMI video output. This feature set is a perfect com-
bination for being the mobile graphical user interface client
for the WSN honeypot. The Tablet is running Android and
could therefore be used to program additional applications
as required. The provided SDK for developers gives access
to all necessary interfaces. Some of the interfaces were pro-
vided by the Android OS, others are coming from TazTag.
TazTag does not give full access to the source code, of course;
this is provided as precompiled libraries.
8.5 Usability
The use of mobile devices has a simple background, it is
simple and very practical and convenient to use existing in-
frastructures therefore the use of a mobile phone or Tablet
PC available is very preferable. Whatever is used in the end,
the goal has once again to be kept in mind: the notification
of a user about an incident which affected the security of a
wireless installation. It is therefore only logical and under-
standable to transmit the notification directly to the user
and not elsewhere. Not a flashing light, not an alarm tone
is what the user would like to have or will install but simply
a notification on their everyday device, the smartphone.
8.6 TazPad user experience
The following were the appropriate points of interest when
chosing the users end device. First of all we have had a look
at the general use of the device, if it is usable out of the box.
The properties for visualisation were of interest, because it
has to display information in a correct manner. Also the
haptic properties were important and as a last point, the
audio experience, the possibilities in the area of audio are of
interest for producing an alarm sound. All of these points
were successfully passed, the device is really usable and use-
ful for further development.
Honeypot Coordinator  












Figure 1: Detailed design of honeypot network ar-
chitecture
8.7 Honeypot working scheme
This is a chronological description of honeypot function-
ality:
1. In normal operation the honeypot regularly reports its
status to a central point, the so-called Combiner/Collector.
In this case, it is necessary to use the Coordinator of
ZigBee, once holding the data, until they can be ac-
cepted by a Tablet PC networks as a repeater.
2. An attack recognised by a honeypot node will result
directly in a notification.
3. If the channel is not permanently blocked the notifica-
tion starts directly.
4. In any other case the honeypot node can decide be-
tween currently three ways:
• continue waiting,
• switch to alternate channel, that was previously
defined, or
• select an alternative medium for notification, which
must have been defined previously (example: WiFi
or GSM).
5. When the Coordinator of the honeypot is reached, the
message is evaluated and made available to the user.
For this, several options are to be considered. This can
be done through ZigBee or other media.
8.8 Honeypot nodes
As described previously in this paper, the nodes have to
be configured in a way so that an attacker can not distin-
guish between “normal” nodes and the ones with honeypot
functionality. The AVR Raven boards can be used as Zig-
Bee network nodes and in addition further Raven modules
can be used as honeypot nodes. The diagram of the design
concept is shown in Figure 1.
8.9 Development and testing
The description in this section provides an outlook into a
preferred development and testing scenario. Running tests
with attacks to the network will provide necessary results to
be interpreted and used to improve and refine the prototype.
One of the key aspects next to functionality is the system’s
effectiveness. The testing of functionality under previously
considered attacks and duration is essential. When the as-
sumption is proven that use of the honeypot yields efficiency
of detection of attacks this will be a success of the proposed
solution. The result will be a well-tested honeypot for a
wireless sensor networks prototype. A very challenging as-
pect is the fact that no one before succeeded in presenting
a working honeypot system for ZigBee. Papers and reports
on a vague idea of this system were presented and also cited
in this section, but the challenge here is to provide a work-
ing prototype and to present the tests and their results that
resulted with this new honeypot system.
9. DEVELOPMENT OF HONEYPOT PRO-
TOTYPE
With regard to the limited resources currently available
for the research stage, as well as funds for hardware, for
instance development kits; at first only a small part of the
ideas mentioned is going to be developed. From all of the
proposed methods for the honeypot, focus will be first on the
detection, later on mechanisms of firmware upgradeability.
For signalling and managing, the focus will be on signalling
the status, later on managing the system in depth.
The detection is going to be implemented with reproducible
decisions, meaning that detection of a high-rated alert event
will be categorised on its next occurrence in the same cate-
gory. Network security is more than a setting up once and
then never again touching a running system. The ongoing
misuse detection of a honeypot is giving the operator of the
wireless sensor network a tangible status of past security
events and an outlook on upcoming incidents and events.
The specified design will be used to develop a honeypot pro-
totype in the research. This work will introduce a prototype
of a real system to detect and react on active intrusion at-
tempts to ZigBee networks. The literature research revealed
that previous attempts were at most just regarding single
attack scenarios in simulated environments.
The development of a honeypot prototype will start with
implementation of the mechanisms to the design of the pro-
posed product. As development platform the Atmel AVR
(and former Meshnetics) products called Raven and ZigBit
seemed to be well-equipped with state of the art chipsets
and a well established developer community, also regarding
ZigBee related topics.
In total a set of 3 MeshBean2 boards from Meshnetics as
well as 4 AVR Raven USB sticks and 8 AVR Raven mobile
nodes will be used for this task. The development boards
contain the same chipsets and are already code compatible
by the microcontroller used: an Atmel ATmega 1281 and
Atmel ATmega 1284p, as well as the by chipset used for
wireless communication, an Atmel AT86RF230. The At-
mel AT90USB1287 features additional on-chip USB capable
communication for the Raven USB stick.
The detailed design is the detailed elaboration of the sketch
of the honeypot concept, which is something like the con-
struction plan of the honeypot.
As such, it is a classic situation from transmitter to receiver,
in which the sink is always the coordinator, the gateway to-
wards the host. The question which arises at this point is
the amount of detail necessary. The participating modules
are shown here schematically.
The Raven and Meshbean modules come with details as to
their design, this makes the credible statement that these
are in principle based on the same hardware and software.
9.1 IDE
Also the programs, tools and techniques used should be
listed at this point. For programming the Atmel AVR Stu-
dio 6 with debugging functionality is used. Its use is free
of cost and therefore ideal for development in a low cost
research setup. For debugging purposes an Atmel JTAG
device is essential. The AVR JTAGICE mkII is manufac-
tured by Atmel. It is a very powerful development tool for
programming and can also be used to debug the programs
directly on the microcontroller via JTAG interface. It is very
important to mention this, because development without a
serious and proper debugging hardware is nearly impossible,
using OTAP and just serial programming is really very slow.
The tests on ZigBee networks does not need to be only
on my project’s own development kit hardware. ZigBee net-
work communication nodes for tests could be hardware from
Philips, like 4 different remote controls and 10 end devices
from the product range of Philips LivingWhites (light bulbs
and power sockets) as well as Living Colors (ambient light),
which were available to be investigated in detail. But other
ZigBee products in consumer electronics can be targeted,
too.
9.2 WSN Tablet - Technical description:
TazTag provides access to an Atmel AT86RF231 chipset
[1], a single chip architecture created especially for mobile
applications. Although the chipset functionality is compre-
hensive, the single chip architecture allows for running with
low power consumption. The processor is a an Atmel SAM
9263.
10. SUMMARY
10.1 Evaluation of prototype misuse detection
capability
Subsequent to the development of the detection capability
and the integration of the collector and reporter to the hon-
eypot framework, the whole system will be put into testing
and evaluation mode for a series of use cases and attack pat-
terns. With the ambition to detect a high number of various
cases of misuse, the network will be guarded by the honeypot
and predefined attacks will take place. All of the attacks will
be documented to a log location and interpreted with the de-
tected ones to establish a rate of success to failure. This rate
can then be compared with others from simulated intrusion
detection systems from the literature research. This evalu-
ation comparison will measure the success of our honeypot
system for wireless sensor networks. Together with its nov-
elty value this will show that a combination of existing work
from different research topics can be applied to research in
the field of honeypots on WSN.
10.2 Evaluation of prototype quality of secu-
rity enhancement
The conclusive part of the research takes place when qual-
itative testing is undertaken in the wild, as it were. Existing
contacts to groups of other researchers will be used to in-
vite them to test their tools against the honeypot system.
This will result in insights into the stability and operabil-
ity of the honeypot as an intrusion detection system. The
outcome will be plenty of further logfiles and success rate
values for attack and detection. The feedback from other
researchers testing the system’s performance will give addi-
tional information about the success of the research project.
Although the focus of this research work is the combination
of the two worlds of honeypots and wireless sensor networks,
further research can be conducted in parallel to this. There
is a lot of open questions to solve and others will be asked
to join in for possible contributions to this as well.
11. CONCLUSION
The conclusion is an analysis of the honeypot system re-
sults. The collected results so far will be the basis for anal-
ysis of honeypot strengths regarding the outcome of the
project work. Common attack scenarios like the replay or
garbage attack are tested on the honeypot for analysis. This
is part of integration and verification. For evaluation, this
routine will be increasingly harsher to analyse the honey-
pot’s robustness and interpret the outcome. The honeypot
mechanisms could further be analysed especially with regard
to performance.
This paper gives a descriptive model of a honeypot as a
security improvement. It shows the procedures and tech-
niques used to specify all its details. A honeypot can be
a specific appliance in the field of wireless sensor network
security. It works on large scale wireless sensor networks
that still have free transmitting slots left. Its operation is
automatic and maintenance-free, because it only reports in-
cidents. Of course, battery powered systems have to have
batteries replaced as before. We demonstrated the feasibility
of composing a honeypot with a wireless sensor network and
developed an architecture to improve detection in wireless
sensor networks, without having to do frequent detection
pattern updates. The Honeytoken approach by [27] uses a
comparable approach to misleading attackers and thus se-
curing network traffic, but has no detection and no learning
of attack patterns can be achieved.
12. OUTLOOK
With the honeypot for WSN we introduced a new style
of security architecture to this domain, whose implementa-
tion demonstrated the architecture and the honeypot itself
as part of the results. We are continuing to conduct com-
prehensive experiments to further evaluate the performance
of the honeypot. The evaluation shall be done with regard
to overall ZigBee network performance with and without an
attack, and again with the honeypot system added with re-
gard to the overall system performance with and without
an attack to the network. The results obtained will yield
the basis for the evaluation phase. Further conclusion of the
project work will be reported in an upcoming paper. The
conclusion of the results will be put into direct correlation to
this paper titled “Honeypot framework for wireless network
architectures”. It is going to be the conclusion of the project
work, especially regarding the performance of the honeypot
for wireless sensor networks. One of the topics should be a
statement on the general capability of honeypots in wireless
sensor networks. As one planned output, another paper will
target the interpretation of the findings, titled “Results of
honeypot framework for ZigBee network architectures”.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By now, everyone has certainly already heard at least
something about IPv6, Machine to Machine Communication
(M2M), Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Internet of Things
(IoT) or Industry 4.0, Smart Home, Smart Grid or Smart City.
These are all innovations that have started to enter into our
lives, new opportunities and standards that aim to simplify,
but also constitute a new platform and playground for those
interested in technology. The topics mentioned above are all
about the communication of devices with each other. Man on
the other hand is only in part initiator or beneficiary of this
communication.
For example, you can remotely control new light models the
so-called Ambient Light by Philips and others. There are also
transmitters (e.g. TV remote control from the company named
“remotecontrol”) for many TV sets of other manufacturers.
Samsung uses ZigBee to offer remote controls to control
TV sets by Samsung. For smart home use, heating devices
can also be controlled from the personal computer; heating
intervals are chosen with a configuration program and then
transmitted via WSN onto the radiator controller, which then
heats the rooms according to these choices. This has the
potential for significant savings. In exemplary tests in a three
person household a decrease of 14,000 kWh to 10,500 kWh
of energy (gas) per year can be observed.
The German government has a project in its High-Tech
strategy called “Industry 4.0”. Traditional manufacturing is
proposed to be computerised to establish the “smart factory”.
In this concept the “Internet of Things” (IoT) and the “Cyber
Physical Systems” (CPS) are used as a conceptual background.
Sensor networks are traditionally put into both these cate-
gories, so it can be stated that securing these systems is also
securing the manufacturing standards of the future. Something
is needed for WSNs to help keep companies secure using these
and also detect intrusion attempts. This could otherwise result
in manufacturing information loss and thus certainly a loss of
profit.
We are dealing with the security concepts for WSN, more
precisely with the question of whether the use of honeypot
architectures in WSN is correct in principle and can also
measure and improve security in a WSN.
II. RELATED WORK
The honeypot for wireless sensor networks (WSN) is an
ongoing project. We would like to give a very short summary
of recent work steps, followed by an overview on the current
state of project work.
At the start of our research we found evidence that there is
a lack of security for WSN. We showed the shortcomings and
the demand for new security techniques, formulated the idea
and conceived a plan to fill this gap with honeypots for WSNs
[1]. Subsequently, requirements were written and research to
establish a first model of the honeypot system was done. This
model showed a course of development with regard to different
attack scenarios, which were also found to be critical by other
researchers in the field of WSN security research [2]. After
going more into detail about how this should look like and
showing the components and their interaction, we put the latest
results together into a paper sketching a framework [3].
Regarding WSN honeypots, there are other groups starting
to work on this topic. A research group from the University
of Galway, Ireland, is focussing on security in WSNs [4] and
started their project on honeypots and honeynets in WSNs in
the year 2013. We are collaborating to share our latest research
outcome.
The results of this second research group on honeypots
for WSNs are available for their prototype build [5], and
they share the experience that some of the classical honeypot
features could be adopted to the domain of WSNs [6].
III. MOTIVATION
We would now like to explain our motivation, then present
our solution and thereafter go into the discussion.
The setup you have to visualise as follows:
We have a WSN, which consists of a number of nodes,
communicating among themselves, in normal operational state.
But there is also the honeypot network, which is basically
exactly like the same network mirrored or cloned.
The action of an attacker on the network, and thus at
least on one network node, is captured in the model like any
interaction.
This leads to a discussion on the main purposes of the
honeypot; one purpose is new attack detection. The intention
is to make it possible to capture a new attack. Without a
device that captures attacks, like a honeypot does, a new attack
method could be applied on a victim’s WSN without any
record of the event happening.
The detection of every attack, be its type known or unknown
before, is made possible with the help of a WSN honeypot.
Any attack detection would be good, but there is a constraint
that has to be regarded as to the boundary of limits; a honeypot
can only be useful when there is interaction with it! This will
be important in the discussion section.
New attack signature gathering is another main purpose of
a WSN honeypot. It is intended to capture new attacks and
therefore to gain new insights into attacks. This might lead to
new signatures for an intrusion detection system, or to possibly
achieve a hardening of the WSN nodes via an update of the
firmware.
So the result is that the best thing a honeypot could do is
to detect every attack and understand the hackers methods as
well as to detect new and unknown attack patterns which can
be used to harden the WSN.
“Traditionally a honeypot has been a single system con-
nected to an existing production network in order to lure
attackers.” [7]. In our opinion it is the detection of new attacks,
and therefore gaining knowledge about new attack vectors
which would otherwise never be captured and examined,
which motivates us to create the honeypot for WSNs.
IV. WSN HONEYPOT REVIEW
Our design of the honeypot [3] is the following: Every
element of the network is a part of the honeypot. Because
every node in a WSN can participate in communication,
this results in every single network node being potentially
exposed to an attack. So the honeypot functionality must not
be considered separately in the implementation of the regular
software of a productive WSN, but should constitute part of
the operating system of all nodes of the WSN honeypot. All
network nodes and their honeypot parts work together.
The goal of our current measures is the refining of the
overall design of the honeypot. The above-mentioned honeypot
framework for WSN [3] shows a technical overview, but does
not tell much about the conceptual background that this paper
would like to present. We have a whole list of different attack
types, some of which were adapted from other networks,
from wire-bound traffic attacks or wireless networks, to the
field of WSN; others were invented only in theory and are
not yet proven to be working correctly in a real WSN. The
different attack types can be categorised for different purposes
an attacker might have.
For preparing the appropriate countermeasures to an attack
scenario, several discussion points have to be evaluated. As a
result it becomes clear that for defensive measures a categori-
sation of attack results in the different WSN layers attacked
has to be worked out.
A. Goal or Layer Oriented Approach?
1) One goal is the purpose to know which intention an
attacker might have and therefore which set of different
attacks he will use to get to his goal, to reach it. Different
authors have written about this, among them Benenson
et al. [8]. In a paper from 2010, an overview was already
presented by [9], also doing a categorisation of attacks,
although that was not as broad an overview as other
surveys.
2) Another approach is - next to the goal of an attacker
oriented approach - the layer oriented dividing of attack
types according to the networking layer they target. So
if an attack is done for instance by jamming the com-
munication frequency, this is targeting the networking
layer 1, the physical layer.
V. WSN LAYERS
The WSN layers can be described by dividing them into:
1) PHY, the physical layer,
2) MAC, the media access control layer,
3) RTG, the routing layer,
4) NODE, the hardware layer.
A work describing this approach is that from Aschenbruck
et al. [10] and they also give a number of detection mech-
anisms they use for their intrusion detection system (IDS)
prototype. We would like to present a short summary of
their experiences by showing a list of attacks to the physical
network layer and additionally our comments.
1) It is definitely hard to detect sniffing and jamming
on layer 1, the PHY layer, although there are already
possible solutions that were presented recently. Wang et
al. [11] focus on countermeasures in a jammed wireless
network and did a simulation on their proposed mathe-
matical model to show the improvement of survivability
during intelligent attacks. It is unclear whether this type
of attack can be detected by a honeypot for WSNs.
Due to the fact that jamming does not have to be a
“meaningful” transmission of packets, but possibly just a
simple disturbance on the frequency, this connectionless
and packet-less attack is the perfect example for the need
to have an anomaly based intrusion detection system.
2) On the MAC layer, attack types occurring are similarly
hard to detect. One attack is by an attacker sending valid-
formed packets on the frequency, but without pauses,
which would be expected in a CSMA-CA based net-
work. This could lead to a node wanting to send a packet
and go to sleep subsequently into a situation where it
cannot send packets at all and will have to stay “awake”
to wait for an opportunity to send, but unable to preserve
energy.
3) The third layer, the RTG for routing, is a very interesting
layer for honeypot routines, because it always makes use
of actual network logic. Attack types on this layer can
be seen as having guaranteed interactions with nodes,
meaning requests and responses being well-interpreted,
and not discarded or ignored like it could happen in the
second layer, “MAC”.
4) The fourth layer, NODE, is some kind of a mixed layer,
because here different attack types can be combined
together that somehow are connected to each other and
fit well into the group of direct attacks on a node, but
are of completely different attack types. An attack is for
instance, opening a node’s hardware case and reading
the firmware via JTAG. This is not an attack which
can be detected by a piece of software alone; other
detection methods have to be used in this case [12].
Further work has to be done here to clear up which
attack types have to be taken into account, and others
that can be considered to be not regarded, although a
direct interaction with hardware is performed.
The next step is a discussion about the attacks and their
detection by the use of a WSN honeypot. How does the WSN
honeypot fit in this layer view approach? This layer view
seems to be a successful approach to continue the discussion
about detection mechanisms on the WSN layers, but it needs
to be refined for the WSN honeypot. This means that the
architectural decisions for our honeypot design are put into
question again.
We have to lay down the following rule for further discus-
sion:
“A honeypot in wireless sensor networks waits for unprivileged
interaction”. This will be discussed later on. So interaction is
needed to trigger a honeypot. When the honeypot function-
ality is already triggered, i.e. the node detected an anomaly
occurring, this has to have some meaning. If this is just
some disturbance, like a lot of noise on the frequency due
to jamming, this could not trigger our honeypot but instead an
alarm in an anomaly-based IDS.
One outcome of the discussion, which is very much worth
mentioning here based on the rule laid down beforehand, is
that there is no possibility to implement honeypot functionality
on the PHY layer of a WSN. Not every interaction on the
PHY layer from an attacker is unprivileged interaction, i.e. a
directed attack. Simply jamming the frequency is an undirected
attack without interaction. All the prerequisites and definitions
about the facts of a WSN and a honeypot lead to one single
result: There is no possible honeypot on the PHY layer with
a WSN honeypot.
Thus it can be stated that anomaly based intrusion detec-
tion functionality should probably not be implemented on a
honeypot.
But for the MAC layer there is an idea, which could lead
to a detection possibility. Whenever the honeypot node detects
numerous traffic from a single node due to it sending many
packets in an aggressive manner without waiting the usual
time intervals that are designed to be interaction-friendly, then
a trigger could be activated stating that this is due to an
attacker and its behaviour. This is similar to the denial of sleep
scenario; whenever such a situation is triggered, an attack is
occurring. These attacks need interaction, so the use for a
honeypot is a given.
On the RTG layer, there is a group consisting of three major
attack types; the sinkhole, the wormhole and the sybil attack.
The sinkhole attack is one of the routing attacks. Karlof
and Wagner [13] described this attack type as: “Sinkhole attack
typically work by making a compromised node look especially
attractive for surrounding nodes with respect to the routing
algorithm.” Its use has a specific pattern that can be recognised
and detected by a honeypot node.
The wormhole attack has the objective to propagate a new
route over a dedicated medium to apparently speed up the
networking as the “best route” in a network. For instance, this
could be the proposal to use a direct connection via a WiFi
bridge instead of ten hops in a WSN. After being accepted as
the best route, a man in the middle scenario can be established
by the attacker.
The sybil attack uses the technique of cloning a single node
to pretend to be a number of nodes on the network [14].
This security threat could be detected with a honeypot as
well, because the cloned nodes would then establish network
interaction, which will trigger the honeypot.
This third layer, “RTG”, is the best layer for testing the
honeypot architecture.
Regarding the fourth layer, “NODE”, the physical dislo-
cation of a node is detectable in a static WSN, where the
nodes stay at the locations where they were deployed initially.
Destroying or removing a node completely can trigger an
alarm if each node sends a heartbeat message frequently
enough.
In case of reprogramming the node, it is evident that this
would be detected if conducted via over the air programming
(OTAP). The reprogramming as a result of an attack on
a honeypot would trigger an alarm. Capturing the node’s
hardware and reprogramming it could only be prevented by
using measures like physical unclonable function (PUF) on
the hardware design.
This was the start of the design review, which we would
now like to continue and refine.
Now the question is, how is the cloned mesh implemented
to measure an attackers interaction.
1) First, there would be some hard facts, such as the ID
of the node. If there is a node with a new and hitherto
unknown ID, this is very likely an intruder. Of course,
this requires that there is a list of all the honeypot
network nodes, also called honeynet, with registered
valid IDs. This corresponds to the known whitelisting
method or approach.
2) Another approach is to use “security by obscurity”.
That could mean for example, that for every network
node a fixed but not externally known behaviour is
expected, which differentiates it from an attacker’s node.
For example, a report of an ambient temperature sensor
could every second time contain an even digit in a
predefined place.
VI. DISCUSSION
We would like to rework several major points for discussion.
It seems that the most important work will be to make a
honeypot for WSN particularly desirable for an attacker. This
is a very valuable topic for further research. Here we could
discuss various approaches, as this aspect has so far not been
considered in detail. But some points can now already be
worked out that would have to be considered: increasing
the transmission power of honeypots, or positioning of the
honeypots within easy access range to public places, near the
border to factory premises or similar; these possibilities have
to be regarded in detail.
Another point arising for discussion is about throughput; is
there really enough bandwidth for an additional network of
similar size? For a first answer to this it could be stated that
one could measure the co-existence of honeypots, i.e. to apply
the throughput test in order to show that a honeynet can exist
as an additional network next to a production network.
A couple of further questions concern alternatives to hon-
eypots. Wouldn’t it be possible to use sniffers to record all
of the traffic for analysis? This could create a derivative of
the network infrastructure. Is that not a kind of honeypot?
But the answer is a simple no. A sniffer is not a honeypot
and also not like a honeypot; it records data traffic of one
node and processes and displays it. The honeypot for WSN is
designed as a large-scale deployed system, to be able to detect
an attack to a node of the honeypot anywhere on the (e.g.)
factory premises. A sniffer would need a a large amount of
memory to store the network data, and WSN nodes generally
don’t have this. Also, if the node would be equipped with a
gateway to forward the captured data, it would only be a single
point in the network that records the network traffic. And that
would in a WSN only have sufficient signal strength within
a radius of a few meters. So just one sniffer is not a proper
alternative for a honeypot solution, but has other purposes.
And the discussion point coming up next as a result of
the previous one is: if a single honeypot is insufficient, why
must it be a whole network of it? The network coverage was
discussed before, which is the main reason for this approach
of a WSN honeypot, because attacks on a single node could
remain undetected.
Regarding a question on how important a feasibility study
would be at this point to show or disprove that a honeypot
functionality can be best integrated into an existing network:
So far we have always been answering in the negative, but
never proven that this cannot be integrated into an existing
network. We are currently of the opinion that we separated
the honeypot from other complex designed WSN applications,
with the main reason to make its results measurable.
But would it not be possible to attach a honeypot flanged to
existing systems? In principle, yes, but up to now we decided
for strong opposition to this for design reasons. We assume this
increases the difficulty to discern the results; it might weaken
the results how the honeypot components behave exactly when
they compete with other applications of WSN for the limited
resources of nodes.
Should the honeypot have been shown to recognise any-
thing? We believe it is sufficient for now to create groups
of attack scenarios that have a pattern in common. If we can
argue that these are indeed groups and why, then we can show
examples to use to attack these groups and to test the honeypot
functionality for the whole group of attacks.
Do we need to implement a honeypot for all types of
devices? Yes clearly, for example, an attacker could for his
purposes indeed show interest in not only end devices, but for
example sensors, or actuator nodes which implement control
commands.
Would a throughput test give evidence that a honeypot is
feasible and be capable to show the honeypot completeness?
No, a throughput test is unsuitable for this question, but the
throughput test should be used to show that honeypot and
production network can exist in parallel.
Is the complexity of the systems really that big that you
cannot be prepared for all possible attacks? This question can,
if necessary, answered by transferring from past experience,
only that is for sure.
Two fundamental insights from this discussion are formu-
lated in the sentences:
A honeypot in a WSN is capable to detect direct interaction.
Direct attack attempts should be detected by every wired or
wireless honeypot.
VII. OUTLOOK
One idea at this stage is the throughput test which could be
done during an attack on the production net and also during
an attack on the honeypot network. The expectation would be
that throughput would decrease significantly during an attack
on the production net, but not in the same amount as when the
honeypot network is targeted. We would like to point out one
of the open research topics, as mentioned in the discussion,
the question on how to make interaction with a WSN very
desirable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This work intentionally listed the attack types a WSN could
likely be facing and presented the defensive approaches a
WSN honeypot could present to an attacker. The sophisticated
defensive measure is found in direct interaction with the
WSN honeypot. Several potentials to detect other attacks
on the hardware layer and on lower networking layers are
given. Additionally, classical statistical methods can be used
for detecting non-intelligent network disturbances. A WSN
honeypot offers methods to capture attack attempts. With
the possibility to give an opportunity for the examination of
security incidents, the analysed data can be used to develop
further preventive measures to defend WSN security.
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Abstract: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) as emerging technology are becoming even
more important through the technisation of industry, our mobility driven lives and our “smart
homes”. In a world where a plethora of our devices interact to serve our purposes, it’s clear
that competing groups may want to use these devices for their own objectives. Therefore we
focus on honeypots for WSNs as an opportunity to become acquainted with the techniques
used to misuse or even to take-over WSNs. This knowledge has the potential to improve
the WSN designs and even those already deployed in the field. Honeypots in information
security can be found in computer networks where a client-server model is applied and
client-honeypots are very different from server-honeypots. In WSNs the client-server model
is not applicable. This was the motivation behind determining whether it would be a
honeypot at all if brought into this domain. What if we have to call it something else?
The uncertainty of a missing naming convention leading to ambiguous conversations about
this new topic needs discussion. In this paper we show the classic definition, discuss the
categorisation and give recommendations for further use as well as the wording that will be
used further on in the following research.




Honeypots for WSNs [1] are an emerging and mostly unexplored research field. We give an
overview on the topic of honeypots and compares honeypots with the purpose of starting a discussion
on the differences between WSN honeypots to wireless ones as well as those in wire-bound networks.
Numerous definitions and terminology exist. This discussion is on their use in WSN and offers guidance
or recommendations for further use in the field of honeypots for WSN. This clarifies our description of
a WSN honeypot. The meaning of the term WSN honeypot is established, because, so far, a concise
definition does not exist.
A honeypot is a well and widely known term in information security. Like the authors of [2] have
practised, it stands for a computer system that is closely monitored, reachable as a decoy and has only
one purpose: to entice the bad guy into this pit trap. The result is knowledge. It is important to understand
there was (an entity with) the intention to utilise the system for (its own) other purposes. Additionally,
a closely monitored system will also give valuable data for analysis, for instance the attack vector, the
strategy, or the tools and techniques used. A set of more than one honeypot acting jointly is called
honeynet [3].
Classically, the discussion is about high-interaction honeypots vs. low-interaction honeypots, when
speaking about honeypots in wired network environments [4]. These are then further divided into
client-side and server-side honeypots, depending on the deployment of the honeypot as being a client
system or a server system [5]. This detail is very important since a client is exposed to other threats
than a server system. As an example, on a personal computer client an attack vector is triggered when
a malicious website is visited (e.g. by a drive-by-download). On the other hand, a server system offers
services likely to contain vulnerabilities, that can be exploited to gain control of the system or deploy
other malware for further attacks.
High-interaction server honeypots are set up to focus on attacks carried out manually and new methods
of the attacker. Therefore a highly interactive honeypot is set up in a way that achieving control of it
appears very desirable, i.e. it would offer significant bandwidth for a potential attacker or seem to
contain documents or data of interest. High-interaction honeypots are often set up in the same network
as the “normal” server. The normal server is hardened as good as possible and the honeypot is under
continuous monitoring. There are honeypot software solutions for these monitoring purposes. Highly
interactive honeypots are very resource-intensive in maintenance, repair and operations (MRO) [4].
On the client-side the high-interaction honeypots are partly automated web crawling systems with
real client software. They are configured to visit websites and capture incoming attacks as well as their
payloads in a sand-boxed system. These honeypots preferably run on a virtual machine for convenience.
Further their web browsers are designed to run in sandboxes.
Low-interaction honeypots are defined as systems that emulate one or more systems [4],[5].
When regarding low-interaction server honeypots, these are services that are emulated. A single
interaction with them is enough to capture an intrusion attempt. A low-interaction honeypot could also
seem to be a whole network, emulated by a single honeypot system. The emulated services offer only
a subset of the features that would be available on a real system. Those systems are most often used to
capture packets of automated or new attacks, to get new variations of computer network worms and to get
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the latest version of a malware, this could for instance be a software trojan application. An attacker has
various possibilities to detect being connected to a honeypot, but this fact could be ignored completely,
because the intrusion detection attempt is already valuable information enough at a low-interaction server
honeypot.
A low-interaction client honeypot is for example a web crawling client emulation that visits websites
to capture drive-by-download attempts of infected malicious websites.
2. Discussion
For the start of a naming discussion after a preliminary short summary of the various details of
established honeypot concepts. With the established fact that a honeypot has no other purpose than
to attract and monitor an attackers’ behaviour (compare to honeypot definition by Spitzner [4]) We
compare the WSN honeypots to this, exactly this is what is done with the "Honeypot Framework for
Wireless Sensor Networks" [1]. Due to this fact that every connection to a honeypot is by definition an
attack, because it has no other purpose than to attract and to monitor the attack, an intrusion detection
attempt is already valuable information enough. So if the name “honeypot” is indeed the right term for a
honeypot independent of being in a wired-network, a wireless network or a meshed network like a WSN
is, it can be called a honeypot, but not something else. Despite the fact, that in a WSN the routing is
different compared to IP networking and we don’t use ports and services, so a service like a honeypot
daemon for a single networking service is not used, it will be called honeypot.
2.1. Low- and high-interaction honeypots
With the definition that a honeypot in a WSN is a generally accepted term for a system that attracts an
attacker and otherwise has no real use for the original purpose of the WSN, can a statement be formulated
to say something about the fact of it being a high-interaction honeypot or is it a low-interaction honeypot?
Like it was shown in the introduction, that low-interaction honeypots are simulating services on real
systems, but they are not physically there, they are not real hardware. It is abundantly clear, that the
devices in a WSN do not offer services like a mail- or web-server in an IP based network does. Due to
the fact that a node in a WSN is real hardware and does not emulate anything, a honeypot in WSN must
be a high-interaction honeypot.
2.2. Honeypots form a honeynet
Likewise it was stated in the introduction, that more than one honeypot working together is called
honeynet, this goes further on. Is it a honeypot if it is distributed and should it be named a honeynet
or is a swarm of nodes that ba acting together are the honeypot? In a WSN all the sensors of the
network together have the honeypot capabilities. A WSN covers a geographical region, its nodes can
only transmit and receive signal within a limited radius. Therefore the taken approach due to the physical
region a WSN can only be is that this WSN running honeypot routines and algorithms should together
be called a WSN honeypot. A single node of the WSN is not the honeypot, it is all the nodes working
together. Our recommendation here is to stick to the naming convention that is already established; a set
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of honeypots working together is called a honeynet. More than one WSN honeypot acting together may
then be called a WSN honeynet.
This is also how a honeynet for wire-bound networks is designed. Numerous systems work together
to collect the attacks, honeynets can work together globally. This design can be adapted for a WSN
honeynet, consisting of WSN honeypots.
The WSN honeynet is a solution that can be reached by numerous WSN honeypots, for instance one
in every metropolitan region, sending their distributed alerts to a database for analysis. In this setup the
analysis of attacks is possible and therefore new improvements can be developed for securing the WSNs.
2.3. Client-Server Model
In a discussion whether it is a client or a server honeypot the classical definitions of client and server
help us to come to conclusion. We assume that the WSN honeypot functionality is put (among others)
in an end-device node of the WSN. As a result, this is by definition not a client honeypot. WSNs don’t
have clients comparable to those on a personal computer. Each of the nodes in a WSN has networking
capabilities and offers services e.g. being an actor for controlling the heating control unit of a radiator.
But is it a server? A server offers services and responds to requests.
With regard to the commonly known wording for the client-server model, the WSN do not fit there.
One of the comparable models is the peer to peer networking architecture that has a decentralised
organisation where every node can communicate to every other, directly or indirectly via hops. Looking
at other networking models, a WSN is rather either a peer to peer or a meshed network.
So a WSN honeypot is neither a client nor a server honeypot.
2.4. Physical or virtual honeypot
Is it a physical or a virtualised honeypot? With regard to the scarce resources in a WSN it will most
likely in any set-up be a physical honeypot. This can be stated, because research on virtualised wireless
sensor network nodes is further ongoing.
2.5. Effectiveness on different layers
Likewise a honeypot needs directed interaction so that if an event is triggered, a WSN honeypot has
the same premise. It waits for interaction, so that the event can be analysed.
An estimated effectiveness discussion was previously already discussed and we would like to give a
reference to this [6].
3. Results and Discussion
So as a matter of fact it has to be stated, that it is neither a client nor a server honeypot, but a WSN
honeypot, nonetheless, this results in:
1. A honeypot in a WSN should be named what is is: a WSN honeypot.
2. The WSN honeypot is most likely a high-interaction honeypot, nothing is emulated.
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3. All the nodes are physical, nothing is virtualised.
4. A differentiation between client and server is impossible, a WSN is different in this aspect.
5. A WSN honeypot needs direct interaction to be triggered.
4. Conclusion
Therefore the fact of matter is, as the result of the discussion on the naming conventions for honeypots
in WSNs it has to be stated, that it is neither a client nor a server honeypot, but a WSN honeypot,
nonetheless. Its use is worthy and needed, paying attention to honeypots shall be on every organisations
list.
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